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Abstract 
 
This dissertation offers an anthropological and genealogical account of forests and social 
forestry, in particular the way they came to be constituted over time in one particular social-
ecological context of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Bangladesh. It draws on ethnographic 
fieldwork to examine how discourses of forest and forest relations in CHT since British rule have 
changed and shaped agrarian relations of the hill peoples and their relations to power. As such, 
this dissertation explores forest history in relation to an ‘ethnically’ different and ‘small group’ 
of population living within a nation-state so as to understand how nature/environment is 
constituted as a terrain of governmental power, subject formation, and state building. The 
analysis is informed by Michel Foucault’s ideas of discourse, power and knowledge; Peter 
Vandergeest’s and Nancy Peluso’s theory of territorialization and political forests; K. 
Sivaramakrishnan’s critical work on the production of colonial state, society, and knowledge in a 
forested region of colonial Bengal, and Tania Li’s and Arun Agrawal’s theoretical and 
ethnographic work on governmentality, indigenous communities, and resource struggles. The 
chapters of this dissertation are organized around the political regimes of Britain, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, highlighting continuities and discontinuities in the making and remaking of political 
forests. Throughout the chapters, there run several underlying themes: opposition to jhum 
cultivation; development; environmental change; and social forestry. These overlapping themes 
take distinct forms in relation to the discourse of political forests at each conjuncture of a 
particular historical development. Through this analysis, this dissertation argues that the ethnic 
conflicts in CHT are rooted in the policies and practices of political forests, in particular 
industrialization of forest resources that resulted in the dispossession and marginalization of hill 
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peoples. However, the persistence of the conflict is primarily due to counter-insurgency 
developments, especially ‘social forestry.’ The dissertation illustrates how hill peoples’ political 
opposition to the state and forestry programs through insurgency and alternative development 
have, in fact, helped to create and expand political forests. While many scholars write accurately 
but too generally about the land issue as the crux of the prolem ethnic conflict and insurgecy in 
CHT, this dissertation explains not just that land is problem, but why and how land is problem. 
In sum, this dissertation contributes to the rich scholarship in South Asian historical political 
ecology, with a focus on Bangladesh and the emerging field ‘Zomia Studies.’ The dissertation 
aims to deepen our understanding of the relations between violence, forests and development in 
CHT and addresses the absence of ethnographic research on ethnic conflict in the CHT in 
general, and on issues of its forests and lands in particular in Bangladesh.  
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Photo 1.1: Typical Landscape in Chittagong Hill Tracts. 
CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
The telling of “natural” or environmental history is not immune to ideology, 
idealism, or moral judgement — all of which have political consequences.  
       — Peluso (1996). 
 
1.1  Unexpected and/or Unknown 
Located in the southeast of Bangladesh and bordering Myanmar (formerly Burma) and India (see 
Appendix A: Map 1), the Chittagong Hill Tracts (hereafter CHT) is a forest region considered 
vital to the security and economic interests of Bangladesh (Ibrahim 1991). For centuries, a 
number of “racially” differentiated ethnic groups (so-called “tribes”1) have inhabited CHT.  
                                                          
1
 The governing regimes and Bengalis have considered all the “indigenous” hill peoples of CHT as “tribes.” The 
nomenclature of indigenous peoples’ “tribal” identity is primarily political and bears no significance in the daily 
lives of the communities. In fact, village-based affiliations as well as other conventional and territorial institutions 
concerning civil and criminal laws, forests, and revenue were and still are more important units of social and 
political organization in CHT than the “tribe” per se. Therefore, I use quotation marks when referring to so-called 
“tribes”. It is important to note the fact that the British invented the term tribe for the hill peoples of South Asia in 
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Notably, these indigenous peoples of CHT (hereafter “the hill peoples”2) have experienced wars 
and armed conflict over a very long period. In 1971, the Bangladesh liberation war began in what 
was then East Pakistan against the West Pakistani military regime, and the nation of Bangladesh 
was born. The hill peoples were indifferent or divided over the East-West Pakistan conflict. In 
1972, a regional political movement emerged, led by the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati 
Samiti (Chittagong Hill Tracts People’s Solidarity Association, hereafter the JSS for short), 
whose leaders demanded cultural recognition of the hill peoples and political autonomy for CHT, 
which led to armed resistance against the Bangladesh security forces and lasted for almost 
twenty five years.
3
   
The insurgency
4
 was followed by a military coup in 1975 and the rise of a military 
dictatorship in Bangladesh (see Chapter IV for further discussion).
 
In 1997, after twenty-five 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the 1840s as part of a race and caste classification system (Skaria 1997). The term lacks a clear definition and 
continues to be contested (Beteille 1992; Scott 2009). 
2
 Some indigenous groups of CHT collectively refer to themselves as “Jumma” as a political identity and at times as 
“Pahari,” meaning hill people (Schendel 1995; Chowdhury 2002). Instead of hill people (singular), I use “hill 
peoples” (plural) to refer to the Jumma/ Pahari groups, recognizing ethnic and cultural diversities and differences 
among the hill peoples themselves. In so doing, I neither intend nor wish to imply political differences among the 
hill peoples along ethnic lines. Moreover, the ethnic nomenclature, particularly the term  ‘indigenous peoples’, as 
used in the dissertation reflects the terms used by the local people and is intended to protect the hill peoples’ rights 
over land and other resources in CHT. It was beyond the scope of the dissertation to enter into a debate that troubles 
the category of indigenous identity, especially in South Asia (see Karlsson and Subba 2006; Barnes 1995; Shah 
2007).  
3
 The term Bangladesh Security Forces refers to all the military, paramilitary and voluntary forces in CHT engaging 
in counterinsurgency war and includes the army, Bangladesh Boarder Guards (previously Bangladesh Rifles), Air 
Force, the Police and the Ansar  (Ibrahim 1991).   
4
 I use the term ‘insurgency’ in its conventional and in a more general sense (as a specific form of violence against 
state authority) to refer to hill peoples’ resistance movement for political autonomy, in particular the armed 
resistance, in order to highlight the nature and strategies of the movement. Even though insurgency and counter-
insurgency are statist categories embedded in the logic of sovereignty and control, my usage of counter-insurgency 
is not intended to indorse or promote statist understanding of insurgency, but incorporates a critical understanding of 
it, and my usage of insurgency is closer in meaning to political autonomy. Significantly, I see insurgency as site 
specific phenomena rooted in local history, resources and social relations but also connected to material and 
ecological changes as well as power relations. Recently there has been a great deal of interest in the ways that 
environmental resources shape and are shaped by violence (Peluso and Watts 2001; Peluso and Vandergeest 2011) 
though scholars of political ecology have documented the role of violence in resource struggles for decades (Skaria 
1999; Sivaramakrishnan 1999).  
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years of low intensity war (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998), the government of Bangladesh 
signed the CHT Treaty (hereafter the Peace Treaty) with the insurgency movement leaders 
thereby ending the war in CHT. While the Peace Treaty opened the region for local government 
and civilian rule after decades of isolation and counter-insurgency, major provisions of the Peace 
Treaty remain to be fulfilled, including the withdrawal of military camps, recognition of 
customary land rights of the hill peoples, and the cancellation of land grants and leases given to 
businesses, Bengali settlers and government agencies (Baer 2011; see also Mohsin 2003).  
Thus, many have argued that the ethnic conflict has remained unresolved, leaving behind a 
violent and brutal legacy (CHT Commission 2009).
5
 
My concerns over the impacts of ethnic conflict and war on the hill peoples led me to 
develop a proposal to study two projects: the forest plantation and resettlement scheme of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Project (CHTDP) that was introduced during the height of 
the insurgency (1979-1993), and a subsequent project on social forestry that was launched after 
the Peace Treaty of 1997 and ran until 2006. Both projects were funded by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). My interest in these projects was rather theory driven, stimulated by 
post-structuralist anthropology and political ecology, particularly works drawing on Michel 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality (e.g., Sivaramakrishnan 1999; Vandergeest and Peluso 
2001; Moore 2005; Li 2007; Agrawal 2005). My interest was mainly related to the study of soil 
and land classification of CHT by Forestal (see Chapter IV). I had come across a reference to 
                                                          
5
 In 1998, immediately after the Peace Treaty, the JSS was split into fraction; the anti-Peace Treaty faction created a 
new regional party, the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF). Since then, the JSS and UPDF have engaged in a 
bitter armed conflict that has killed hundreds of hill people. Most recently, the JSS has further split over conflicts 
among the leadership regarding implementation of the Peace Treaty; this has resulted in the creation (in 2008) of 
another regional political party, the JSS (M.N. Larma), in 2008, and has further complicated the internal armed 
conflicts. In an interview with me, the movement’s leader and the president of the JSS (Jyotirindra Bodhipriya 
Larma) blamed the army for the divisions of the JSS and internal armed conflict. He also insisted that that if the 
Peace Treaty is not fully implemented, it is very likely that the JSS will resume the armed resistance.    
4 
 
Forestal’s study at the time of my MA research, but it was not relevant to me then (see 
Chowdhury 2002). However, as I grappled with the framework of governmentality and territory, 
I came to acknowledge a way of reading Forestal’s study of CHT as an environmental discourse 
that would make an interesting comparison with social forestry discourse. I was very excited 
about my research proposal, as I thought I was going to do a “big thing” showing how discourses 
of sciences (biology, forestry, geology, soil science, etc.) shaped environmental rationalities and 
subjectivities in CHT and became a hegemonic discourse of development. My choice of field site 
in CHT was informed by my interest in making this theoretical contribution. As such, I proposed 
to explore the practices, rationalities and effects of environment and development programs 
when implemented in a particular time and place, including their entanglement with landscapes, 
livelihoods, and ethnic identities. However, I encountered numerous obstacles to my fieldwork 
that I describe below, and had to modify my research plans in CHT.  
Based on the modified research plan, this dissertation offers an anthropological and 
genealogical account of the making of forests and participatory forestry of CHT, in particular the 
way forests came to exist during British rule in South Asia, and the ways the forests in CHT have 
hitherto changed through colonialism, industrialism, counterinsurgency, development and war. 
The analytical focus is on the discourses and practices of making and remaking of what I, 
borrowing from Vandergeest and Peluso (2001) identify as “political forests” in CHT, and 
resistance to these discourses and practices forest making. I use the terms “making” or 
“remaking of forest” to refer to the processes in which place or space, and resources (including 
but not limited to land, water, trees, bamboo or bush), come to be identified as forests and thus 
become a forest. I provide detailed accounts of how forests became a trope of imagination about 
the hill peoples’ economy, identities and society, and also provided the technologies of the 
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state’s power and domination over the hill peoples. I demonstrate that CHT was not a “territorial 
space” when the British (East India Company) seized it in 1757, but rather a frontier occupied by 
different groups of people who were consistently mobile because of conflict and war among the 
traditional states of Hill Tripura, Arakan and Bengal (compare Scott 2009).
6
 CHT remained a 
frontier in British India until 1860, constructed as such by the absence of plain land agriculture 
and the perpetuity of violence; it was neither ruled nor governed by the British, nor did it have a 
local indigenous sovereign. Political power was instead shared among many local indigenous 
elites and contested both by the state and the peoples governed (see Chapter II).  
Put differently, I would argue that forests in CHT did not exist before their construction 
in the late 1860s. In 1860, the region was annexed to the British Empire in India under an 
exceptional administration. By the end of that decade, almost the entire CHT had been made into 
forests and state property as part of a strategy of state-making in CHT following the Forest Act 
of 1865. Subsequently, by the end of the century, a large area of CHT, approximately one fourth 
of the region, had been made into Government Reserved Forests. The remaining area was 
designated as Unclassed State Forests (USF), in which the civil society of the hill peoples was 
built, recognizing hill peoples’ customary rights to settlement and agricultural practices including 
jhum
7
 cultivation, i.e., slash-and-burn agriculture. Beyond law, what made the forests in CHT 
intelligible were discourses of frontiers and sovereignty that enabled the government to control 
the hill peoples, in particular their usage of land and forest for agriculture and domestic needs. 
Since then, forests and forest relations formed by local ecology and by different regimes of 
political power and ideology have remained fundamental to governmentality in CHT; forest 
                                                          
6
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relations in CHT have been altered by colonial paternalistic policies of political isolation, and by 
post-colonial industrial development and counter-insurgency war. In turn, all of this has shaped 
the hill peoples’ agrarian and ethnic relations, and their relations with the State and other 
political powers. In particular, industrial development in CHT in the early 1960s significantly 
changed forest relations. I would argue that industrial development represented the ecological 
watershed moment for CHT; it not only reinforced the processes of marginalization, 
dispossession and land alienation of the hill peoples, but also led to the insurgency, and thus 
counterinsurgency, resettlement and “development”.8  
In grounding my argument, I will explore the genealogy of development in CHT, 
especially the practice of horticulture-based resettlement of the hill peoples; I will also examine 
the effects of resettlement and development programs on hill peoples’ lives and livelihoods. I 
will demonstrate that “development” programs in CHT are not only coercive but also 
ethnocentric, lacking concern for the food security and cultural knowledge of the hill peoples. 
The effects of development have led to further dispossession, marginalization and land alienation 
of the hill peoples. 
 By examining forests and forest relations, I also tackle environmental and agrarian 
changes in the region since British rule. I challenge the dominant narratives of environmental 
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 In its modern use (i.e. since the 19
th
 century), the term ‘development’ relates to economic changes in societies; 
however, after Word War II, development became synonymous with planned social changes and modernization of 
the economy in so-called “Third World” countries and was related to industrial and infra-structural development 
associated with “nations” and “nation-building” (see Myrdal 1968; but compare Escobar 1995; Esteva 1992). Since 
the 1960s, development became a highly contested and debated term. It has several renditions: one that considers it 
primarily as a statist project of improvement, and another that encompasses a more nuanced and complex 
relationality between the state and civil society. Inspired by the post-structuralist turn in social sciences and 
humanities, contemporary scholarship (particularly anthropology) takes development as assemblages of discourses 
and institutions (Escobar 1995), will to improvement and governmentalities (Li 2007), anti-politics cultural projects 
of rule (Ferguson 1994), or forms of state-making and production of the legitimacy of rule (Sivaramakrishnan 2000). 
Building on contemporary anthropological discourse on development, I use the term ‘development’ as an 
assemblage of discourses and institutions and a form of government to refer to both colonial and post-colonial plans, 
programs and projects of sedentrarization, agrarian changes and resettlement of the hill peoples that are directed to 
the improvement of life and things.          
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change that frame hill peoples’ agricultural practice (namely, jhum cultivation) as the primary 
cause of “deforestation” and “soil erosion”. I argue that environmental and agrarian changes in 
CHT are neither unidirectional nor even; they are directly related to state polices of resource 
extraction as well as discourses of industrialization and counterinsurgency development. I will 
show that the changes in the northern part of CHT (inhabited by the Chakma, the largest group of 
the hill peoples) are more consequential than changes in the southern part of CHT, and in turn I 
will explain the ethnic and spatial dynamics of these environmental changes and insurgency and 
counter-insurgency development.  
At the same time, I deal with practices of scientific forestry and its strategies of 
territorialized resource control in CHT. I will illustrate variations in the application of territorial 
strategies in the management of the Reserved Forests and I suggest that these variations are 
mainly caused by the relative inaccessibility of the Reserves, but also influenced by local 
ecological conditions. Importantly, scientific forestry and its strategies have been fractured by 
landscape, ecology, and at times insurgency, resulting in neither full control over the Reserved 
Forests nor control over the representation of the Reserves.   
Finally, I also examine the ‘forest plantation program’ and the ‘forest villager system’ 
that emerged as part of colonial scientific forestry.  I demonstrate that the arrangement of the 
‘forest villager system’ and related taungya9 cultivation (i.e., the plantation of forest along with 
shifting – slash and burn – cultivation) represent the earliest form of the participatory forestry 
regime, which, until recently, has been practiced in CHT. In turn, I challenge the newness of 
participatory social or community forestry that is currently being mobilized by the Forest 
Department and indigenous movements. I will demonstrate that the social forestry program in 
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CHT hinges upon conflicts over control of the Reserved Forests between the Forest Department 
and the army, and is marked by state intervention and domination of the Forest Department. The 
social forestry program has further helped to mobilize an indigenous movement in CHT which is 
now articulated with a form of community forestry called “village common forests” (VCF), in an 
effort to gain recognition of hill peoples’ indigenous identities and customary rights over forest 
resources (see Chapters V and VI).  
This dissertation draws on my multi-sited fieldwork research in Chittagong Hill Tracts 
and approaches that include my lived experiences with the hill peoples in their communities, 
participant observation, interviews, and archival document research. Although my experiences 
with the hill peoples were limited and fragmented by circumstances in CHT, and my archival 
research could be more comprehensive,
10
 my purpose here is to contribute to forest history, its 
trajectories and limits in relation to “ethnically” different and ‘small group’ populations living 
within nation-states so as to understand how nature/environment is constituted as a terrain of 
governmental power, subject formation, and state-making. While this dissertation engages with 
broader theoretical issues related to political ecology, indigeneity, and development, it does not 
engage in substantial theoretical critique or theory-building. Nor does it engage in comparisons, 
such as comparing hill and plains peoples, or Bangladesh and South Asia. Even though I 
recognized the connections and commonalities between South Asia and Southeast Asia, I was 
unfortunately not able to trace these links . This is a choice that I made: my dissertation is rather 
descriptive by intention.
11
 I chose a descriptive ethnographic focus for my dissertation because I 
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The main reason that I made this decision is because I realised that I was in a unique position to fill a major gap in 
the historical and ethnographic understanding of CHT. Prior to my work, the most contemporary ethnography of 
CHT was by Wolfgang Mey, published in 1980, based on fieldwork conducted in 1968-1969. Mey is the first and 
last European ethnographer who wrote a comprehensive account of CHT. Since then, some ethnographies have been 
written by Bengalis but these have been traditional community studies that do not consider the larger political 
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saw the need for a better, more accurate and consistent foundation for CHT studies. CHT has 
figured prominently as a case study in many critiques of development and social justice, but 
scholars since the 1970s have been relying mostly on secondary sources and activist reports. 
Despite the prominence of CHT in Western academia, there has been no single review of the 
literature on CHT, with no consistent dialogue, checks and balances among scholars. For 
example, John Bodley uses CHT as a case study in his book Victims of Progress, a very 
significant work on the impact of modernity and development on indigenous peoples (Bodley 
1975, 1999). However, Bodley's account is too vague or unclear; he mentions a resource crisis 
among hill peoples that he suggests was caused by a combination of commercialization, 
population growth among Bengalis, and industrial development. Bodley's account is typical of 
many scholars who write critically about the effects of modernization and development on 
indigenous peoples in CHT (e.g. Mey, A. 1981; Mey, W. 1981; 2006; Penz 1992). I agree with 
the intention of these scholars, but my dissertation offers a more comprehensive explanation and 
a fuller picture that is “closer to the people”.  
As such, this dissertation is a contribution to the understanding and knowledge of the 
CHT region and of the hill peoples and Bangladesh more broadly; second, to the discipline of 
anthropology; and third, to area studies, in particular to South Asian historical political ecology 
and Zomia Studies.  My hope is that this dissertation will help deepen our understanding of the 
relation between violence, forests and development in CHT, as there is a clear absence of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
economy nor the region as a whole. This gap in knowledge is significant, and I decided that it was a higher priority 
to fill this gap with careful ethnographic detail than to write a contribution to theoretical debates in areas such as 
subaltern studies, colonial governmentality, or debates on South Asian colonialism and conservation. 
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ethnographic research on ethnic conflict in CHT in general, and even less on issues of its forests 
and lands.
12
 
Regarding the CHT region and hill peoples, this dissertation provides much needed 
clarity to the cultural geography of CHT, particularly the ethnic groups as well as civil, land and 
forest administration. For instance, to date there has been a great deal of confusion and 
uncertainty among scholars on the number of ethnic groups in CHT. This dissertation, 
particularly my map of ethnic groups and appendix of how hill peoples’ groups call each other, 
clarifies the number of groups and their general locations; it also offers an ethnography of 
changes in the economy, communities, and livelihood strategies of the hill peoples, including 
evidence of social mobility among specific ethnic groups. Furthermore, no academic scholars of 
CHT to date have described exactly how the region is administered. Of those who have 
published on CHT, only the present Chakma Chief addresses the issue of administration, but 
even the Chief's account is short on details of local administration (e.g. Roy, D. 2002a). This 
dissertation provides ethnographic details of local administration, including the roles of Mouza 
headmen and Karbari, with particular attention to little known forest villages. Significantly, 
many scholars note that CHT is presently a “military zone” but they do not go beyond this level 
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After Claude Levi Strauss’ visit to CHT in 1950, there was a great enthusiasm for the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
(CHT) among French and German scholars and students of anthropology resulting in some original ethnographic 
monographs, mainly in German and French (e.g., Bernot, L. 1967; Mey, W. 1980;  Mey, A. 1979; and Spielmann, 
1968); only a few of these accounts are available in English as seminar papers, commentaries, books and journal 
articles (see Barua 1969; Branus and Loffler 1989; Kantikar 1968; Mey, W. 1981; Mey, A. 1981). Unfortunately, 
this enthusiasm was cut short by the closure of CHT to foreigners in the early 1960s on the pretext of the security of 
the state. Since then and up to the 1990s, CHT remained off limits to the outside world because of the Bangladesh 
liberation war and subsequent counter-insurgency war that began in the mid 1970s. Meanwhile, CHT emerged as a 
classic case of development displacement (Bodley 1975). In the early 1980s, the region and its indigenous 
communities also sprung to the attention of international news and human rights organizations as well as 
Bangladeshi and international scholars across many disciplines because of human rights violations, displacements 
and counter-insurgency led development (Schendel et al. 2001). Recently, CHT has become the object of studies and 
inquiries by a number of Bangladeshi academics and students including myself (e.g., Chowdhury 2002; Dewan 
1990; Mohsin 1997; Nasir Uddin 2008; Rasul 2003; and Shafie 2001); however, none of these studies consider 
forest issues and politics.  
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of generality. This dissertation goes into specifics of how military control has actually been 
practiced and extended, to the point that – as I argue – the military is the de facto administration 
of CHT. Finally, this dissertation has clarified the ecological and ethnic basis of the insurgency 
movement, its programs, projects and its spatial scope in the region and provides a foundation 
for future research.     
With respect to anthropology, this dissertation demonstrates my commitment to 
anthropology's fieldwork method. As I will describe shortly, my fieldwork experience had a huge 
effect on my understanding of the hill peoples and the issues of CHT. The story of hill peoples’ 
internal displacement and their experiences with state-led development that I encountered in 
Alikadam Upazila, particularly in Matamuhuri Reserve, was not what I had planned to study, but 
when I returned to Canada and began writing the dissertation, I made these experiences central to 
my arguments. In other words, this dissertation demonstrates both the centrality of fieldwork 
research in shaping my arguments as well as my commitment to social justice. This connection 
between fieldwork and social justice is a strong characteristic of anthropology; my dissertation is 
an affirmation of these anthropological priorities. 
With respect to area studies, particularly South Asian historical political ecology, this 
dissertation provides a case of regional forest history from Bangladesh. Interestingly, South 
Asian historical political ecology, a subfield of investigation into nature, culture, history and 
politics, has been largely dominated by scholarship on regional histories of forests in India, with 
a few accounts of Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka (e.g. Grove et al.1998; Arnold and Guha 1995). 
Regrettably, Bangladesh is not merely underrepresented in South Asian historical political 
ecology, it is almost absent, except for occasional reference to colonial Bengal of which 
Bangladesh was once a part. My aim is to contribute partly to this missing story, complementing 
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K. Sivaramakrishan’s pioneering work Modern Forest (1999). Modern Forest examines the 
making of state and forest in Bengal during British rule, dealing mainly with the Bengal districts 
of Burdawan and Midnapore which now form parts of West Bengal and Jharkhand of India. 
Understandably, the parts of colonial Bengal which now form Bangladesh are not considered 
comprehensively, though there are references to Chittagong, Chittagong Hill Tracts, and 
Sundarbans.  
The contribution of this dissertation to Zomia Studies is largely a comprehensive account 
of CHT, illustrating historical and contemporary changes in state and hill peoples’ economy, 
ecology and society; it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to make comparison between CHT 
and other upland regions of Southeast Asia or South Asia. It is important here to mention that 
Zomia Studies is a recent initiative of Willem Van Schendel and James Scott, and represents an 
emerging ecological area study of upland and so called “Hill Peoples” of Southeast Asia and 
South Asia that includes the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Schendel 2002; Scott 2009). Indeed, 
Schendel’s work on Bangladesh in general and the region of CHT in particular has been key to 
the conceptualization of Zomia Studies and the problem of existing approaches to area studies 
that focus too much on political or state boundaries (see IISH n.d.). Some scholars arguments go 
so far as to claim that CHT should be regarded as more of a part of Southeast Asia rather than 
South Asia (e.g. Mey, W. 1980; Schendel 1995, 2009; Schendel et al. 2000). These arguments 
tend to be based on ethnic or racial discourses rather than on real political economy. I remain 
somewhat skeptical of these political arguments, because of my past research on the JSS 
insurgency movement. I do not wish to engage in the political argument about whether CHT 
“belongs” in South Asia or in Southeast Asia. Instead, my research has led me to understand and 
support  Schendel’s and Scott's effort, through Zomia Studies, to define a common region that 
13 
 
spans parts of both South Asia and Southeast Asia and is marked by common ecological factors 
as well as people's marginal relations to their respective states. In my case, I certainly found that 
my understanding of CHT was greatly helped by my reading of the relevant literature on ecology 
and marginalization in Southeast Asia. The fact that Southeast Asian perspectives were 
important to my dissertation as the South Asian ones, supports the contention of Zomia Studies 
that there are important commonalities across the two regions. However, this is an intellectual 
observation, not a political one; it does not necessarily lead to any particular conclusion about 
whether or not CHT should be part of Bangladesh. The actual identity of CHT is a matter for the 
people to decide, and I do not take one side or the other in this political debate.  
 As mentioned before, several unexpected events hindered my research plans in CHT, and 
it is important to mention some of these challenges in order to clarify the revision of my research 
project and the difficulties of fieldwork in CHT. In October 2006 when I arrived in Bangladesh, 
violent political unrest had led to a military-backed civilian interim government and an indefinite 
emergency rule throughout the country. The emergency rule soon became normalized, and 
despite the possibility of successful negotiation with the government authorities to carry out 
fieldwork, a further uncertainty emerged. My repeated inquiries about the implementation of the 
projects and sites did not produce viable responses. On the one hand, the hill peoples’ traditional 
elites and political leaders who were opposed to the social forestry project insisted that the 
government had cancelled the project and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the main 
funding agency, had withdrawn its funding.
 13
 On the other hand, forestry officials at the Head 
Office of the Forest Department in Dhaka acknowledged the hill peoples’ opposition to the social 
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forestry project but rejected the claims that the project had been cancelled by the government and 
insisted that the project was underway.  Interestingly, the forestry officials refused to provide 
specific locations where the social forestry project had been implemented or any contacts for 
further inquiry. Both the forest officials and hill peoples’ leaders showed little interest in my 
inquiry about sites of the afforestation and resettlement scheme of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Development Project of 1979. They were unequivocal in their opinion that the scheme had been 
implemented primarily by the army and there was little probability that resettled village(s) would 
still exist because of the continued violence and displacement of the hill peoples during the 
counter-insurgency war.  
Following these developments, between March and April, 2007 I contacted friends and 
colleagues in the Department of Forestry at Shah Jalal University and at the Head Office of the 
Forest Department in Dhaka for assistance. I then established myself in a network of forest 
officers in CHT and at the Head Office of the Forest Department in Dhaka, where I determined 
that the social forestry project had two schemes – one in Lama Forest Division and another in 
Bandarban Forest Division. Over the course of the project, the scheme under Lama Forest 
Division had been forced to change its project site to the Matamuhuri Reserved Forest and had 
been completed, while the other scheme under Bandarban Forest division had been abandoned.  
In November 2007, three months after arriving at the Matamuhuri Forest Range office in 
Alikadam Upazila (sub district) of CHT, I settled in ‘Rizaroa,’14 a forest village in the 
Matamuhuri Reserved Forests, next to ‘Nyapara’, a Bengali village with 10,000 people, on the 
outskirts of the northern boundary of the Reserve. There I found the Reserve to be an “open 
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forest”, with a large number of inhabitants (approximately 15,000) in over a hundred villages up 
to where the headwater of the Matamuhuri River separates the Reserve from Myanmar. Among 
the inhabitants of the Reserve, the Murucha (Mro) people are believed to make up eighty 
percent; others include the Marma, the Tripura, the Tanchangya, the Chakma, and the Bengali. 
Interestingly, the Forest Department recognizes only the old forest villagers and their inheritors 
belonging to the Marma, the Murucha, and the Tripura who live in Babupara, Meringchar and 
three other forest villages in between. The Forest Department has only nominal control over the 
movement of forest produce and forest villagers; it is largely the army that controls the entire 
Reserve and all the villages with four permanent army camps inside the Reserve. Significantly, 
beyond a few patches of newly planted forest, there were hardly any trees in most of the Reserve. 
As I spent more time in the village, I discovered that stories of illegal logging of the Reserve 
were the talk of the village and local villagers spoke incessantly about it. 
Once I was settled in the Reserve, I met a group of Bengali seasonal sharecroppers and 
found tracts of plough land mainly around Rizaroa. A very few forest villagers of the Reserve, 
mostly Marma, controlled possession of these valley plough lands and have over the years 
become relatively wealthy by producing tobacco and vegetable cash crops, grown with 
assistance of Bengali sharecroppers and, at times, wage labourers. However, the majority of 
Marma forest villagers are marginal jhum cultivators and seasonal daily wage labours since they 
lack access to lands inside and beyond the Reserve. The Murucha forest villagers, by contrast, 
have mainly remained jhum cultivators. Many in the vicinity of the new social forestry plantation 
have abandoned their villages to move deeper inside the Reserve in search of a livelihood by 
jhum cultivation; their movement has been influenced by a further complex set of reasons, which 
I will discuss in Chapter V. 
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Despite troubles with local indigenous research assistants and language barriers (see the 
fieldwork section below), my fieldwork with forest villagers’ communities went well, and for the 
first time, I experienced first-hand the hill peoples’ communities, their participation in the forest 
development project, and issues surrounding their livelihood. As my fieldwork proceeded, I 
came to know one of the sites for the forest resettlement program that took place during the 
insurgency and war within Alikadam Upazila, which importantly led me to the villagers of 
‘Golden River’, a forest village under the Tain Range of Lama Forest Division. My fieldwork 
with the Golden River village community was an eye-opening experience that led me to unearth 
the history of forest operations and programs in CHT during the counter-insurgency war, 
including the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Project of 1979. An initial lead into my 
research on forest programs during the counter-insurgency war was the 2007 Annual Report of 
Lama Forest Division and an up-to-date brochure of the Division. I received both documents 
from the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) of Lama Forest Division as a kind gesture of his office 
immediately before he retired from his job with the Forest Department in March 2008. In part, 
the courtesy was an attempt by the DFO to make amends for his initial non-cooperation with my 
fieldwork research (which I discuss in the fieldwork section of this chapter below). Examining 
the documents led me to discover that there are nine forest divisions in the three administrative 
districts of CHT, six of which  – including the Lama Forest Division – were created during the 
counter-insurgency war as part of the forest plantation and resettlement program (see Appendix 
A: Map 5).
15
 By the end of fieldwork in July 2008, I had also visited seven of the eight other 
forest divisions in CHT and collected current brochures of these forest divisions, and very 
recently the remaining one. In reading the brochures, I gathered that the Forest Department had 
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implemented several forest plantation and resettlement projects concurrently during the counter-
insurgency war as either a sequel to the afforestation and resettlement scheme of 1979 or 
independent of it. Altogether, these projects and schemes alienated about 217,995 acres of 
common land in the Unclassed State Forests (USF); these common lands are also referred to as 
Mouzas (i.e., a collection of villages as a revenue unit). The brochures confirmed what I had 
learned about Lama Forest Division: that is, the hill peoples had abandoned many wartime 
resettlement villages. I thus surmised that a discourse of forest resettlement projects was a key 
technology that got articulated with the counter-insurgency war and ‘development’ and, in turn, 
produced unsettlement and land alienation of the hill peoples.  
In considering the ways in which the hill peoples of CHT have been systematically 
marginalized and alienated from their land over time, I wish to argue in this dissertation that their 
marginalization and exploitation can be linked to the forest policies and practices that were 
adopted first by British rule in colonial India, and then successively by Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
Importantly, despite differences in terms of ideology, ethnicity, class and technologies of rule, 
there appear to be some obvious similarities between the colonial British and present Bangladesh 
experiences in CHT. Both regimes’ initial challenges in CHT began with concerns for the 
security of the territory as well as the control over the resources in CHT with little concern for 
the economy and welfare of the hill peoples; they both responded with military and 
administrative reorganizations that incorporated elites; and I will argue in Chapters II and IV that 
both governments pursued policies of making and expanding their territorial control over forests. 
I must concede that in arriving at this dissertation’s arguments, I was deeply saddened by the 
similarity between colonial British and Bangladeshi regimes in relation to the hill peoples (but 
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compare, Penz 1993), perhaps because I was not ready to accept the ‘colonial’ nature of 
Bangladesh, the country I was born into and love. 
 
1.2  CHT: Cultural Geographies, Economy and Polity    
In this section, I present a general overview of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) with its specific 
cultural geographies (including land and forest),
16
 economy, and political and civil 
administration as it exists today. This overview is important not only because CHT is ethnically 
diverse and because there have been ethnic conflicts in the region, but also because the civil, 
forest and land administration of CHT are highly complex and often confusing. As such, this 
section provides an historical account of changes in land and forest management, polity, and civil 
administration in CHT.  
CHT contains an area of 5093 square miles (13,295 square kilometers) or about 10 
percent of the land of Bangladesh. At present, almost one third is “Reserved Forests”, and the 
remainder is “open forest”, known as Unclassed State Forest (hereafter USF).17 In contrast to the 
low lying alluvial plains in the remainder of Bangladesh, the land in CHT primarily comprises 
chains of hill ranges interspersed by valleys and river drainage systems, which are locally known 
as the Feni, Karnaphuli, Sangu and Matamuhuri.
18
 Because of the topography of the region (see 
Photo 1.1), there is a lack of suitable land for intensive agriculture: only 4 percent of the USF 
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This estimation is based on fieldwork data I collected during 2007-8. At present, the land area of the Reserved 
Forests is 1,598 square miles which includes 1,253 square miles of old Reserved Forests created during British rule 
and 345 square miles created recently. 
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 As an offshoot of Himalayan hill ranges, CHT hills range northeast to southwest and are an average height of 
2000 feet (600 metres), with the highest peak approximately 4034 feet (1300 metres) in the southern region. Among 
the rivers, the Feni and the Karnaphuli run transversely across the hill ranges in the north where the valleys are 
mainly formed by tributaries of the Karnaphuli (Chengri, Maini, and Kassalong). In the south, the Sangu and 
Matamuhuri rivers are the main drainages that run parallel until they enter the plains and form the valleys (Ishaq 
1971; Lewin 1869). 
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land (located around the valleys) is cultivable plain land, which are locally referred to as “plough 
land” (see Forestal 1966e).  
Numerous ethnic groups inhabit the region, of which the hill peoples include eleven 
ethnic groups
 19
  and are considered to be the “original” inhabitants of CHT (Lewin 1969; 
Hutchinson 1909; Schendel 1992; but compare Scott 2009). Among the hill peoples, the Chakma 
are the largest. The others are: Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, Bawm, Panku, Lushai, Khumi, 
Khyang, Sak and Murucha (Mro) (see Appendix A: Map 4). With the exception of the Tripura, 
all the hill people groups are undoubtedly of Burmese-Arakanese origin and are mainly Buddhist 
or Christian. With regards to religious faith, the Tripura in the north of CHT follow Hinduism 
and the Tripura in the south, known as Usui, follow Christianity. These characteristics, along 
with their traditional method of shifting or jhum cultivation, distinguish them clearly from 
Bengali “plainsmen”, who are predominantly Muslims.  
Besides the hill peoples, there are several ethnic groups who have lived in CHT since the 
British rule, namely the Santal, Rakhain, Ghurkha, Burua, Bengali and Ahomia. Of these groups, 
the Santal, Gurkha, and Ahomia were brought into CHT by the British during the mid nineteenth 
century for government work;
 20
 the Ghurkha worked as the frontier police, and the Santal and 
Ahomia were employed as coolies of the British government. The Rakhain found in CHT were 
the Arakanese refugees of the First Anglo-Burmese War of 1824 who have remained in CHT; 
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with confusion over accurate designations, as these groups have adopted new names over time. These issues have 
been further compounded because of the use of multiple languages such as Bengali, Chakma and Burmese for the 
designation of the groups. My account of the communities of the hill peoples is based on my study of historical texts 
as well as my interviews of key resource persons and rural villagers. This conforms to the JSS’s account, which is 
supported by the Chakma’s chief, Raja Devasish Roy. See Appendix B for alternative names used by Bengalis and 
the groups themselves. 
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peoples, and they are generally put together as “others” in government representation of the communities in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts. 
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however, the overwhelming majority of the Rakhain refugees left CHT to inhabit the Cox’s 
Bazar and Potuakhali districts. The Barua mainly inhabit Cox’s Bazar district, a neighboring 
district of CHT and are also found in CHT; they identify themselves and are identified by others 
as Bengali. Bengalis had never inhabited the region before the British occupation of CHT; they 
mainly began to inhabit the region during the Pakistan regime as they took up administrative 
positions left by the British and filled the ranks of industrial labourers and commercial posts 
created by industrial development in the 1950s. After Bangladesh’s independence, Bengalis 
again began to settle in CHT as part of state-sponsored settlement projects. At present, the hill 
peoples constitute a majority, albeit diminishing, population in the region, totalling 845,541 or 
only 0.5 percent of the nation’s total population of 149 million in 2011; whereas the Bengali 
population in CHT has increased  to the extent they now comprise almost half of the total 
population of CHT region (see Appendix C).  
Most of the hill peoples still depend primarily on jhum cultivation, or at times wet rice 
cultivation, in conjunction with hunting, fishing, trapping, herding, and gathering. This is 
definitely the case with the Bawm, Chak, Pankhu, Khumi, and Murucha. However, with a 
growing urban population, a significant number of the hill peoples (particularly from the 
Chakma, Marma and Tanchangya and Tripura communities) are involved in non-traditional 
occupations (Roy, D. 2000; Tripura and Harun 2003).
21
  
A number of overlapping national, local, regional and traditional institutions of 
governments in CHT currently exist, but the administration is a complete anomaly, partly 
because in theory, if not in practice, nearly the entire CHT is still considered forest lands and 
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 Non-traditional occupations include cash crop agriculture, market oriented fruit and tree plantations, trading, 
commercial fishing, and jobs in both private and government offices. 
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therefore state property (or Khas land).
22
 Furthermore, the jurisdictions, functions and authorities 
of various government institutions are confusing, conflicting and vague. CHT is currently 
divided into three administrative districts: Bandarban in the south, Khagrachhari in the north, and 
Rangamati in the centre (see Appendix A: Map 2). As elsewhere in Bangladesh, CHT districts 
fall under Deputy Commissioners’ (DCs) oversight for civil, criminal and police administration. 
CHT is also conventionally divided into 25 Upazilas
23
 (sub-districts), which are further divided 
into 110 union councils for local government. In addition, CHT has a unique and exceptional 
traditional administration and revenue system called “circles” in the USF land that have existed 
since the 1880s, excluding the regions of the four compact Reserved Forests under the authority 
of the Forest Department since 1871. Coinciding slightly with the territories of CHT districts of 
Bandarban, Khagrachhari and Rangamati, these administrative and revenue circles are known by 
the ethnicity of the traditional chiefs of Bohmong, Mong, and Chakma respectively (see 
Appendix A: Map 3).  A circle chief or ‘Raja’ heads each circle, which is further divided into 
Mouzas
24
 (government revenue units) under headmen or Mouza headmen. Mouzas are 
conventionally comprised of several villages with a Karbari
25
 or village headman for each.
26
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 Khas land refers to agricultural land owned by the government and managed directly by the land revenue officer 
of the government (see Barkat et al. 2001).  
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 As this Bengali term is used frequently in the dissertation, it will not be italicized in subsequent uses. 
Furthermore, when the term is plural, I will add an 's' to assist the reader's comprehension according to English 
grammar, although this is not how the plural is actually formed in the Bengali language. 
24
 As this Bengali term Mouza is used frequently in the dissertation, it will not be italicized in subsequent uses. 
Furthermore, when the term is plural, I will add an 's' to assist the reader's comprehension according to English 
grammar, although this is not how the plural is actually formed in the Bengali language. 
25
 As this Bengali term is used frequently in the dissertation, it will not be italicized in subsequent uses. 
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 All positions of chiefs, headmen, and village headmen are in principle hereditary but chiefs of the circle are 
currently government appointed; the chiefs appoint the headmen in consultation with Deputy Commissioners (DCs), 
and the chiefs also appoint village headmen in consultation with the headman and village residents. The position of 
Karbari appeared to be a conventional practice of the chiefs and headmen and is certainly not part of the Regulation 
of 1900.  
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Chiefs and headmen exercise specific duties and powers in collection of taxes on lands and 
households of jhum cultivators. They are further empowered to settle family and civil disputes 
including land titles and petty crimes other than crimes against the state. The British invented 
this traditional administration and revenue system following the annexation of the region in 1860 
but it was only formalized by the regulation of 1900 (Lewin 1869; Hutchinson 1909; Bertocci 
1989). 
In addition to the chief’s circle, CHT has an overlapping local government system for 
each district known as Local Government Council, later renamed Hill District Council (HDC),
27
 
which were established with a two-thirds majority of hill peoples as part of CHT Accord of 1988 
and which provide limited authority over small industries, health, primary education, agriculture 
and some other matters.
28
 The Peace Treaty of 1997 reorganized HDCs and added two new 
institutions to supplement and coordinate the district councils at national and regional levels 
respectively: the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs (MOCHTA) and CHT Regional 
Councils.  However, the political and administrative roles of these bodies have not yet been fully 
clarified (CHT Commission 2000; JSS 2011). The Upazilas and union councils have remained 
under the control of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives, 
whereas the Hill District Councils and Regional Council are under the Ministry of Chittagong 
Hill Tracts Affairs.  As of 2008, the government had transferred seventeen government 
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 The Hill District Council consists of one Chairman, twenty Councillors from the hill peoples’ communities, and 
ten Councillors from the Bengali community in the respective districts of CHT region (see MOCHTA  n. d.). 
28
 The government and a beleaguered faction of the JSS signed CHT Accord in 1988 leading to the establishment of 
three local government councils in the districts of CHT through the Local Government Council Acts 19, 20, and 21 
of 1989. On the basis of the Peace Treaty of 1997 the Local Government Councils were renamed as Hill District 
Councils on September 2000, and by the amendment of the Local Government Council Acts 19, 20, and 21 of 1989, 
68 functions of 33 government subjects (and/or departments) were agreed to be transferred to the Local Government 
Councils Hill Development Council (see CHT Commission n. d., for the full text of the PeaceTreaty). 
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“subjects” to HDCs and most recently another five subjects, but the Regional Council is yet to be 
made effective (JSS 2011; Mohsin 2003).
29
     
One of the fundamental contradictions of CHT body politic and administration was and 
still is the ownership and rights over forest and land in USF. The Regulation of 1900, which laid 
the basis of governing the USF and formalized the administration and revenue systems, gave the 
then Deputy Commissioner absolute power to control and distribute land and forests in USF. 
This expressly recognizes or implies an array of individual and common rights of the hill peoples 
over land and forest in USF. Private forests, commercial plots and plough lands, whether they be 
freehold (rights with perpetuity) or lease (rights for a specific period), are examples of individual 
rights and are regulated by the Deputy Commissioner. Common rights are not specific but 
generic entitlements of the hill peoples (through customs and practices of jhum cultivation) to 
use forest resources for domestic purposes, to graze cattle on village pastures, and to occupy 
non-urban homestead plots.  Of homestead plots, the right to occupancy without formal 
settlement is specifically reserved for hill peoples. Chiefs, headmen, and village headmen 
primarily regulate these rights and are responsible for collection of land revenue and jhum taxes 
(Hunter 1973; GOBD n .d.).   
In the first few decades after the departure of the British, the government’s policies of 
national integration, industrial development and displacement posed considerable limitation to 
jhum cultivation (Chapter III), but the common property regimes in land and forests in USF were 
generally left unaltered. However, immediately following the insurgency in 1979, the 
Bangladesh government amended Rule 34 of the Regulation of 1900 through a military 
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 The departments/subjects include: Agriculture, Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industry Corporation, Bazaar Fund, 
Cooperative, Family Planning, Fisheries, Games, Health, Livestock, Primary Education, Public Health, Public 
Library, Shilpakola Academy (that is, Performing Arts Academy), Social Welfare, Tribal Cultural Institute, and 
others. 
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ordinance. This change permitted the Deputy Commissioner and the Divisional Commissioner to 
allow any Bangladesh citizens to have access and to settle land in CHT. It further provided a 
ceiling of a maximum 100 acres that the Divisional Commissioner and 25 acres that the Deputy 
Commissioner could offer to a business for settlement and commercial use, with a maximum of 
10 acres for individual agricultural use (GOBD n. d.). This led to a fundamental change in 
ownership, rights and management in lands and forests in the USF over the following decades — 
a direct result of the government policies of Bengali settlement, commercial land leases, 
development resettlement and forest expansion as part of counter-insurgency programs (see 
Chapter IV). In turn, the common property regime in the land and forests nearly collapsed as 
individual rights and absolute state ownership in the USF became dominant and fundamental to 
the management of USF land and forests. Notwithstanding these changes in ownership, as in the 
past, commercial extraction of forests in USF land has remained subject to the permission of the 
Deputy Commissioner(s) and the supervision of the Forest Department, regulated by the Forest 
Transit Rule of 1973.
30
 Lately, the army has also become party to the supervision of forest 
transits from CHT (see also, ADB 2001a: 34-35). 
The other significant anomaly is the ‘forest village system’31 within the Reserved Forests. 
The forest village system began in the first quarter of the 20
th 
century as part of plantation 
programs instituted by the British after years of experimenting with temporary hired labor, 
mainly in the Kassalong and Renikhyong Reserved Forests, and later in the 1950s in the 
Matamuhuri Reserved Forests. Unlike revenue villages in Mouzas under traditional and civil 
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 Recently, the Forest Transit rule of 1973 was repealed to be called the Forest Transit (Control) Rule of 2011 (FD 
n. d.). 
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 Interestingly, the English terms forest village as well as forest villagers are also used in the Bengali or hill 
peoples’ languages. To the best of my knowledge, there are no alternative local terms for forest village and forest 
villagers in the Bengali language, although I cannot say the same about hill peoples’ languages.  Interestingly, 
during my fieldwork in CHT, I was so much used to these terms that it did not occur to me that they are English 
terms.     
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administration, ‘forest villages’ were controlled by the Forest Department, but customarily 
governed by Karbari  (village headmen) and Forest headmen although forest villages form a part 
of the local government of union councils.  It may be relevant here to mention that forest villages 
were not councils or panchayats that were formed in the early 1900s in Kumaon in British India 
(Agrawal, A 2005), but were communities of forest villagers conventionally formed by Karbaris. 
However, no formal rules exist to select Forest Karbaris or headmen; Forest Karbaris are 
typically selected by fellow forest villagers based on their status, power and abilities as well as 
willingness to serve the community, whereas Forest headmen are selected by the Forest 
Department. Based on the Forest Department’s records, documents, and my interviews with 
forest villagers of Matamuhuri Reserved Forest, I found that forest villagers including Karbari 
usually received 2 acres of cultivable land as a tax free grant (without ownership or control) to 
supplement their food production from taungya cultivation and their earnings from paid forest 
work. The Forest headman, however, received 3 acres of land as well as lump sum allowances. 
Significant aspects of the forest village system were: i) villagers must perform both paid work 
and non-paid work (e.g., “begar” or mandatory free labour) which “may be ordered by the Forest 
Officer to be done for the preservation, protection and improvement of the ... Reserved Forest”, 
and ii) forest villagers must not work for “other employers without permission of the Forest 
Officer.”32 From my field work in villages of the Matamuhuri Reserve and my perusal of 
government texts, it seems clear that until recently the Forest Department maintained 
considerable control over the forest villagers and forests, control which has only recently fallen 
into “chaos” (see Chapter V).  
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 Quoted from the forest villager agreement I collected from Matamuhuri Forest Range garbage about to be burned. 
See Appendix D for text of the form reconstructed of torn parts, copies found in the garbage.       
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Besides these structural and functional anomalies, a further aspect of CHT politics is the 
role of the army (see also the ensuing fieldwork section). Despite the Peace Treaty, the CHT has 
remained a highly militarised region in South Asia, and the intervention of the army in everyday 
affairs of government and administration in CHT is a fact of life.
33
 In addition to regular policing 
and patrolling of waterways, cities, towns, markets and roads under the pretext of security, the 
army is involved in a wide range of administrative, economic, and political activities including 
but not limited to infrastructure development, distribution of relief goods, and overseeing 
commercial timber extraction. A report by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 
(IWGIA) sheds light on some of these extra-legal army activities, including human rights 
violations, but the report is short on detail and local experiences of the hill peoples (IWGIA, 
2012).  Moreover, unelected political elites of the hill peoples and Bengalis have represented the 
HDCs and the Regional Council on an ad hoc basis. The Regulation of 1900, based on a 
rationality of common property regimes of land and the overdeveloped powers of the Deputy 
Commissioner(s), remains a fundamental instrument in the polity and administration of the CHT 
(Roy 1998). Therefore, I submit, problems with governance in CHT are not simply due to ethnic 
conflicts or violence, but also due to a lack of principles and policies for the governance of the 
hill peoples, and their rights to land and forests. In other words, the fundamental problem of 
governance in CHT has been the lack of state interest in concern for the welfare of the hill 
peoples’ communities. 
To conclude this section, and to repeat, first the colonial regime and more recently the 
government of Bangladesh have systematically intervened in the governance of CHT land and 
forests, manipulating the various land and forestry regulations in order to maintain control over 
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 Despite the Peace Treaty, the army and its networks still oversee and partly control the entry, exit and movement 
of people and goods within CHT. 
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resources. These interventions have resulted in institutional expansion of the state and 
bureaucracy while incorporating traditional and political elites. Meanwhile, the hill peoples have 
been dominated by the state, and the land and forests in CHT have been controlled for the 
despotic interest in ‘things’, i.e., the territory, sovereignty and security of the state itself or for 
raison d’état as well as in the interest of Bengalis .  
 
1.3  Political Ecology of Forests: Beyond the Myth of State and Community 
How is the space of forest constituted, and what are the social, historical, and political forces that 
make forests and the regime of participatory forestry? In this section, keeping in mind the rich 
debate over colonialism, scientific forestry, and conservation in the context of South Asia 
(especially the contributions of Ramachandra Guha, Richard Grove, Arun Agrawal, K. 
Sivaramakrishnan, Paul Robbins, and Vasant Sabherwal)
34
 I hold that Michel Foucault’s notion 
of governmentality and interpretations of it offer a useful perspective to examine the ways in 
which forests have come to exist or been produced as an effect of governmental power — made 
the object of expert knowledge, regularized, simplified, and disciplined, managed, and planned 
for. Thus, I draw upon a critical political ecology perspective that builds on Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality and its limits (e.g., Vandergeest and Peluso 2001; Sivaramakrishnan 1999; 
Saberwal 1999; Robbins 2004; Moore 1996; Li 2007; Escobar 1996; and Agrawal, A 2005). I 
begin my discussion with the concept of governmentality to illustrate theoretical and conceptual 
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 The debate is a dispute between Ramchandra Guha and Richard Grove concerning the roles of the colonial state in 
conservation in South Asia (Guha 2000; Grove 1995). One of the key differences which can be highlighted is that 
Guha and Grove focused on two different periods of colonial governmentality, while generalizing experiences of 
‘forest conservation’ in South Asia during British rule: Guha starts in 1870 with the making of the Forest 
Department and focuses on scientific forestry, while Grove, not really a colonial apologist,  focuses on the earlier 
period and shows  that there was neither a glorious period of harmony nor evil colonial masters, but rather a 
complex scenario of how environmental knowledge was constituted in the British empire, how it traveled,  and the 
ways in which state officials and elite scientists in colonial India drew on discourses of science and politics  for 
advocacy of forest conservation. 
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nuances for my use of this and other related terms that I use in this dissertation. I then consider 
recent works on critical political ecology and discuss how they have tackled the concept of 
governmentality to examine forests and participatory forestry as sites and strategies of 
governmental power and politics.  
 Foucault used the term governmentality to refer to the forms of ‘governmental 
rationality’ and/or to the arts of ‘government.’ Governmental rationality for Foucault means a 
way of thinking about the nature, practice, and knowledge of government. Government implies 
the “conduct of conduct,” “the right disposition of things” or “the techniques and procedures for 
directing human behaviours” (Foucault 1991, 1994). According to Foucault, governmentality 
emerged in mid-eighteenth century Europe through a process that bracketed off modernity from 
earlier societies and their regimes of truth, power, and ethics. At its birth, it represented 
regulatory forms of bio-power (power over life) and discipline, and involved shifting ‘the 
problematic of sovereignty’ (how to protect the “fragile link” between the sovereign Prince and 
his territory) to ‘the problematic of governmentality’: how to be ruled, how strictly, by whom, to 
what end, by what methods, and how to introduce ‘economy’ into management of the state 
(Foucault 1991; Gordon 1991). With this change, the purpose of the government became not to 
act upon government itself but “the welfare of the population, the improvement of its conditions, 
the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc” (Foucault 1991:93). In so doing, it also became 
necessary to govern with economy a complex of people and things: not inhabitants alone, nor 
territory as a bounded entity, but “men in their relations, their links, their imbrications with those 
other things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific 
qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, etc” (Foucault 1991:93). 
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Thus, in Foucault’s use, the analytic of governmentality is not the language of state (sets 
of institutions that maintain governments), nor is it the government (the personnel and 
organization with defined responsibilities for ruling and directing the affairs of a 
state).According to Hansen and Stepputat, “In this view, the modern state is not the source of 
power but the effect of wider range of dispersed forms of disciplinary [and regulatory] power 
that allow ‘the state’ to appear as a structure that stands apart from, and above [what we 
generally call] society” (Hansen and Stepputat 2001:4).35  This is, however, not to say that 
Foucault denies the existence of “states”, but makes the state “one among other provinces of 
power rather than its sovereign director” (Moore 2005: 6). Li (2007) argues this position clearly, 
and I think her position agrees more with Foucault’s: Foucault suggests that governmentality is 
both “internal” and “external” to modern states, depending upon the tactics of government, 
which makes it possible to continually define and redefine what is or is not within the 
competence of the state (Foucault 1991: 103).   
Moreover, the analytics of governmentality imply a certain relationship of government to 
disciplinary and sovereign power: the emergence of governmentality does not eliminate 
sovereignty or discipline as forms of power but “renders all the more acute the problem of 
sovereignty... and all the more acute equally the necessity for the development of discipline” 
(Foucault 1991:102). However, the power of sovereignty-discipline-government varies in terms 
of their objective, targets, and means or strategy: sovereignty as a form of rule is at times 
expressed as a “right to death” and is exercised through the juridical and administrative apparatus 
of the state. The object of sovereign power, then, is “the exercise of authority over the subjects of 
the state within a definite territory – for example, ‘the deductive’ practices of levying taxes, of 
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 Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, in a collection of ethnographic studies of the postcolonial state, 
somewhat disagree with Foucault and argue that governmentality has “ not necessarily weakened the state in terms 
of the capacity of policies and designs to create social effects” (Hansen and Stepputat 2001:16). 
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meting out punishments” (Dean 1999:18). Discipline, on the other hand, “concerns the exercise 
of power over and through the individual, the body, its forces and capacities, and the 
composition of aggregate human individuals (classes, armies, etc.)... The object of disciplinary 
power is the regulation and ordering the numbers of people within that territory, e.g., in practices 
of schooling, military training, the organization of work” (Dean 1999:18). While 
governmentality utilizes the techniques, rationalities and institutions of sovereignty and 
discipline, the object of governmental power is in contrast the welfare of the population and the 
improvement the conditions that caused these to vary (Foucault 1991).  
I follow these insights to define and limit the scope of this dissertation. I have already 
made it clear that this dissertation is on the making of forest and resistance to it in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts, Bangladesh and is neither about the state, nor the government of Bangladesh, nor the 
state regimes that preceded it in the region of CHT.  Rather, part of this dissertation will examine 
the material and discursive production of forest (and its positioned practices designed by various 
governments, institutions and their experts) as relations of power, and explore the ways in which 
landscapes of CHT and livelihoods of the hill peoples are governed and disciplined both for 
improvement of the hill peoples and for the wealth and security of the state. In my use, 
government, to borrow Donald Moore’s words, “includes state practices, but it is neither limited 
to nor isomorphic with them” (Moore 2005:6). However, in this dissertation, I will remain open 
to questions about the extent to which the colonial and postcolonial state apparatus of Chittagong 
Hill Tracts was and is being governmentalized. I consider the triangle of sovereignty-discipline-
government as a contingent relation of power rather than as a stable one, and I will examine the 
ways and extent to which sovereignty-discipline-government work together in the culturally and 
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geographically specific context of CHT in the practices of making of forest and participatory 
forestry. 
 Turning now to political ecology and the complex relationship between governmentality 
and forests, let me consider the work of K. Sivaramakrishnan who has applied Foucault’s 
concept creatively to examine the production of colonial state, society, and knowledge in a 
forested region of colonial India. Sivaramakrishnan (1999) takes governmentality to be forms of 
“state-making” that involve the production of state and society in colonial South Asia and also 
involve the production of colonial knowledge i.e., representation of colonized peoples and 
landscapes. To be specific, he suggests there were two distinct regimes of state-making in 
colonial India that produced the forest and shaped its management in colonial Bengal: the East 
India Company regime (1767-1859) and the Crown regime (1860-1947). The distinction between 
the former and the latter lay in the introduction of conservation during the Crown regime, when 
forest policy was framed and institutionalized through strongly centralized scientific 
management in various parts of India (Sivaramakrishnan 1999: 21). These processes culminated 
in forest reservation in those lands – in some cases irrespective of existing land use – which had 
already been designated as forests by the Company regime, therefore creating a class of state-
owned land dedicated to specific types of tree production under the regime of scientific forestry. 
During this period, scientific forestry emerged as a development regime through the rhetoric and 
imperative of conservation ideas. It drew on a language of improvement, casting the colonialist 
project in terms of reclamation of peoples and lands (Sivaramakrishnan 1999: 211-3). However, 
in normalizing and disciplining forests and forest communities under the control of the Forest 
Department, colonial science— a particular modern regime of representation and governmental 
technology— never had a unified coherent doctrine, but was always fractured, both by social 
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formations and regional geographies. For Sivaramakrishnan, this kind of regional diversity in 
state-making is “the product of natural, social and political processes” (Sivaramakrishnan 1999: 
25 and 216-218). In sum, he shows that forest conservation in colonial Bengal emerged as 
contingent and contested forms of state-making that were informed by i) ecological, cultural and 
political diversities of landscapes; ii) emerging local discourses of place, property and identities; 
and, iii) the specific history of local administration and conflict within the government 
(Sivaramakrishnan 1999; 1995). He further acknowledges differences between reserved and 
protected forests in terms of how each is defined by customary rights and privileges of local 
users over land and forest resources, and marked by differences in terms of strategies of 
territorialization, power and forest conservation practice. These points are absent in the otherwise 
accomplished works of both Guha (2000) and Skaria (1999).  
 The value of Sivaramakrishnan’s approach, for my purpose, is not the ‘making’ or 
‘breaking’ of the colonial state in South Asia, but the diverse and complex ways through which 
the process of forest conservation was constituted. I suggest that given that the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts were part of colonial Bengal, the experience of forestry in CHT is consistent with 
Sivaramakrishnan’s account of forest history and conservation, its contested and contingent 
origins, and local and regional diversities, but it is not so consistent with his account of the 
“general pattern” of the development of forest conservation in colonial Bengal. According to 
Sivaramakrishnan, the general pattern in Bengal “was one where reservation mostly took place in 
the 1880s, initiation in the planning in the 1890s, and the approval of the short-term (ten to 
twenty year) plans in the period of 1900 to 1910” (Sivaramakrishnan 1999: 253). The CHT 
differs from this pattern not only in the timing of the working plan regime, which only began in 
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the 1920s in CHT, but also in the variation in the application of territorial strategies and control 
of forests within the region.  
 One of the fine points of Foucault’s concept of governmentality is the way in which 
governmentality depends on territory and its quality.
36
  Sivaramakrishnan’s (1999) work helps us 
understand the conditions and consequences of contingent processes of conservation in South 
Asia during British rule – what Li (2002) identifies as “rule accomplishment” – and underscores 
the deviation, failure and exemption of the rule, but there is limited discussion of “functional 
territorialization”, i.e., nature’s inner qualities and intelligibilities (Vandergeest and Peluso 
1995). This brings me to the work of Peter Vandergeest and Nancy Peluso, in particular their 
theory of territorialization (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Peluso and Vandergeest 2001). 
Vandergeest and Peluso developed this theory in the mid 1990s in examining forest management 
in Thailand, and their theory was rather more informed by sociological theories of the state in 
relation to territory than Foucault’s suggestive remarks on governmentality and its link to 
territory. Still, in retrospect, the theory is one of the most generative illustrations of 
governmentality and territory, especially in relation to the way in which forests come to exist and 
get territorialized and managed by government institutions while at the same time being 
contested by forest dependent communities. Recently, both authors have engaged critically with 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality, and reworked and expanded the theory of 
territorialization with various analytical and conceptual frames, namely, political forest, 
customary rights, and insurgency and counterinsurgency violence, in order to illustrate post-
colonial forest practices in Southeast Asia (Peluso and Vandergeest 2001, 2011). My fieldwork 
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 It should be noted that Foucault never examined the ways in which the rise of population brought the government 
of the state directly into contact with its territories and their qualities, and said very little or nothing about the 
cultural form, i.e., scientific or other kinds of discourses through which lands and territories took objective form 
(Braun 2000). 
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experience in CHT suggests that there are some striking similarities between Southeast Asia and 
Chittagong Hill Tracts in terms of forest practice in relation to post-colonial insurgency and 
counterinsurgency development; thus, I find Vandergeest and Peluso’s work an important 
intervention in critical political ecology for explaining and understanding forest practice, politics 
and strategies of power in the context of both colonial and postcolonial CHT.         
 Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) define territorialization as processes by which, whether it 
be in practice or in theory, a particular geographical boundary or space gets defined to regulate 
people and resources within the boundary or territory. Beyond the conventional use of the term 
to define a state’s boundary and political identity, they use territorialization to examine the 
development of internal spatial organizations of the state and the government, especially the 
government agencies which are endowed with territorial and functional jurisdiction over 
population and resources; they call this process “internal territorialization”. In so doing, they 
map the development of the modern state of Thailand as it emerged during the twentieth century 
through internal territorialization, which entailed organizing the state’s territories both vertically 
and horizontally into various spatial organizations such as villages, regions and provinces on the 
one hand, and ministries of the government on the other. In particular, Vandergeest and Peluso 
unravel the processes and strategies of internal territorialization in relation to land and resources 
through which ‘forests’ emerge as a subject of government and also as an object of control, 
planning and management. In Thailand, they show three phases of the process that make forests 
through strategies of reservation, demarcation and “functional territorialization” —that is, 
mapping the forest in terms of nature’s intelligibilities, e.g., slopes, soil types, and vegetation 
(Vandergeest and Peluso 1995:408). In this sense, Peluso and Vandergeest (2001) hold that the 
idea of forests only exists as “political forests” which helped to constitute and were constituted 
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by a particular discourse of state property and a related discourse of “customary rights.” In turn, 
political forests not only “revolutionized people’s lives and livelihood [of rural people and 
population] but created new, almost inescapable means of imagining land, resources and people” 
(Peluso and Vandergeest 2001:762). Importantly, Peluso and Vandergeest (2011) have recently 
broadened their analysis of political forests to examine specific forms of violence, i.e., 
insurgency and counterinsurgency, and the institutional effects of such violence on the practice 
of forestry, on the consolidation and expansion of political forests, and on the legitimating of 
cultural projects of rule.  Illustrated through cases of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies from 
Southeast Asia in the 1950s-1970s, Peluso and Vandergeest argue that both insurgencies and 
counter-insurgencies have enabled not only the establishment and extension of political forests 
but also their normalization. 
  Thus, in this dissertation, I engage with Vandergeest and Peluso’s framework and the 
links between territorialization, political forests, and violence.  I find the term political forests a 
valuable starting point to understand the making and remaking of forests in CHT, as it speaks 
clearly to post-structuralist ideas that the categories of our knowledge, whether they be nature or 
forests, cannot pre-exist before representation or construction but depend on discursive and non-
discursive practices much like categories of “madman” and “sex”, as Foucault has shown 
brilliantly (Foucault 1988; 1980). Further, I agree with Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) that the 
making of forests is predicated on territorial strategies for control of land and resources, and that 
variation in the application of territorial strategies is contingent upon the function of forestry in 
the economy, the relative accessibility and value of forests, and the modalities and ideologies of 
rule. In applying Vandergeest and Peluso’s theory of territorialization in CHT, I argue that since 
the annexation of CHT into the British colony of Bengal in 1860, colonial civil administrators 
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had been confronted with violence in the region till 1900; these administrators advocated and 
pursued a protectionist policy for stable agrarian order and, at times, for the welfare and 
improvement of the hill peoples. As forest conservation in Bengal began during the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century, there emerged fierce conflicts between colonial forest and civil 
administrators in CHT about the extent to which forest conservation should be adopted (but 
compare Guha 1990; Sivaramakrishan 1999; and Peluso and Vandergeest 2001). This conflict 
also involved concerns for the protection of CHT from violence, and in turn shaped the 
difference in the control of forests between Reserved Forests and Unclassed State Forest (USF) 
on the one hand, and the conservation agendas in CHT on the other.  
Further, I argue that the agenda of the conservation and control of Reserved Forest and 
USF in CHT changed significantly during post-colonial regimes. These changes were related to 
industrial development and displacement in CHT during Pakistani rule (1947-1971) and the 
subsequent insurgency and counter- insurgency (1975-1997) in the region during Bangladeshi 
rule. A key technology to the changes was the functional territorialization or mapping of 
qualities and capacities of land and resources in the Reserved Forests as well as USF. In the 
1960s, ‘functional territorialization’ enforced the control of the Reserved Forests for industrial 
needs and markets. It further articulated a discourse of development, “optimum land use”, an 
environmental discourse for the management and control of land and forests in USF that became 
hegemonic during the insurgency and counter- insurgency in the mid 1970s (see Chapter IV). 
The insurgency and counter- insurgency have completely altered the mechanism that had been in 
place for the control of the Reserved Forests and USF with contradictory results. In the USF, as 
part of counterinsurgency development discourse, there has emerged an individual rights regime 
of land alongside the new territorial forests based on state property regime. At the same time, the 
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control of the Reserved Forests was fractured by the insurgency and counterinsurgency, leading 
to deforestation and permanent encroachment of the Reserves by the hill peoples. It was in this 
specific conjuncture of the encroachment and deforestation of the Reserved Forests, and the 
conflict between forest officials and the army over control of the Reserved Forests, that the social 
forestry (a global discourse of development, environment and governmentality) emerged in CHT 
as an extension of existing social forestry program of Bangladesh. The social forestry program in 
CHT also draws upon on earlier model of development in CHT that had been mobilized during 
the counter-insurgency for the expansion of territorial forest in USF. The model was a 
resettlement of jhum cultivators for forest work with a horticulture program. The forest villagers, 
whether they settled legally in the Reserved Forests or encroached into them, have emerged as 
new subjects of development as participants and labourers for commercial forest production. 
Social forestry has further stimulated a political opposition, an indigenous movement of the hill 
peoples that has articulated an alternative model of community forestry as an example of 
indigenous culture for the recognition of indigeneity and customary rights over land and forest in 
CHT.  
Beyond the theory of territorialization, I further draw upon Tania M. Li’s (2007) 
approach to governmentality to examine these postcolonial developments, their approaches to 
communities, and the links to political forests that have been mobilized by the Forest Department 
in CHT as forms of participatory forestry since 1960. Writing extensively on governmentality, 
development and social movements, Li has developed a critical approach to governmentality that 
takes development and environmental projects as a heterogeneous “assemblage” of actors, 
discourses, institutions, and practices (to name some of the elements) and examines how and by 
whom they are assembled; how they constitute their fields of intervention and the target 
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population; and their rationalities, effects and limits. This approach helps me to examine the 
practices of development of the Forest Department in CHT, untangling the assemblage of actors, 
discourses, institutions, practices and objectives, whether they are being mobilized by the 
government agencies or by indigenous movements. Li’s approach further enables an analysis of 
the effects and limits of the development programs and the ways in which they shape and change 
hill peoples’ lives and livelihood strategies, their social and ethnic relations, and their relations of 
power. In so doing, I build my arguments on social forestry based on fieldwork; indeed, my 
fieldwork experience resonates with some observations that Li (2001; 2010) has developed 
provocatively. As Li (2001) observes, a significant aspect of recent community- based resource 
management and forest conservation is that conservationists and their advocates concede that 
coercive measures fail when they threaten subsistence and everyday livelihood, yet the same 
conservationists and advocates are seemingly reluctant to acknowledge that “rural people may 
also resist conservation measures for reasons that are very much like those urbanities (including 
ourselves): convenience, greed, or the desire to catch up with, or get ahead of, others near and 
far” (Li, 2001: 163). Most recently, Li (2010) has demonstrated striking similarities between 
colonial governmentality and recent indigenous movements in Asia in terms of their protectionist 
agenda for “managing dispossession.” My analysis and representation of environmental 
developments in CHT explore these contentions and provide ethnographic arguments about how 
the conservation agenda of the state agencies and indigenous movements work in practice, and 
how the indigenous movement draws on colonial protectionist policy in its struggle for resources 
and identity.    
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1.4  Fieldwork: Foreigner in My Own Country   
This dissertation is based on a multi-sited ethnographic approach, combining archive, library and 
ethnographic research carried out in CHT and Dhaka from November 2007 to December 2008 in 
three phases (see Fieldwork Photographs below). I began my fieldwork in Alikadam Upazila of 
Bandarban district under Lama Forest Division. In my fieldwork in Alikadam, which I 
completed in April 2008, I focused on examining practices of social forestry and forest 
resettlement projects. During this phase, I lived in Rizaroa and Meringdome villages of 
Matamuhuri Reserve, and in the bungalow of Train Forest Range, which is next to Golden River, 
the forest resettlement village of the Tripura community. In all three villages, I used several 
methods for collecting data, including participant- observation, in-depth and informal interviews, 
directed group conversation, life histories, and surveys. There were a total of 45 long and short 
interviews of 35 men and 10 women representing occupational class categories, namely jhum 
cultivators, wage labourers and farmers; they were selected after careful analysis of data on 
household income and occupations. I also often participated in and observed various routine 
activities of the Forest Department; for example, daytime patrolling, community meetings, and 
private forest investigations in both the Matamuhuri and Tain Ranges. Additionally, I read forest 
registers and office files including official correspondences and annual reports in the Forest 
Ranges and Lama Forest Division Office. Moreover, I interviewed several forest staff, including 
the Range Officer of Matamuhuri Forest Range and the Divisional Officer of Lama Forest 
Division, both formally and informally.  
In June of 2008, I resumed my fieldwork research, which involved examining an 
indigenous movement of the hill peoples, “Saving the Village Common Forest” (hereafter, VCF 
movement) in the Rangamati district. Led by Taungya, a local NGO of CHT, the VCF movement 
is part of the hill peoples’ movement; the movement represents “village common forests” as the 
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indigenous culture of the hill peoples and their customary practice of common property forests 
management. During months of fieldwork with a research assistant within a village community 
participating in Taungya’s VCF projects, I interviewed 8 men and women of the village, as well 
as Taungya’s personal and indigenous leaders; I read projects, documents and reports; and I 
observed Tanungy’s daily office work.  In this way, I further investigated the insurgency 
movement of the JSS and the social movement of the Committee for the Protection of Land and 
Forest led by loosely organized civil society groups of the hill peoples. My research with these 
social movements continued until the middle of August 2008, when I conducted document 
research in the Deputy Commissioner Office’s library; there, for a period of two weeks, I 
examined historical documents of revenue and forest reports of CHT from the time British rule. 
After this, I extensively searched through documents in the libraries of the Forest Department, 
the Ministry of Forest and Environment, the Asian Development Bank, and the University of 
Dhaka for forest working plans, forest laws, forest projects’ plans, proposals and completion 
reports.  In particular, I read and later collected all forest development projects’ proposals, plans, 
and evaluation reports implemented in CHT since Bangladesh gained independence. During this 
period, I also interviewed the Director of Social Forestry Circle, a prominent bureaucrat and 
writer on forest histories and social forestry in Bangladesh; and Jyotirindra Bodipriya Larma (J. 
B. Larma for short), the leader of the JSS and the chairman of the Regional Council. This 
followed a month of archival research at the Bangladesh National Archive located in Dhaka, 
where I found a few relevant books and documents. The challenge at the Archive was that there 
is no modern system of cataloguing, and all the documents, books and other references are 
handwritten and numbered in the registry. There are also limits to access and services in the 
Archive.  
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Given that my research involved ethnically and politically diverse groups of people and 
organizations, often supporting differing ideologies, interests, organizations and spatial 
configurations, I faced many challenges in the field. The power and influence of the army was 
the single most difficult challenge in CHT since the army controls the region for security 
purposes. My encounters with the army began while en-route to the Alikadam Upazila, following 
a visit to the Lama Forest Division Office in Lama Upazila to obtain permission for fieldwork in 
the Matamuhuri reserve. I arrived at Lama Upazila in July 2007, and it took days before I was 
able to discuss my fieldwork with the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO). The DFO held doubts 
about my research in part because he could not relate social anthropology to the issue of social 
forestry or forests.  To avoid responsibility, the DFO advised that I submit an application 
‘properly’ through the Range Officer of Matamuhuri Forest Range, to whom he reluctantly 
introduced me when the latter visited the Divisional Forest Office. The Range Officer, in turn, 
offered me a ride to Alikadam in his car.  At a security checkpoint on the Lama - Alikadam road, 
the army stopped the car and I had to explain to them the reason for my visit, details, contacts 
and personal information. The next morning an agent of the Directorate General of Forces 
Intelligence (DGFI) followed me to my lodging at Matamuhuri Forest Guest House. Although 
the agent was ‘impolite,’ he agreed to meet with me and the Range Officer. Following this 
meeting, he insisted that I obtain ‘residence permission’ from the Alikadam Cantonment and 
asked questions I had answered earlier at the roadside camp. I reacted to his style and manner of 
questioning, and resisted his ‘interrogation’ by pointing out that I was a citizen of Bangladesh 
and that my family had provided service to the government and the army. The conversation soon 
turned to a debate and the agent told me to prove my identity with government documents. This 
surprised and terrified me as I began to anticipate an unpleasant incident. Since Bangladesh was 
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under emergency rule, I exercised self-control and assured the agent I would contact the 
Cantonment authorities through the civil or police administrative authorities, as any citizen 
should. I also gave him my passport. My proof of identity and citizenship somewhat appeased 
the agent, although he then proceeded to leave the Range Office, taking my passport without my 
consent. This incident greatly angered me, because I felt like a foreigner in my own country.             
In the weeks that followed, I began to anticipate the army’s interference in my research 
and, based on ethical grounds, I decided not to meet the Cantonment authorities. I instead turned 
to the officer in charge of the Upazila police administration and the executive officer of the civil 
administration (a.k.a., Upazila Nirbahi Officer in Bengali, or UNO for short), for their assistance 
and residence permission in the Upazila for my fieldwork. The UNO had attended the University 
of Dhaka (which I also attended) and understood my concerns with the Cantonment authorities 
and the importance of fieldwork research in the Matamuhuri reserve. Nevertheless, neither of 
these officers accepted my application or request to conduct fieldwork research in the Upazila. 
They told me that meeting the Commanding Officer (CO) at the Cantonment would be the only 
alternative for obtaining permission if the DFO was not helpful. The Range Officer also declined 
to accept the application.   
Over this period, I grew more resistant to meeting the CO and accepting the army’s 
powers. I therefore resigned myself to associate with government officers of the Upazila civil 
administration and Matamuhuri Range staff to build social networks within the Upazila for 
support, rapport and trust. I also occasionally visited Dhaka city for consultation with Ahmed 
Kamala – a former university professor of mine – and visited Chokoria Upazila of Cox’s Bazar 
district for internet access. Interestingly, over time, the government officers began to develop an 
interest in my research project. In particular, the Range Officer developed a keen interest in 
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anthropological research on social forestry projects and became more sympathetic to my 
situation. He thus introduced me to the Forest Headman and a village Karbari of Matamuhuri 
reserve, and he offered the assistance of his office, staff and forest villagers if I agreed to do my 
research from the Range Office. Given contemporary anthropological critiques of representation 
and anthropological authority, I respectfully declined the Range Officer’s proposal for ‘armchair 
anthropology.’ This decision angered the Range Officer, and he asked me to leave the Forest 
Guest House and find alternative accommodation.   
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Photo 1.2: One of many meetings with a village community of CHT to explain my fieldwork and gain their consent. 
 
Photo 1.3: One of the film nights that I organized for the forest villagers of Matamuhuri Reserve. 
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Photo 1.4: Myself (left) collecting household information from a Murucha man (far right) in a forest village with the 
help of a young Murucha woman (centre) who is a grand-daughter of a Murucha forest villager. 
 
Photo 1.5: Research assistants Bhubon Chama (far left) and Hla Marma (far right) collecting household information 
from Murucha and Tripura forest villagers. 
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Photo 1.6: Myself (left) and my research assistant Hla Marma (right) interviewing a Marma man, a resident in a 
forest village.  
 
Photo 1.7: Myself (left) and my research assistant Hla Marma (right) interviewing a Marma woman, a forest 
villager. 
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Photo 1.8: Myself (right) interviewing Tripura villagers. 
 
 
Photo 1.9: Research assistant Alap Alam (right) interviewing a Chakma participant (centre) in Taungya’s VCF 
program. 
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Photo1.10: Myself (left) and my research assistant Alap Alam (right) retrieving documents that had been thrown out 
from the Matamuhuri Range Office and were to be burned.  
 
 
Photo 1.11: Conducting research in Rangamati Deputy Commissioner’s Office Library. 
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Photo1.12: Monthly meeting of Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) with key figures in the Upazila administration 
including Mouza headmen, local government representatives, NGO representatives and police officers. I was an 
observer.  
 
 
 
Photo 1.13: One of many visits by DGFI agents to question me during my fieldwork in CHT. In this photo, the agent 
is seated to my left. Others present on this occasion were not army personnel and therefore I have removed them 
from this photo to protect their identities.  
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At this point, I understood that little possibility existed for independent ethical research, 
and I decided to leave Alikadam within days. While I was leaving the Forest Guest House on 
September 14th, the Forest Headmen, the Karbari, and the Range Officer came to bid me 
farewell.  At this time, they requested that I reconsider the Range Officer’s proposal, or meet the 
CO at the Cantonment. I again declined the offer, and the Range Officer said sarcastically, “If 
you have permission from the Chief Conservator of Forests (CCF) for the research, you can visit 
us anytime.” As I left Alikadam for Dhaka in disappointment, I realized the Range Officer’s 
comment provided a slim possibility for access. I knew that the Office of the CCF was in 
disarray since one of the ex-Chief Conservators of Forests and other senior forest officers had 
been arrested by the army’s anti-corruption drive. Notwithstanding this, because of the support 
of my friends in the Head Office of the Forest Department at Dhaka and their networks, I 
successfully obtained a letter of permission to conduct my research in Lama Forest Division 
from the Chief Conservator Office, signed by an Assistant Chief Conservator of Forest (ACCF). 
An important aspect of the ACCF letter was an order to Lama DFO to assist with my research 
(see Appendix E).  
Thus, I returned to Alikadam on November 1, 2007, and submitted a formal application 
to the DFO for permission to enter and reside in the Matamuhuri reserve for fieldwork research. 
According to security protocol in CHT, I also gave a copy of the ACCF letter to the UNO and 
the OC of Alikadam Upazila. The ACCF letter greatly surprised the Range Officer and other 
staff of Matamuhuri Range Office, let alone the Lama DFO. It also elevated my position in the 
locality and prompted the DFO’s action for the official and unofficial process of my application. 
On November 7
th
, 2007, I was invited to join the DFO and the Range Officer in a meeting with 
the forest villager communities in the Matamuhuri Reserve. The DFO consented to my fieldwork 
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in the Reserve that day, contingent on my meeting the CO at the Cantonment at my convenience 
and arranged by the Range Officer. Finally, on November 15, 2007, after protracted bitter 
debates and negotiations with the Range Officer, I settled in the Rizaroa forest village and 
accepted a part time employee of the Range Office as a cook, with boarding arrangements in the 
Forest Beat office. On several occasions during these negotiations, the Range Officer and the 
Forest Headman visited the Cantonment and the Upazila Office to provide their personal 
assurance to the army authorities concerning my security. In spite of these assurances, DGFI 
agents visited me often during my stay in the villages of the Matamuhuri reserve (Photo 1.13), 
and on one occasion I was interrogated by a group of army officers inside the Reserve. In 
addition, a commander of a nearby army camp sent some soldiers to further inquire about me and 
to search my lodgings in Meringdome forest village. On yet another occasion, an army officer 
attempted to assault me in the Alikadam Bazaar as I was taking pictures of market-goers and 
their products. The event was later resolved in the Cantonment and the young officer offered me 
a handshake without apology.  
In sum, based on my encounters with the army, the UNO (the executive officer of an 
Upazila) and other government officers, I gathered that the UNO and the DFO regularly report to 
the Alikadam Cantonment, which in turn holds monthly meetings with representatives of Union 
Councils of the local government and Mouza headmen of the traditional administration. 
Similarly, the army camps in the Upazila hold monthly meetings with village Karbari(s). 
Interestingly, I once met a group of protesting tobacco cultivators in the Matamuhuri Reserved 
Forest who had set out to meet the CO at the Cantonment. They were protesting the Forest 
Department’s ban on tobacco cultivation in the reserve and seemed to consider the CO a public 
representative. The forest villagers, Bengali sharecroppers and forest employees also told me 
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about many similar deputations of public grievance to the CO of Alikadam Cantonment by all 
sections of people in the locality for favorable intervention. In fact, the army appeared to 
exercise overarching extra-legal power over the civil and local administration in CHT while 
under the pretext of security, and they also worked as primary gatekeepers to field sites in CHT.  
Beyond the army, another serious challenge for ethnographic research in CHT is the 
armed conflict between the JSS and the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF), an anti-
Peace Treaty faction of the JSS. These groups exercise a degree of control and they limit access 
to field sites in some parts of CHT. Although I was not confronted by either the JSS or the UPDF 
over access, their conflict influenced my research plan and choice of field sites. In particular, I 
never contacted the UPDF for my research and avoided long ethnographic fieldwork with VCF’s 
project community in Barkal Upazila.  
Another major challenge I faced in my fieldwork within the communities was the 
linguistic variation of the hill peoples, and also variations in the Bengali language. Hill people, 
generally men, use a specific Bengali dialect for inter-ethnic communication in CHT; the 
majority of the rural women of the hill people do not speak Bengali. To overcome these language 
barriers, I hired Bhubon Chakma, a university graduate and a member of the Chakma 
community. However, after settling in the Rizaroa forest village I determined that Bhubon did 
not speak local Bengali adequately and I therefore had to learn the language. To do this, I began 
to participate in Adda (an informal public space used to hang out in a group) with the Bengali 
and Marma men and women in the tea shops in the village. Hla Marma, a villager of Rizaroa, 
was my main language instructor and interlocutor. I discovered the tea shop to be an instrumental 
space and Adda a useful technique, which enabled me to learn local Bengali quickly and to begin 
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short conversations and dialogues across ethnicities and genders.
37
 For longer conversations and 
interviews both in Rizaroa and Meringdom, I continued to rely on the assistance of Hla Marma, 
and also Hlachaong Marma, whom I hired to replace Bhubon Chakma. Similarly, while doing 
fieldwork in Golden River, the forest resettlement village, I hired Samel Tripura, a school 
teacher and villager, in addition to Alap Alam, a Bengali university student. Trained in 
anthropology, Alap Alam was of great help during the fieldwork both in Rangamati and Dhaka.  
In terms of trust and rapport with the communities and other field sites in CHT, I enjoyed 
the benefit of social honor built up through my conflict with the army, and my social identity as a 
university teacher. However, to translate this social honor on the ground for information and 
knowledge, I employed what I call the ‘triple C’, a set of general principles that involved 
concern, care and critique, built in part on my critical reading of contemporary anthropological 
methodologies (e.g., Amit 2000; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Marcus 1995; Messerschmidt 1981; 
and Narayan 1993). In practice, the triple C principles promote concern and care about persons 
and things in the field while remaining critical about information, knowledge and representation 
of them. They also acted as ethical codes that governed my self-conduct while interacting with 
people and things in a way that would contrast with the authoritative and coercive power of 
governments represented by the army, bureaucracy and Forest Department. To establish rapport 
and trust with the communities, I also had two main approaches: (i) unambiguous 
communication and ii) gift exchange. The communication involved community meetings with all 
villagers before taking up any fieldwork activity, where I explained in a simple manner and 
language the purposes, interests and stakes of my research and the importance of learning from 
the community through participation. In so doing, I retained my identity as a teacher, which was 
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 Since occasional fierce debates among the villagers are very common in the rural Adda, discretion of researcher’s 
participation in Adda is a mandatory requirement; see also Chakrabarty (1999). 
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widely known in the locality, and generally presented myself as a teacher and writer who wished 
to understand and document what it was like to live in and around the hills and forests. In my 
presentation, I shared many personal stories and the struggles I had undergone to reside in the 
communities. Importantly, I evoked the memories of the stories of the great books and men of 
the religious traditions, and connected those stories to highlight the importance of writing and 
books for the survival of religions and cultures. To facilitate better understanding I ended the 
stories by saying, “Had there not been the great books, there would not be religion; and, without 
grandma’s and grandpa’s stories, there would not be the Marma, the Murucha or the Tripura.” 
My construction of stories about the great books took clues from the ongoing religious 
movement of Krama
38
 and conversion of the Murucha from Buddhist to Krama that I had known 
for some time before my fieldwork from a colleague who did anthropological fieldwork with the 
Murucha in 1998 (Shafie 1999). The meetings and my stories proved successful, shaping the 
moods and attitudes of the communities in favour of myself and my fieldwork, though I must 
concede I was not entirely successful in eliminating their fear of the Forest Department for 
speaking to me.  
Considering the limitations of going native and risks involving monetary exchange in 
rural indigenous settings, I found gift exchange a very productive strategy for creating strong 
rapport and social intimacy with individuals and the communities. In the communities of Rizaroa 
and Meringdom, I offered free bi-weekly movie nights since both forest villages had community 
centers equipped with furniture, a color television, VCD (Video Compact Disc) player and 
generator. In addition, I gave printed individual and group photos that I had taken to individual 
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 Since the 1980s, the Krama, a newly invented native religion of the Murucha – with strong emphasis on education 
and monotheistic orthodoxy – has created a great tension among the Murucha. The tension is also shared by the 
other communities of Bandarban district. The story of the coming of Krama, in which a native Murucha young boy 
appeared as a “prophet” who then eventually “disappeared” for good, is the subject of talk and debates in many 
households. 
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members of the communities, and at times winter clothes to the poor and needy.  Since the 
community of Golden River did not have a community center or electricity, I provided the 
community festival with food on holidays, and individual members of the community with 
clothes and photos as I did with the other communities in the locality.  
It is beyond my scope here to further elaborate strategies involving my manner, courtesy, 
and respect that I employed in everyday interaction with individuals and communities for 
rapport. Nevertheless, I believe that my own childhood experiences of living in a village where I 
learned the behaviors, norms, values and folkways of village communities were instrumental in 
helping me to connect with the men and women in the communities.  
In summary, over the period of one year I examined through ethnography the 
environmental development projects of social forestry, forest resettlements, and village common 
forests, and the ways they shaped and changed social relations and relations of power of the hill 
peoples when run by the Forest Department or indigenous NGOs. In my fieldwork research with 
projects’ communities and organizations, I used several methods combining techniques of 
participant observation with in-depth interviews, informal interviews, directed group 
conversation, life histories, and surveys. In addition, as previously mentioned, I undertook 
extensive document and library research in CHT and in Dhaka. The significance of this 
methodology is that I did not rely totally on secondary data, and historical data was taken 
directly from original sources, much of which have not been exposed to scholarly examination or 
presented in their original forms. Most important, however, is the fact that the understanding and 
arguments I present here did not emerge solely from research, data, or evidence, but from 
differences of “structures of feeling”, to borrow Raymond Williams’ phrase, i.e., the lived and 
shared experiences of the place and communities, broadly defined (Williams 1977). In other 
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words, my feeling of being ‘other’ and ‘foreign’ never disappeared during the entire period of 
fieldwork in CHT, and there was a constant reminder of my own and others’ ethnicity as my 
local research assistants tried to dominate my relation to the communities through their selective 
representations of the communities, let alone the intervention of the army, civil officials and 
Forest Department. This difference of my being “ethnic” or “other” in terms of identities, 
positions and relations of power both enabled and constrained my knowing and unknowing of 
fields, lives, and issues of the hill peoples. 
 
1.5  The Structure of the Dissertation  
The goal of this dissertation is to examine how discourses of forest and forest relations in CHT 
have changed and shaped agrarian relations of the hill peoples and their relations to power, and 
to describe the effects of such changes. I have organized different chapters around the political 
regimes of Britain, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and drawn on ethnographic accounts to help 
explain the chronological history of the making and remaking of political forests in relation to 
the hill peoples of Bangladesh. The dissertation, however, is not a history of forest per se; 
instead, it offers a genealogy of forests and forest relations as relations of power and how they 
came to be constituted over time in one particular social-ecological context of CHT.  
 In Chapter Two, I deal with British rule (1760-1947) in CHT to provide a historical 
account of the making of the state, society and forest in the region. This chapter shows that until 
1860 CHT was the eastern frontier of the British colony of Bengal. Up until this point, ethnic 
relations in CHT were unstable and influenced by the adjacent princely states of Tripura and 
Arakan; the people were self-sufficient, politically decentralized and living in a ‘tribal’ system of 
governance. Though hills and land in the region were covered with trees, grasses, canes, 
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bamboos, bushes and jungles, they were not considered as forest or property of the state or 
community to be extracted for the market or regulated for conservation. The forest of CHT, as in 
other parts of Bengal, came into existence following the Forest Act of 1865 as part of the wider 
discourse and practice of sovereign rights over uncultivable waste land, timber trees, and jungle, 
in addition to the material interests of timber and revenue. However, unlike other areas in 
Bengal, almost the entire CHT comprised hills and forests. The specific conjuncture that led to 
making CHT as forest was the violence in and around CHT. Thus, the making of forest in CHT 
became a key strategy of power to govern CHT, and involved creating large areas of political 
forests in the borders, extending the Reserved Forests, and territorializing hill Chiefs’ 
administration and civil administration; on many occasions, this denied the hill peoples’ access 
and common rights of control over forests and land resources. In turn, British policy in CHT 
resulted in an exceptional system of government, an indirect rule of local elites under a 
protectionist and absolutist bureaucracy. The consequence of British rule was exploitation of 
forest resources, political isolation, and land alienation.         
Chapter Three describes the Pakistani regime (1947-1971) and examines the remaking of 
the forest in CHT in relation to capital, knowledge and industries. It shows that the remaking of 
forest and participatory forestry had a differential impact on the Reserved Forests and Unclassed 
State Forest. In the Reserved Forests, remaking of forest was associated with the industrial needs 
of timber and scientific management over the forest and landscapes; the practices of taungya 
mode of participatory forestry by forest villagers remained unchanged. Changes in Unclassed 
State Forest were related to resettlement of the hill peoples displaced by industrial development 
(namely, the Kaptai hydro-electric power plant). The resettlement programs introduced 
considerable changes in agrarian relations and relations of power, and reframed a participatory 
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forestry program in USF. This chapter also describes the material and ecological contexts of 
insurgency and contemporary land conflict, while tracing the idea of CHT model of development 
which was taken up by the Bangladesh state after Bangladesh’s independence as part of counter-
insurgency.        
Chapter Four presents accounts of insurgency and counter-insurgency programs of forest 
resettlement during Bangladesh rule, and examines the changing discourse of forest, forest 
settlement and agrarian relations in USF. The chapter explains the origin and geographies of the 
insurgency movement and maps the counter-insurgency development programs to illustrate 
changes in the control of Unclassed State Forest and agrarian relations as they exist today. This 
shows how counter-insurgency greatly transformed land, agrarian relations and relations of 
power through the expansion of territorial control of forests, the introduction of a private 
property regime in USF, and the introduction of other programs, including forest resettlement 
designed as a form of participatory forestry. The chapter also includes an ethnographic account 
of a forest resettlement project to provide an example of how development works in practice, its 
effects and limits, and the extent to which it shapes and changes the lives and livelihoods of hill 
peoples.     
Chapter Five examines the effects of insurgency and counter-insurgency on the Reserved 
Forests in CHT. In particular, I illustrate the ways in which the insurgency and counter-
insurgency affected, altered or facilitated ecological and economic changes in the Matamuhuri 
Reserve and its communities of forest villagers. This chapter questions the perceived wisdom 
that blames the hill peoples and their mode of jhum cultivation for forest encroachment and 
deforestation. Through narratives of local memories and history, I show that both encroachment 
and deforestation of the Matamuhuri Reserve are related to counter- insurgency and resource 
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conflicts between Bengalis and the hill peoples. Importantly, the chapter also deals with 
contemporary discourses and practices of social forestry to examine practices and limits of social 
forestry programs in the Reserve, and the ways in which it shapes forest management and forest 
villagers’ relations to forest and lands.The chapter provides ethnographic arguments as to why 
the social forestry program will perpetuate unsettlement and displacement of the hill peoples and 
thereby perpetuate the ethnic conflicts in CHT.    
Chapter Six deals with an indigenous movement of CHT and explores how indigenous 
environmentalism mobilizes civil society groups, NGOs and elites, and how it articulates 
indigenous issues with forest and environment and identity. In this chapter, I consider the 
indigenous movement led by Taungya, a local NGO of CHT, and its village common forest 
(VCF). The main success of the movement is not VCF but the mobilization of large groups of 
grassroots actors and educated young men and women who desire to help their rural cousins 
against forces of the state, market and business in order to protect dispossession and land 
alienation.               
In Chapter Seven I provide conclusions and a synthesis of this dissertation. The chapter 
highlights the differences between colonial and postcolonial governmentality in CHT and further 
analyses the ethics of the practice of development and the rule of the Bangladesh state in CHT.   
In sum, this interdisciplinary dissertation aims to cross the disciplines of anthropology, 
environmental history and political ecology to contribute to an understanding of the history, 
trajectories and limits of political forest in relation to “ethnically” different and “small group” 
peoples living within nation-states.  It will further add to the epistemological critiques of 
contemporary development practices in the context of Bangladesh and South Asia (Marcus and 
Fischer, 1999). My attempt to critique environmental development knowledge and practices 
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follows a concern about the hegemony of development practice in the Third World and is not 
meant to critique “development” per se (Ferguson 1994; Li 2007). Rather, my aims are to 
increase our understanding of the limits of ideology in order to change policy and practices of 
environment and development in CHT, and to promote environmental and social justice in 
Bangladesh. Finally, this dissertation brings studies on governmentality and social movements 
into conversation with research on CHT, studies of South Asian historical political ecology, and 
South Asian historiography. My hope is that this dissertation will deepen our understanding of 
emerging debates on indigenous identities, government and the state in South Asia.  
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CHAPTER II 
The Making of Political Forests and the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
 
2.1  Introduction  
Building on the concept of “political forests” as discussed by Vandergeest and Peluso (1995; 
2001), this chapter examines and illustrates the making of political forest and participatory 
forestry and the manner through which the discourses and practices of forestry shaped and 
changed the relations of forests and land in the Chittagong Hill Tracts during British rule (1760- 
1947). In doing so, I aim to make the category of the “natural forest” and the perceived 
“newness” of participatory forestry —what is commonly referred to as social or community 
forestry —into unfamiliar and archaic terrain. For analytical purposes, I divide the British rule 
into two regimes, a division that is in part based on the local history of CHT: the early British 
regime of 1760 to 1860 (which somewhat parallels the East India Company regime) and the late 
British regime of 1860 to 1947. Considering the making of political forest in the CHT, I concur 
with South Asian scholars who maintain that the development of forest had been uneven in 
British India (Rangarajan 1996; Skaria 1998; Sivaramakrishnan 1999). In particular, I follow 
Sivaramakrishnan’s arguments that during the early period of British rule, the British Empire in 
Bengal was primarily built on land revenue settlement, and forests were considered as limiting 
the expansion of agriculture. The British authorities saw a clear need for agricultural expansion 
into forests which included wasteland (Sivaramakrishnan 1999). The making of political forests 
in Bengal (including CHT) —through legal sanction, reservation, demarcation and control — 
only began after the first Forest Act of 1865, a result of widespread concern by state authorities 
over timber shortages across the British Indian Empire (Sivaramakrishnan 1997; 1999). Thus, I 
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argue that as landscapes, resources and governmental spaces of scientific management and 
political power, forests in CHT did not exist before their construction in the late 1860s. Having 
said that, I am not suggesting that land and hills covered with trees, bamboo, bushes, or jungles 
were not present in the CHT, but that the space and category of forests depended on acts of 
power involving discursive and non-discursive processes and practices. To be specific, I argue 
that the forest of the CHT arose as part of the discourse of sovereignty informed by the 
discursive processes concerning the frontier, and was contingent on state-making (but compare 
Sivaramakrishnan 1999). Drawing on Stuart and Walker (2003) and Mbembe (2001), I am using 
the term discourse of sovereignty more generally to refer to the bodies of political and legal 
statements such as laws, customs or conventions that define, deny and exercise the state’s 
authorities and rights over space, life and things. In this usage of the term, “sovereignty” refers to 
persons, state or state authorities (including traditional or customary authorities) whose rights, 
including the rights of denial, are considered supreme or “natural”, whether it be accepted, 
contested or resisted by subordinate political communities or groups.  
In what follows, I begin by investigating the early British regime and its relations to 
forests and the hill peoples, and illustrate how CHT emerged as a landscape and place. I also 
illustrate how the identities of hill peoples were bounded and constructed through differences 
between hills and plains, and between settled agriculture and jhum cultivation. I show that until 
1860, the land and hills of CHT were seen as barriers to agriculture, and the trees, bushes and 
grasses that covered the uneven terrain were seen primarily as places of wilderness. Importantly, 
the hill peoples were considered primitive and wild, and hence untenable for government and 
civilization. In this context, I would like to argue that the CHT may be considered a frontier that 
was shaped by the perceived differences between plains, hills and violence. By frontier, I mean 
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an imagined or a material terrain that is neither ruled nor governed by the state, but rather by 
local elites from whom the state claims political recognition in the form of consent, gifts, or 
tribute rather than taxes (Tsing 2003). I also intend it as a system of exceptional rule, where 
political power is dispersed among local elites; the economy is more or less localized within the 
community that resides in the social spaces; and the sovereignty, authority and the rights of the 
state over the spaces, resources, local elites and communities are shared and contested (Leach 
1960; Peluso and Lund 2011; Sivaramakrishnan 1999). 
Second, I deal with the making of political forests and the state in CHT, and the 
consequences of these practices on hill peoples’ agrarian and power relations during the latter 
period of British rule. In particular, I examine the discourses that created political forests in the 
CHT and I illustrate differences between Reserved Forests (RF) and Unclassed State Forests 
(USF) in terms of their sovereign territorial control and customary rights. In so doing, I further 
consider the process of internal territorialization of USF that enabled state-making, including the 
civil administration of state authorities as well as the traditional administration of indigenous 
chiefs and headmen. I show how internal territorialization in USF differentiated agricultural 
lands and forests as well as common property and individual property for private agriculture with 
differential access rights and control. In sum, this section demonstrates the effects of political 
forests on hill peoples’ agrarian relations, state institutions and emerging colonial 
governmentality in CHT, particularly the permanent dispossession of the hill peoples’ control 
over land and forest as well as the economic differentiation between and among the hill peoples’ 
communities.  
Third, I examine forest management, mainly the management and control of the Reserved 
Forests. I demonstrate that forest management was primarily concerned with the Reserved 
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Forests and comprised timber extraction and plantation in the CHT shaped by relative 
accessibility, ecology and economy. The technique of forest plantation known as taungya
39
 (i.e. 
forest plantation through jhum cultivation or slash and burn agriculture) institutionalized the 
“forest villager system” as part of forest management in the Reserves, and I demonstrate that 
despite its limitation, scope and scale, taungya forestry represented the earliest form of 
participatory social forestry in practice.
40
  
Finally, in the concluding section, I summarize my arguments to consider the nature and 
rationalities of British rule in CHT. I argue that paternalistic laws, administration and discipline 
dominated British governmentality. Governmental concerns about the population did not arise to 
provide care for the wellbeing of the hill peoples, as governing the hill peoples was mainly 
concerned with the economic activities of individual jhum cultivators.  
In sum, this chapter is about the making of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), the hill 
peoples, forests and the state at the southeastern border of colonial Bengal during British rule. 
The geographical scope of the chapter goes beyond Chittagong and CHT to include Arakan and 
Hill Tripura. In addition to the hill people groups, the chapter also makes reference to the so 
                                                          
39
 Taungya is an agro-silviculture technique for forest plantation and was invented by Dietrich Brandis, the first 
Inspector- General of Forest in British India. It was first practiced for planting teak in the Prome district of Burma in 
1856 and incorporated in general forest plantation, particularly the plantation of teak, throughout Burma and British 
India in the early 1860s after successful experimentation (Stebbing 1921: 367-391; see also Bryant 1994, 1997). 
40
 The importance and concreteness of taungya as a form of participatory forestry had long been overlooked until 
recently, though taungya had widely been practiced in British India and Burma and has continued to be so in parts of 
Asia (Nair 1990; Peluso 1995). It is worth mentioning here that in Burma the practices involved Karen taungya 
cultivators, who would sow teak along with dry hill taungya cultivation in a systematic manner that provided 
benefits in addition to their taungya crops. These benefits varied at times and places and included direct payments, 
tax exemption, or usurer rights on lands for their own use (Bryant 1994).  
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called Kuki-groups, namely the Shendu, the Lushai and at times the Panku and Bawm (see Table 
2.1 below).
41
  
 
2.2  Making of CHT as a Frontier 
The East India Company took over Chittagong in 1760.
42 
 By the early 1770s, the Company had 
risen to political supremacy in Bengal and the British Empire expanded across South Asia and 
Myanmar (Burma). Nevertheless, the Chittagong plain —inhabited primarily by Bengalis, a 
stable and populous peasant community of Bengal —remained the eastern limit of the British 
Empire until 1860. The adjoining mountainous and forested parts of Chittagong in the east, 
known as ‘Capas Mehals’ and later as Chittagong Hill Tracts, were then inhabited and shared by 
the hill peoples’ groups as well as the Shendu and other groups of the Mizo people (of Mizoram, 
India); the British neither ruled them directly nor formally recognized the local chiefs’ 
sovereignty or political control. In his book titled, The Hill Tracts of Chittagong and the 
Dwellers Therein, Captain Thomas Herbert Lewin, the first Deputy Commissioner of CHT, 
summarized this in the following words:  
On the 6
th
 May 1784, Government wrote to Mr. Irwin, the Chief [Commissioner] of 
Chittagong, desiring to have his opinion fully, whether by lenient measures, the 
inhabitants of the hills, might not be induced to become peaceable subjects and 
cultivators of low lands. No practical result, however, ensued, and the tribes do not crop 
                                                          
41
It may be relevant to note that in the early years of British occupation, the term “Kukis” also referred to all hill 
peoples groups, excluding the Chakma, the Marma and the Tripura (Lewin 1969:28; cf. Schendel 1992: footnote 
31).  
42
 British rule in India began in Bengal in 1757 when the British East India Company’s forces led by Lieutenant-
Colonel Robert Clive defeated the semi-independent Mughals’ Nawab of Bengal at the Battle of Plassey by 
arranging the defection of the Nawab’s commander of troops. At this time, the Mughal Empire itself was involved in 
a regional skirmish (Ludden 2002). The takeover of Chittagong by the British went along with Burdawan and 
Midnapore to “meet the expenses of the army which the British agreed to maintain for the support and assistance of 
the nawab of Bengal [and they together accounted for] one-third of the whole revenue of the Bengal” (Serajuddin 
1971:12).       
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up again until the 21
st
 April 1829, when Mr. Helhed, Commissioner, writes that he finds 
that the hill tribes are not subjects, but merely tributaries. ‘I do not recognize any right on 
our part to interfere with their internal arrangements. We have no authority in the hills; 
the payment of the tribute which is trivial in amount in each instance is guaranteed by a 
third party, resident in our own territory, and who is alone responsible. He derives his 
own profits from the arrangements under stipulations which have no place in his 
agreement with us. He is merely an agent, or mooktear, or medium of communication 
between his constituents and the authorities. He is not the ruler of the clan he represents, 
and possesses no control over the member of it. [. . .] Up to 1829, therefore, we seem to 
have exercised no direct influence or rule over the hill tribes. The near neighbourhood, 
however, of a powerful and stable government brought the Chiefs [of the hills] by 
degrees under our influence, and by the end of the 18
th
 century every leading Chief paid 
to the Chittagong Collector a certain tribute or yearly gift made to purchase the privilege 
of free-trade between the inhabitants of the hills and the men of the plains. […] Until the 
year 1860, it appears we did not interfere directly with the internal economy of the hills 
(Lewin 1869:22-23). 
 
Published in 1869, Lewin’s book is considered “the first” 43 detailed account of the CHT, 
and Lewin as paramount authority on the CHT, but Lewin did not explain how and why this 
“non-interference” form of indirect relation developed and what it meant. Interestingly, Lewin 
republished the book as Wild Races of the Eastern Frontier India from London in the next year 
with a new introduction that described the hill peoples as “wild,” “savage,” “barbarians,” and 
“very little better, indeed, than the apes among who they reside” (Lewin 1870:2). He also 
claimed a “novelty” for his part in introducing them to English readers.  
This characterization of the hill peoples, along with other patterns of silence and denial 
about the early colonial regime, suggests that the hill peoples, polity and landscapes of the CHT 
did not easily fit into an emerging governmentality of colonial rule in Bengal. In Modern Forest, 
Sivaramakrishnan (1999) explained these differences of colonial governmentality while he 
examined the making of state and forests in the southwestern colonial Bengal districts of 
                                                          
43
Much before Lewin, Francis Buchanan visited the region of Chittagong Hill Tracts and provided a very detailed 
account of the peoples and the region, which remained unnoticed and unpublished until1992 (Schendel 1992). 
Nevertheless, we must give Lewin credit for publishing his account of the CHT first and for writing at length about 
the hill peoples. In 1912, Lewin also published A Fly on a Wheel: or, How I Helped to Govern India (Lewin 1912). 
An analysis of Lewin’s contributions in shaping the frontier administration is beyond the scope of this research. 
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Burdawan and Midnapore he argued that the differences were primarily based on a discourse of 
land revenue settlement in the plains. He called the hill regions a “zone of anomaly” where the 
making of the colonial state was thwarted by place, people and landscape. Despite some 
similarities between these western and eastern jungle regions of Bengal, one significant 
difference between them was that the British hardly attempted to govern CHT, the eastern part of 
Chittagong. Thus, I qualify this early British regime in CHT as a ‘frontier’, and I argue that the 
CHT as a frontier emerged not only from discourses of land revenue settlement and the 
difference between plains and hills but also hill peoples’ resistance and continued violence in the 
region. In this section, I describe and discuss this frontier relation of the British and the CHT 
with three specific purposes in mind. First, I challenge the perceived wisdom that forests are 
“natural” or “pristine” categories; instead, I demonstrate that what one refers to as forests in CHT 
were being used and altered in the past by hill peoples and other communities who lived in or 
around them. Second, I provide evidence (supporting the idea of political forests) that the 
existence of forests depends on discursive and non-discursive forces of power and strategies of 
territorial control. Third, and importantly, I explore the frontier relationship as it existed and the 
ways in which it bore significance to colonial governmentality that emerged (in CHT) during the 
late colonial regime.                    
What was CHT like before the British occupation of Chittagong? Historical accounts 
suggest that much of the area of Chittagong (including the CHT) had been a bone of contention 
for centuries among the traditional states of Arakan, Bengal, and Tripura, as well as among 
Portuguese pirates. The hill peoples and the other groups then living in the CHT and beyond had 
arrived in the region in different waves, the result of war and conflict with the traditional states 
of Hill Tripura, Arakan, and Bengal (Lewin 1869: 21-23; Schendel 1992: xv; cf. Roy C. 2000; 
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Scott 2009). Among these hill peoples’ groups, the Chakma and the Marma were the most 
prominent and numerous. Both groups lived closely along the Chittagong plains and 
intermingled with the Bengalis, fearing attacks from the Bawm, the Pankho, the Shendu, the 
Lushai, and other groups to the East, all known vaguely as “Kukis” (see Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1: Ethnic Groups of the Chittagong Hill Tracts by their Collective Group Name at the 
time of British Occupation of Chittagong and Chittagong Hill Tracts   
 
Collective Ethnic Name Members of the Group 
The hill peoples (“hill tribes” of Chittagong 
Hill Tracts) 
Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, 
Bawm, Panku, Lushai, Khumi, Khyang, 
Sak and Murucha (Mro) 
The Kukis  Shendu and the Bawm, Panku and Lushai 
of the hill peoples  
 
The Chakma occupied most of the central and northern portion of the region on the banks of the 
Feni and Karnaphuli rivers, and their territories also included Rangunia areas of the Chittagong 
plain (Hunter 1973; Qanungo 1998). The Marma occupied the southern part of the Karnaphuli 
River on the banks of the Matamuhuri and Sangu rivers, including the areas of Sitakund hills and 
Cox’s Bazar of the southern Chittagong plain (Schendel 1992: 34-35, and 58-65). The Tripura 
lived in the north of the CHT, bordering the Hill Tripura (Tripura, India), and also in adjoining 
districts, such as Chittagong, Noakhali, Comilla, and Sylhet, whereas the Tanchangya were to the 
east of the CHT, close to the Chakmas. The Khumi, the Khyang, the Mrucha, the Bawm and the 
Pankho lived in remote southern and southeastern parts along the banks of the Matamuhuri and 
69 
 
Sangu rivers, at times with or around the Marma. The last two groups, the Shendu and the 
Lushai, primarily inhabited the land in and around the Lushai and Arakan Hills, the remotest 
eastern portion of the CHT.  
The people in each group were autonomous, living in non-permanent villages based 
largely upon kinship (or fictive kinship) and/or “common descent” (Kuper 1982).  Each group 
had a chief or chiefs, and each was independent of the others, internally uniform in tradition and 
customs (Schendel 1992).  However, the position of chiefs among the Chakma and Marma was 
one of great power and importance, and by some accounts they were considered pre-colonial 
“rulers” of the region (Qanungo 1998; Roy C. 2000; cf. Lewin 1912). The chiefs of the Chakma 
and Marma had paid “voluntary” tribute to the Mughals for access to trade with Bengalis of the 
plains and they appeared to have control over forest resources. In addition, the Chakma chiefs 
held the Zamindari
44
 of Rangunia from the period of the Mughals, for which they paid separate 
revenue (Serajuddin 1971; see also, Hutchinson 1909: 24). Both the Chakmas’ and Marma’ 
chiefs also had many subordinate officials, such as Dewan and Rowaza, who respectively 
oversaw their village communities, collected what can be called household tax or  “jhum tax” 
from their kinsmen, and meted out justice.
45
 Thus, the characteristic polity was the village 
community, governed by village elders, with political power dispersed among many “chiefs” 
(Schendel 1992, 1995).  
                                                          
44
 Zamindari was a system of landlordship that first originated during the Mughals. It became a political system of 
government and the principle form of land revenue settlement in Bengal during the East India Company; thus, 
Zamindar refers to a landlord or landlordship (for details, see Guha, Ranajit 1996). In Bangladesh, the system was 
abolished immediately after the partition of British India as the then East Bengal, now Bangladesh, became part of 
Pakistan.   
45
 I have called it household tax or at times jhum tax as it was levied upon a family of jhum cultivators. The tax is 
variously described as poll tax, capitation tax, or tribute paid by a jhum cultivating family to the chief of the 
community or the territory (Lewin 1869; Hunter 1973).     
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The region’s economy was based on relatively self-sufficient village communities that 
practiced slash-and-burn cultivation, locally known as jhum, and all jhum land and other 
resources belonged to the community that occupied them (Roy, C. 2000; Roy, D. 2000a). 
Excluding young children, all members of a family participated in jhum cultivation, producing 
various types of rice, corn, melons, and vegetables. Jhum also produced a large quantity of 
cotton and the region, as Lewin (1869) noted later, was “well fitted both in soil and climate for 
the production of cotton” (Lewin 1869:8).46 The extreme rarity of plough cultivation among the 
hill peoples cannot be attributed to technological ignorance or a “love for a wandering life” as 
Lewin (1869) argued.
47
 David Sopher (1964) correctly points to two interrelated conditions for 
the absence of this mode of production. The first was “the existence of an excess of cultivable 
swidden land in relation to the needs of the swidden population. [The second] was the probable 
absence of a prerequisite to permanent cultivation, namely, a measure of internal security that 
impeded the spread of plow cultivation” (Sopher 1964:124).  
Cotton, not money, was the currency among the hill peoples; all of the groups used it as 
“butter money” to trade with Bengalis for dried fish, salt, and other daily household items not 
produced by them. Cotton was also consumed by the hill peoples’ communities themselves by 
weaving homespun clothes; the chiefs further used it to negotiate political power with the 
Mughals (Schendel 1992). It also is reasonable to assume that other occupations such as hunting, 
                                                          
46
 According to W. W. Hunter, cotton export from the CHT during 1874-75 was 2,015 tons, which is partial but may 
give an idea about the quantity of cotton production in the region before the British occupation of Chittagong 
(Hunter 1973:84). 
47
 Lewin argues the hill peoples’ aversion to plough cultivation was so strong that when jhum land was exhausted 
from over-cultivation, they “steadfastly held aloof from the plough, preferring to earn a precarious subsistence by 
cutting and selling bamboo and hewing out boats. Some of them who could borrow a small amount of capital took 
up the profession of itinerant traders; [others might earn] their means of livelihood by rearing and herding cattle, for 
which the country afforded ample pasturage” (Lewin 1968:14). 
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gathering, fishing, weaving, and animal husbandry existed among all of the groups but 
production was limited to family consumption (see also Lewin 1869).  
Turning now to the development of early British relations and policies regarding the 
CHT, the most significant influence was hill peoples’ resistance. Known as “Chakma’s 
resistance”, hill peoples’ resistance to the British began in 1772, and was the first ever peasant 
resistance against the British (East India Company) after 1757 in Bengal. Up until this point, and 
somewhat following the Mughals tradition, the British authorities had collected cotton “tributes” 
from the Chakma and Marma chiefs through Bengali contractors. Unlike the Mughals, however, 
the British claimed territorial jurisdiction over the hills and began expanding land settlement 
through various forms of temporary land revenue settlements. It is important to note that before 
the Permanent Land Settlement Act of 1793, the British had tried and experimented with various 
forms of temporary land revenue settlements in the plains, including nowabad (new cultivation), 
which brought fallow jungle lands into cultivation and was new to the Chittagong plain 
(Qanungo 1998). It was this policy of land revenue settlement in the Chakma’s territory of 
Rangunia that set the stage for the Chakma’s resistance. Rangunia was then under Ranu Khan, a 
prominent Dewan, and included a large area of plain land. With the Bengalis moving to 
Rangunia receiving land settlement, the Chakma chief and the Dewans withheld their tribute to 
the British in order to reclaim their land rights and privilege as well their sovereign rights.  
They fixed the boundary between what they claimed as their jurisdiction and the plains; 
made it obligatory for the people of the plains to obtain pattas from them for cultivating 
lands within their jurisdiction, and to pay the rents to them; imposed a tax on the removal 
of grass, bamboo, firewood and timber from the hills; prohibited pasturing of cattle in the 
forests; and set up courts of justice for punishing trespassers (Serajuddin and Buller 
1984:93, italic mine).  
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The intricacies of the resistance between the British and the hill peoples need not be 
rehearsed here (see Qanungo 1998), but they certainly gave birth to the discourse of wild and 
savage people, as one finds in Lewin’s account of the hill peoples. Importantly, the resistance 
forced the British authorities at Chittagong to change their policies to deal with hill chiefs, and in 
turn brought about and shaped what I call frontier relations. Accordingly, in 1789, the 
government began making arrangements to collect taxes from jhum cultivators directly through 
recognizable chiefs of the CHT, depending on the chiefs’ willingness to submit to British 
authority. The government further introduced money as a medium of payment of the 
government’s share of jhum tax (or tribute) but allowed hill chiefs to fix the jhum tax according 
to their customs to be levied on jhum cultivators. Meanwhile, the British continued the policy of 
land revenue settlement in plains land with Bengali landlords and cultivators in its exercise to 
maintain sovereign rights over land. As a result, the Chakma were dispossessed from their rights 
over plains lands and pushed eastward into deep jungle areas of CHT. In turn, the Chakma chief 
was made a local agent of the British; however, unlike Zamindars or feudal landlords in the 
plains, the chief’s rights, power and authority were not defined by any written agreement or laws. 
In hindsight, the British authorities considered the Chakma chief as merely an agent for 
collecting jhum tax from kinsmen or any group who the chief was able to command; that is, the 
British recognized the chief’s right over his people only, but not over lands and other resources. 
However, as I show in the next section, the Chakma chief took his position as if he was a 
Zamindar much like in the plains, and engaged in bitter legal battles with the government during 
the late colonial regime (see GOB 1929).  
In the south of CHT, the British also made a similar jhum revenue settlement directly 
with Bohmong Koonglafru, the prominent Marma chief (hereafter Bohmong chief), in exchange 
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for tax/tribute to be paid in money to the government. The Bohmong chief was further allowed to 
collect jhum tax from groups other than his “kinsmen,” such as the Khumi, Khyang, Murucha, 
and Tripura (Schendel 1992: 34, 63-65). It may be relevant to note that the Bohmong chief, 
Koonglafru, was driven away to Arakan by the Mughals in 1756 but returned to the region in 
1774 after the British took over Chittagong (Hutchinson 1909).  
In the meantime, in 1784, the British also installed another chief in the south of CHT 
from the small groups of Arakanese Marma refugees, known as Palangsa Marma. This followed 
the Burmese occupation of Arakan in 1784 that brought thousands of refugees to the south of the 
Chittagong plains. Although most of the refugees abandoned the Chittagong plain immediately 
for the southern coasts of Bengal, fearing an impending war between the British and the 
Burmese, a group of refugees settled in the valley of Matamuhuri under the leadership of a chief 
by the name of Marachi. In 1789, the British also changed the method of payment to money for 
jhum revenue settlement with Marachi.   
Unsurprisingly, like the Chakma chief, both Marma chiefs were also denied rights to 
plain land revenue settlements, except to jhum cultivators— kinsmen and others who recognized 
them. The combination of the British land revenue settlement policy, particularly nowabad (new 
cultivation) in the southern Cox’s Bazar area of the Chittagong plain, and the incursion of 
Bengalis, pushed the Bohmong chief and his fellow groups gradually toward the hill areas of the 
south and the south-east; thus, in 1822, the Bohmong chief settled his residence in Bandarban at 
the bank of the Sangu River (Hunter 1973; Hutchinson 1909). Marachi, the Palangsa Marma 
chief (hereafter, Mong chief), and his followers also moved into the Sitakund hill areas of the 
Chittagong plain that had been abandoned by the Bohmong chief, and continued to live there 
until 1827 when the Mong chief received jhum revenue settlement in the interior hills in the 
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north of the CHT (i.e., present day Khagrachhari) (Hutchinson 1909; Bessainet 1958: 9). In other 
words, by the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the British policy of plains land revenue 
settlements had pushed the hill chiefs and hill peoples from the border in the Chittagong plain to 
the hills further east. This created a political, ecological and ethnic boundary between Chittagong 
plains and Chittagong hills, and the latter was to become and remain a frontier for some time. 
Beyond the Chakma’s resistance and the British policy of land revenue settlement, what 
made the CHT into a frontier and maintained it in this state was violence. Indeed, violence 
remained a signature feature of the CHT even up until the end of the nineteenth century 
(Hutchinson 1909:8-12). One aspect of the persistent violence was border conflicts between the 
British and the Burmese Empires. The Burmese occupation of Arakan in 1784 led to this border 
conflict between the two empires, as the British acceptance of Arakanese refugees increased the 
hostile feelings of the Burmese Court. The Burmese Court assembled armed men on the eastern 
side of the Naf River and began attacking “elephant hunters in the public service, and the peoples 
were killed or carried off and sold as slaves” (Hunter 1973: 121). These acts of violence by the 
Burmese raised British concerns about the security of Chittagong, and led the British to declare 
war with Burma in 1824 (known as the First Anglo-Burmese War). This was followed by the 
Burmese occupation of a British island near the Naf River, Shahpuri, and the killing and 
expelling of British subjects (Hunter 1973). The war ended during the same year, and the British 
annexed Arakan (Schendel 1992).  
Although the British annexation of Arakan ended Burmese hostility and violence in the 
region, new violence by so called “kuki groups” erupted in the interior parts of CHT. Intergroup 
violence, plundering of jhum cultivators’ villages, and killing and enslavement of men, women 
and children had a long history across the hill regions from Assam to Burma, and so too in parts 
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of the CHT (Shakespear 1909; Mackenzie 1884). It appears that the British authorities at 
Chittagong paid little attention to intergroup violence until 1830, and it was only when it 
disrupted the stability of the Bohmong chief’s territory and security of revenue of the British that 
the internal conflict became visible to the British (Mackenzie 1884: 333). In the early 1830s, 
there were several raids in the Bohmong territory which were committed by the Murucha, Khumi 
or Bawm, who were the Bohmong chief’s subjects. Interestingly, all these raids were upon 
Marma villages in the Bohmong territory, and were apparently over disputes regarding the 
position of chief among the Bohmong family members after the death of Bohmong Satung Pru. 
In 1847, the Commissioner of Chittagong, Mr. Henry Ricketts, personally intervened and helped 
to arm the new Bohmong chief for the security of his subjects and to give him additional 
remission to his revenue payment to the government. The government also sent a military 
expedition against the raiders. Nevertheless, the various clans of the Shendu and Lushai 
continued to engage in violence across the hill regions, including the Chittagong plain, and made 
numerous raids into parts of CHT. In response, Mr. Ricketts proposed to separate CHT from the 
Chittagong plain in 1847 (Mackenzie 1884:338). The government squarely opposed Mr. 
Ricketts’ idea as it would have been inconvenient to define the boundary of the territory and its 
expenses, and it also opposed any consideration of removing its responsibility to protect the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts and solely protecting the settled parts of the Chittagong plain. An 1854 
government police inquiry provides a detailed picture of the raids and several policies to deal 
with the subject of raids which is worthy of examination: 
During the last seventeen years there had been nineteen raids in which 107 had been 
slain, fifteen wounded, and 186 carried captive. The whole of these forays were believed 
to be the work of [Shendu] or tribes from the south, the Superintendent exonerated both 
the Phu [Bohmong] chief and the Chukma Rani from all complicity. The Bohmong or 
Poang had stocked six posts, in which he kept squads of ill-armed retainers. But it did not 
appear they had ever prevented a raid or punished raiders. Efforts had been made through 
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the Arracan authorities to ransom the captives from the [Shendu], but without success: 
and it had been proposed to establish a line of frontier posts garrisoned by one [Marma] 
battalion; also to create a Joomea police under hill Chiefs, well armed and located at 
central thannas who should protect their neighbours from forays by the outer tribes. But 
to this there was the great objection of the expense, which the returns from the Kapas 
Mehal would be quite insufficient to cover (Mackenzie 1884:338).                           
 
It appeared that the government was concerned about the difficulty of using military 
expeditions to punish offenders, and it surely thought such an expedition would be unsuccessful 
not only because of the “unhealthy climate” but also the improbability of reaching the offenders 
and distinguishing them from others. The government further considered that establishment of 
military posts would be costly, lengthy and difficult. In the end, the government provided the hill 
chiefs, especially the Bohmong chief, with arms in 1858 to combat the raids, but this policy also 
proved unsuccessful in preventing raids. In 1860, a violent raid, known as the “Great invasion of 
Kukis”, took place in CHT. It was directly in response to this invasion that the government was 
forced to separate the CHT (the hill region to the east of Chittagong) from the Chittagong plain, 
and named it after Chittagong as the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Accordingly, the CHT was 
made a district in 1860 for civil and revenue administration, with a boundary created to mark not 
only the existing political differences between Bengalis and hill peoples but also the ecological 
and ethnic divisions between them (Mackenzie 1884). The district was placed under a 
Superintendent within an exceptional administrative system unlike that established in the Santhal 
Pargana to oversee the administration of the CHT “in the simplest manner… respecting customs 
and prejudice of the hill people” without allowing Bengali middlemen to represent the people 
(Lewin 1869:23-24). The position of Superintendent was upgraded to that of Deputy 
Commissioner in 1867 under the Commissioner of Chittagong. The extent to which this shift in 
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the policy changed hill peoples’ relations to the state, how and with what effects I will consider 
in next section.        
In sum, through a careful reading and scrutiny of official government writings, I have 
tried to argue that from 1760 to 1860 the CHT was a frontier to the British Empire and that the 
British had claimed (un-successfully) to exercise sovereign power and control over the CHT. All 
chiefs paid arbitrarily fixed amounts of jhum or household tax as tribute. The chiefs’ offices were 
considered as “estates” or “human taluk” by the British authorities (No. 532 1/07/1872 in GOB 
1929: 48-61). The state authorities at Chittagong appointed chiefs according to custom, and 
when there was no dispute over recognizable inheritance, or the customary heir was a minor, the 
British authorities temporarily took over the office of the chief (Hutchinson 1909; Mackenzie 
1884). Importantly, the Permanent Land Settlement Act of 1793 that was supposed to apply to 
the CHT was never implemented; the hill peoples did not receive plains land settlement. The 
only exception was the Chakma chief and a prominent Dewan of the Chakma who received a 
temporary wasteland settlement in their territory in 1818, cultivated by Bengali tenants (Hunter, 
1973). The British authorities in the Chittagong plain also at times defied their own policy 
principles for dealing with hill peoples and made jhum revenue settlements with Bengali 
speculators. The authorities also commonly exercised their power to lease out grasskholas or 
land with grass, and allowed Bengali woodcutters and ivory collectors into the CHT. The British 
further collected a transit tax of all produce carried to markets at the border between the 
Chittagong plain and the CHT (Hunter 1973). The chiefs of the CHT had remained sovereign to 
the extent that they shared and negotiated their sovereignty with the state; they also appeared to 
have some rights and control over jhum lands and other resources, but ownership of the lands 
and other resources was always contested, neither recognized nor denied.  
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2.3  The Making of Political Forests and the State 
This section examines the origin of political forests in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), 
including how political forests shaped the state and in turn changed the frontier relations as well 
as hill peoples’ relations to forests, land and power. The focus of this section is hill peoples’ 
agrarian relations and customary rights. I will demonstrate that forests in the CHT originated as 
political forests only in the early1870s as part of a wider practice of forest conservation in 
colonial Bengal as well as other parts of British India. Since then until to the end of British rule 
in South Asia, the land and hills with trees, bush, or jungle – in some cases irrespective of them – 
were created as forests in the CHT and also other parts of Bengal by the discourse of sovereignty 
and related discourses of land revenue settlement and customary rights. As such, the forests in 
colonial Bengal and elsewhere in British India were also constituted as territories of sovereign 
control and were shaped by several factors including but not limited to the conflict between civil 
and forest officials, local resistance, and most importantly the strategies of internal 
territorialization (Agrawal, A 2005; Rangarajan 1996; Sabherwal 1999; Sivaramakrishnan 1999; 
Skaria 1999; but compare Philip 2004). In turn, forests were enrolled in a new economy of public 
enterprise under a bureaucracy, for both conservation and timber demands, in contrast to 
agriculture and the agrarian economy represented by private property and interests (Agrawal and 
Sivaramakrisnan 2000). As I describe below, the case of the making of forests in CHT was 
consistent with this general pattern in Bengal, but with the important exception of the agrarian 
economy that was mainly based on a common property regime according to which jhum land 
was the common property of the hill peoples.  
In British India, debates over forests, the timber trades, and conservation began in the 
provinces of Bombay and Madras as early as the 1800s. In stark contrast, the making of forests 
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in the CHT and other parts of Bengal for timber or conservation only began in the 1860s. This 
followed the enactment of the Forest Act of 1865 that marked a new beginning of forest 
conservation as well as resource conflicts in South Asia (Stebbing 1921:514-520; 1923:371; cf. 
Guha 1990).
48
 To be specific, the Bengal government appointed Dr. T. Anderson, the 
Superintendent of the Royal Botanical Garden, Calcutta, as the Conservator of Forest in 1864, at 
the insistence of the central government. Anderson’s inquiries of 1864 revealed that most of the 
forested land and hills from the Darjeeling Hills to the Sundarbans, and from the Jungle Mehals 
to Chittagong, whether they covered trees, bush, or jungles, had been leased for agricultural 
expansion or permanently settled with Zamindars’ estates, and only a little was left for forest 
conservation. The government had little forested land under its control and had exercised only 
limited periodic sovereign control over the extraction of some tree or bamboo species and other 
forest products in different places (Stebbing 1923:375-403). This was so mainly because forests 
in Bengal during the early British regime were considered “limited agriculture”, and thus 
classified as wasteland (Sivaramakrishnan 1997: 75; Stebbing 1921:61-76). It was also because 
(much like CHT, as I have just discussed) the other forested regions in Bengal (such as Jungle 
Mehals, or Santhal Pargannas, or Darjeeling Hills) were mostly inhabited by subsistence 
agriculturalists or pastoralist communities, remaining marginal to British economic interests, and 
at times, on the frontiers of its political powers (Sivaramakrishnan 1999). Nevertheless, at the 
beginning of forest conservation in Bengal, Anderson’s work was limited to felling and making 
sleepers as well as forest planting in the areas of British Sikkim, British Duras and Darjeeling 
Terai rather than Bengal proper (Stebbing 1921:514-520). Mr. H. Leeds succeeded Anderson in 
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 This was the case in all of northern British India. In Punjab Himalayas, Kumaon and Garhwal, the discussion of 
forestry did not start until the 1860s (see Brandis 1875 for details of the progress of forest conservation in British 
India before the Forest Act of 1865).  
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1867 as Conservator of Forest and gave forest conservancy in the CHT and other parts of Bengal 
a ‘proper’ start.  
Concerning the beginning of forest conservation in CHT, the Chittagong Forest Division 
was created in 1868 under Leeds’ guidance; the Chief Commissioner of Chittagong was made a 
Conservator of Forest with an assistant conservator in his office (Stebbing 1923:371-431). In the 
same year, the forest of the CHT was surveyed locally and a proposal for conservation in the 
CHT was also forwarded to the Government of Bengal (Lewin 1869; Sivaramakrishnan 1997). 
Crucially, the forests of the CHT at that time had neither royal tree species of teak (tectona 
grandis) nor dominant tree species of Bengal such as sal (shorea robusta) and sissu (dalbergia 
sissoo); rather, they were comprised mainly of local timber species such as jarul (lagerstroemia 
speciosa), gramar (gmelina arborea), chapalish (artocarpus chaplasha), toon (cedrela toona) 
and chikrashi (chikrassia tabularis) which were considered to be fine timber (Lewin 1869, 
Appendix A; Cowan 1923a; 1923b; 1923c).
49
  In 1871, as the Bengal Forest Rules came into 
force, almost the entire area of the CHT was declared state forests in accordance with the 
provisions of section 2 of the Forest Act of 1865 (Hunter 1973:29).
50
  
Central to the forest law and its intelligibility that created forests in the CHT was a 
discourse of sovereignty, that is, the rights of the sovereign over forests. Emerging from state 
engagement in forests in Madras, Bombay, and British Burma in the late eighteenth century, this 
discourse further extended the colonial state’s rights to forest resources that held the state as the 
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 One characteristic feature of Bengal forests was ecological diversity. Dominant forest tree species in Bengal were 
sal and sissu in the north and western regions, and sundari (heritiera fomes), gewa (excoecaria agallocha), goran 
(ceriops decandra), keora (sonneratia apetala) and other species in the south-western costal region. Most other 
forests held a variety of local species.  
50
 It is also noteworthy that in 1862, immediately after making the CHT into a district, the Deputy Commissioner of 
CHT set up tolls for river borne timber and other forest products, and these were leased to hill chiefs in 1864. In 
1871, the Forest Department took charge of the main toll stations, leaving only one to the Mong chief (No. 532, 
1/07/1872 in GOB 1929: 48-62, paragraphs 33-39).   
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absolute proprietor of forest land in British India. One interpretation of this discourse was, as 
Baden-Powell (1874) puts it:  
Wherever the State is the absolute proprietor of forest lands, it can of course exercise its 
proprietary rights and keep these lands in a proper condition; even where its right is 
limited, it can, at any rate, protect so much as it has. 
 
In the exercise of the proprietary rights, however, the State is not actuated by the purely 
selfish or temporary motives of a private owner or speculator. The State is to be 
considered rather as called on to fulfill a great public trust, on which it brings to bear the 
resources of the superior skill and knowledge at its command as well as the executive 
force of its servants and employes (Baden-Powell and Gamble 1874: 3).  
 
Although this discourse was primarily built on European examples of forest management, it 
further justified the state’s absolutist claim on interpretations of pre-colonial “native” rulers’ 
authority, specifically the roles of Tipu Sultan of Mysore, the Amirs of Sindh, and the Alampra 
Dynasty of Burma (Stebbing 1921:34-38). For example, in 1874, in a conference paper on The 
Defects of the Existing Forest Law (Act of VII 1865) and Proposal for a New Forest Act, Baden-
Powell writes: 
A very large proportion of [the Indian forests] are admitted to be the absolute property of 
the State, at any rate in theory. The State had not, it is true, exercised that full right; the 
forest was left open to any one who chose to use it, but the right was there. Every native 
ruler closed, when he chose, whole areas of forests to preserve the game, and as in the 
well known instance of the forests of the Amris of Sindh, and in other parts, punished 
with the utmost cruelty the slightest trespass within the forest limits. Whenever this was 
not the case, people were in the habit of doing what they pleased, no one caring to stop 
them. Here, then, we have forest ‘absolutely the property of the State’ (Baden-Powell and 
Gamble, 1874: 4-5; italics in the original). 
 
This view held that customary practices of forest use in British India that had existed 
before British rule were a privilege; the villagers or rural communities who had used forests had 
never had forest rights.  However, the view was not uncontested. In particular, the Government 
of Madras opposed this view and suggested that “the state had no rights on uncultivated lands 
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that were invariably ‘village property, not village privilege’” (Guha 1996). The pioneer architect 
of forest institutions in the British Empire in India and Burma, Dietrich Brandis, also differed 
with the view, though he strongly supported the state takeover of the forest in India and Burma 
(Guha 1996). Brandis argued: “Forest rights in India have had a similar origin and development 
as in Europe, with that important difference that the arbitrary dealings of the Native Rulers have 
interfered [with] growth with these rights and have in many cases restricted or extinguished 
them” (Brandis 1875:14).      
What made the CHT a forest region? Compared with other forested regions in Bengal, 
the absence of land settlement in the CHT no doubt provided material grounds, but the main 
factor contributing to the actions of the time was the prevalence of jhum cultivation in the region. 
For example, in 1868, while participating in the debate on administration and political principles 
of the CHT, the officiating Commissioner of Chittagong Lord H. Ulick Browne wrote:   
I have always been desirous to lay in some way a slight foundation for the usual system 
of cultivation, with a view to its ultimately displacing the [jhuming] system entirely. Had 
it not been, however, for the proposals to introduce forest conservancy into the Hill 
Tracts, I do not think it would have been easy to have even made a beginning in that 
direction; but as it is, though quite unable to recommend the immediate introduction of 
the forest conservancy system proposed by Mr. Leeds, the slight restrictions that I have 
already imposed on [jhuming] have, even at this early period, proved of use as a 
preparation for its very gradual suppression (No. 421, 12/11/1868 in GOB 1929:25-35, 
paragraph 13 ).    
        
Still, what remains inexplicable is why most of the CHT was declared as forest. Given 
the progress of forest conservation and policies of that time (Stebbing 1926:192-212, 213), 
declaring most of the CHT as forest seemed not only aggressive but also inconsiderate. As noted 
earlier, there had been numerous murderous raids in the CHT and adjoining regions by “Kuki” 
groups, especially between 1860 and 1870 (Hunter 1973: 18-21). The violence by the Kuki 
groups in the region continued until the end of the nineteenth century. In 1898, the final military 
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expedition was launched against these groups which successfully ended the “Kuki raids” in the 
CHT and adjoining regions (Bessaignet 1958:10). How this violence affected the making of 
political forests in the CHT, I cannot ascertain; however, there are many examples in British 
India such as the Dangs Bhils in the Western Ghat, the Paharia of Rajmahal Hills of Bihar, and 
the Rampa tribal groups in North Arcot near Madras where the British used forest control as 
means to control and quell resistance (Grove 1995: 390; Skaria 1999). These are some of the 
colonial equivalents of post-colonial insurgency and counter-insurgency strategies that 
Vandergeest and Peluso have recently examined to theorize the role of violence of the making of 
political forests (Vandergeest and Peluso 2011). 
Nevertheless, conflicts emerged between the civil and forest officials about reservation or 
the territorialized control of the forest resources in the CHT; the conflicts were related to the 
timing, methods, and extent to which jhum cultivation would be eliminated or dealt with. The 
Commissioner of Chittagong (E. E. Lowis) and assistant Conservator Davis, who was then a 
Deputy Commissioner of Chittagong Hill Tracts, opposed the reservation of forest in the CHT. 
Davis reasoned that “these forests were vast, inaccessible and very difficult to explore, since the 
only means of access was up the rivers and streams. Once the latter was left, there were no roads; 
few paths in the network of forest-covered hills” (Stebbing 1926: 194-5). Both the Commissioner 
and the Deputy Commissioner appeared to be advocating “Open Forest.” They also favored 
gradual suppression of jhum by plough cultivation for which the district was running a 
governmental scheme.
 51
  In 1875, Dr. Schlich, the Bengal Conservator of Forest, visited the 
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 In 1869 the Government offered the hill peoples favorable terms if they would take up plough cultivation: they 
would be exempt from paying jhum tax to the chiefs and would receive a credit of £3.00 per family, payable within 
five years with 5% interest. By 1872, there were only 25 settlements and 78 applications pending for survey and 
demarcation, which amounted to 294 acres of land, from the Chakma and Marma. Given what was considered 
limited progress, the government began to offer more liberal terms in 1872 by increasing the advanced credit up to 
£8.00 to a family payable within five years without interest. Moreover, they would pay no rent for the first five years 
of a thirty year lease, gradually increasing up to 9 dime per acre from the 12
th
 year, and the lease holder would be 
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Chittagong Hill Tracts and expressed dissatisfaction about the ways in which forests had been 
dealt. He argued strongly for reservation of the hill tracts forest even at the hill peoples’ expense, 
and had a harsh debate with civil officials. John Beames, who joined Chittagong as 
Commissioner after the event, wrote about it in his Memoirs of a Bengal Civilian: 
Dr. Schlich, the Head of the Forest Department, calmly proposed that the whole Mugh 
and Chakma population should be removed from their native hills! He did not say where 
they were to go to. He merely said, in the true departmental spirit, ‘These people destroy 
the trees, therefore let them be sent away.’ Of course, the district officers and the 
Commissioner strongly opposed this view. The Commissioner even went so far as to say 
that if trees and Mughs could not live together, he thought it would be less harm if trees 
were removed, which caused Dr. Schilch to foam at the mouth and utter bad words 
(Beames 1984:282).  
  
It appears that that this debate ended with an amicable solution as Schlich proposed a 
plan to the government for forest management in the CHT that same year, conceding that jhum 
would continue for a long time. Some of the salient aspects of the proposal were: i) that there 
would be Open Forest under the authority of the Deputy Commissioner, and Reserved Forests 
under the Forest Department; (ii) that forest in the Sitapahar on the bank of the Karnaphuli River 
and on the Maini and Kassalong rivers (the tributaries of Karnaphuli River) would be reserved 
immediately; iii) that the Forest Department would be under the Conservator of Forest, Bengal, 
rather than the Chittagong Commissioner;
52
 iv) that no logs of telsur (opea odorata), toon 
(cedrela toona), jarul (lagerstroemia flosreginae), kamdeb (calophyllum polyaltha), gammar 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
allowed to cultivate jhum during the first year of the lease.  Despite these improved terms, only 26 settlements were 
made by 1875, an increase of one from 1872, and most were made with headmen on behalf of 460 families of 
cultivators; the amount of the leased land was 4,256 acres and the cash advanced £3274.00. Even those who 
received money in advance wished to live by jhuming again. The resistance was partly the result of the chiefs’ 
reluctance to encourage abandonment of jhum cultivation, which formed the main source of their earnings (1973:78-
80). The government blamed local officials for not trying hard enough, and forced them to hire Bengalis to teach hill 
peoples how to plough (Beames 1984). 
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 At that time, most Bengal forests were under civil officers at the district levels and several local conservators of 
forest offices. The Bengal Conservator of Forests had limited jurisdiction and few forest divisions under his 
authority (Stebbing 1923).     
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(gmelina arbora), chapalish (artocurpas chaplasha) and chikrasse (chikrassi tabularis) would be 
allowed to pass the toll stations unless they measured 3 cubits in girth and 3 cubits from the thick 
end. 
Apparently, the government approved the plan in the same year and this brought about 
the first Reserved Forest of 339 square miles in the CHT on the banks of the Maini River in 
1875, removing five villages of hill peoples from the area (No. 265C 15/2/1875; and No.81F, 
25/2/1875 in GOB 1929: 202-212). From that point until the 1880s, the forests of the CHT were 
regularly and systematically inspected (using elephants brought from Burma), surveyed, and 
demarcated for reservation by the Forest Department. The demarcation process was extremely 
slow, in most cases assisted by the administrative-political department. By 1884, a total of 1,345 
square miles of the CHT was gazetted as Reserved Forests
53
 as absolute property of the state 
under the Forest Acts of 1878 for territorialized control, dispossessing the hill peoples from the 
areas of the Reserves. Except for the Sitapahar Reserve, all the Reserved Forests were also 
placed strategically along the main rivers and their tributaries and up to the borders between 
CHT and Hill Tripura in the north and north-east, CHT and Lushai Hills in the east, and CHT 
and Burma in the south-east and south. In turn, these Reserves effectively cut off Lushai and 
other so called Kuki groups in the north and northeast from the hill peoples.
 
The rest of the areas 
of CHT remained as open forest which was technically referred to as Unclassed State Forest 
(USF) or sometimes District Forest under the administration of the Deputy Commissioner of the 
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 These were the Kassalong and Maini Reserves in the north of the CHT, bordered to the north and east by the Hill 
Tripura; the Renikhyong Reserve in the east of the CHT, bordering the Lushai Hills and Arakan; the Matamuhuri 
Reserve in the south of CHT bordering Arakan; the Sangu Reserve in the south east of CHT bordering Arakan and 
paralleling the Matamuhuri Reserve to the east; and the Sitapahar Reserve near the district headquarters (i.e., 
Rangamati). Regarding the areas of the Reserves, there are some differences (about a few hundred square miles) in 
the areas mentioned in CHT Regulation 1900 and areas reported in the 1973 Working Plan for Chittagong Hill 
Tracts North Division. According to CHT Regulation of 1900, the areas of forests were Kassalong and Maini 
Reserves (678.5 sq. m.), Renikhyong Reserve (215 sq. m.), Sangu Reserve (145 sq. m.), Matamuhuri Reserve (251 
sq. m.), and Sitapahar Reserve (23.70 sq. m.). 
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District for control of population and civil administration. The USF remained under the control 
of the Deputy Commissioner until the end of British rule; however, there was a change in total 
area of USF, which decreased by about 104 square miles as a number of small areas were 
brought under the Forest Department as Reserved Forests during the early 1920s (FD 1973a: 24-
29).
54 
The role of the Forest Department in the management of USF only extended to the 
collection of revenue from timber and other forest products such as sun grass, cane, bamboo and 
so forth at toll stations, as well as the control of the movement of these forest products.  
Nevertheless, the management and control of USF, and the hill peoples population within 
it, entailed the internal territorialization of civil administration in the district to formalize the 
state institutions that had been pending for some time for the forest reservation; it also entailed 
resolving conflicts among government officials. In the end, after more than a quarter century of 
debates among local officials and the Revenue and Political Departments of the Bengal 
Government, and several experiments, internal territorialization was completed in 1900 by the 
Regulation of 1900 based on Lewin’s proposal. In turn, the Regulation shaped state institutions, 
agrarian relations and governmentality in the region; how and to what extent this internal 
territorialization of civil administration in the CHT worked out in practice, and with what effects, 
I discuss in the remaining part of this section.  
Lewin first proposed a detailed plan of internal territorialization of local administration as 
early as 1867, having had firsthand knowledge of the hill peoples and the economy of CHT. The 
main features of the proposal were: i) the CHT would be divided among three principal chiefs 
with territorial limits, and every village would have a “responsible” headman appointed by the 
chief and acting under them, subject to the confirmation of the Deputy Commissioner; ii) the 
                                                          
54
 The areas of these new Reserved Forests were:  the Thega Reserve (70 sq. m.), the Shubholong Reserve (32.02 sq. 
m.), the Sitapahar Reserve (0.55 sq. m.), the Rangamati Reserve (0.40 sq. m.), and the Barkal Reserve (0.91 sq. m.) 
(see GOBD n. d.). 
87 
 
chiefs would be brought into agreement with clearly defined duties and responsibilities, and the 
jhum tax collected from the hill peoples and revenue paid to the government would be fixed; iii) 
the hill peoples would retain freedom of choice allowing them to move across territories; iv) the 
chief would not have perpetual jhum cultivation settlement and would not have land rights on 
jhum cultivation; v) all other cultivable lands would be brought under a distinct and separate 
settlement; vi) the hill peoples would be induced to adopt plough cultivation and to settle 
permanently in villages; and vii) there would be a census and register of the jhum cultivators and 
each chief would be responsible to pay revenues to the government (No. 185 T.M. 23/09/1867 in 
GOB 1929: 17-24). The Commissioner of Chittagong, Lord H. Ulick Browne, endorsed the 
proposal and sent it to the Secretary of the Bengal Government for approval, adding that a fourth 
division of Khas Mehals (Government Estate) would be created under the Deputy Commissioner 
and that the chiefs would be “at liberty to make land settlement in Khas Mehals as well as 
others.”  In his letter to the Secretary, Browne further suggested that the hill peoples would pay 
jhum tax to the chief of that division or to the Deputy Commissioner if they were cultivating 
jhum within any of the four divisions, but if they took up plough cultivation on lease, they would 
pay rent for the land and would not pay jhum tax.  He reasoned that “the change from [jhuming] 
and capitation-tax to land settlement will gradually diminish the power and influence of the 
chiefs if some counter-action is not applied, and this preferential claim to land settlement within 
their division will have that effect when, by the gradual tightening of the restrictions on 
[jhuming] in a course of years, plough cultivation increases” (No. 421, 11/12/1868 in GOB 
1929:25-36). A significant aspect of Browne’s letter is that he raised the question of ownership 
of land in the CHT, given the nature of jhum cultivation settlement. Following Lewin’s 
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description of hill customs and of jhum settlement, Browne further argued that “the chiefs had no 
right whatever in the land” (No. 421, 11/12/1868 in GOB 1929:25-36).   
The plan as a whole was objected to by the Secretary of the Government of Bengal and 
also by the Board of Revenue, Government of Bengal. The Secretary feared that changes were 
“so sweeping in their effects” to the hill economy that it was therefore “dangerous” to carry them 
out without a “distinct consent of the hill chiefs” (No. 270, 01/23/1869 in GOB 1929:36). The 
Board of Revenue found the plan, particularly the Khas Mehals, “disturbing”, as it was 
“injurious” to the chiefs’ interest. The Board also observed that the chiefs’ rights to the land were 
“theoretical,” implying that further inquiry and confirmation was required to settle it (No. 2177B, 
4/12/1869 in GOB 1929: 36-39). The Commissioner of Chittagong failed to gain the “distinct 
consent” of the hill chiefs, and the government postponed the localization of the chiefs’ 
jurisdictions, leaving the chieftain system intact in collecting jhum tax from their “kinsmen” or 
others who acknowledged them. Ashley Eden, the Secretary to the Government of Bengal in 
1870, reasoned:  
It may be necessary for purpose of forest conservancy to place considerable restriction 
upon the extension of [jhum] cultivation, and such a step may tend to prepare the way for 
more radical changes to which, in other ways also, the mind of the people may become 
reconciled; but this subject must be considered apart (No. 295, 01/21/1870 GOB, 1929: 
45-47).  
 
However, the government confirmed state ownership of the lands and partially approved the plan 
for a census and maintenance of a jhum register to assess government revenue for each chief. 
The creation of Khas Mehals (government estates) that would encourage the hill peoples into 
plough cultivation also received government approval, even though a similar scheme had already 
been attempted and failed (No. 295, 01/21/1870 GOB 1929: 45-47; No.532, 07/01/1872 in GOB 
1929:48-61).    
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In 1873, while serving his second term as the Deputy Commissioner of the district, Lewin 
again moved a new proposal for nine internal divisions, with maps, in order to localize hill 
chiefs’ jurisdictions so as to limit jhum cultivation. Following a government inquiry, the 
commissioner of Chittagong altered the proposal from nine to seven divisions. The proposal was 
approved with modifications after a long debate, dividing the CHT into five revenue circles: 
three hill chiefs’ circles and two Khas Mehals under the Deputy Commissioner. The boundary 
was gazetted in 1880 but only took effect in 1884. In 1892, the hill chiefs’ circles were further 
divided into 33 taluk (estates, or revenue circles) under middlemen, to which all of the chiefs 
were opposed. Moreover, the Khas Mehals proved “a complete failure as an administrative unit”, 
paving the way for reconsideration of internal territorialization of the CHT and the Regulation of 
1900 (hereafter the Regulation). 
The Regulation abandoned both the taluk and Khas Mehals and divided the CHT into 
four territorial administrative and/or revenue circles: the jurisdiction of the Chakma chief in the 
center (Rangamati), the Mong chief in the north (Khagrachhari), the Bohmong chief in the south 
(Bandarban), and the Government Reserved Forests that were located across the CHT 
(Hutchinson 1909:12).
55
 Under the office of the Deputy Commissioner, each hill chief’s circle 
corresponded somewhat to a conventional administrative subdivision with each chief subject to 
the authority of a sub-divisional officer. Each subdivision was also divided into several police 
stations (Thanas) comprising numerous villages. Parallel to this conventional division, each 
circle was further divided into Mouzas comprising villages. There were 373 Mouzas and each 
was between 1.5 and 20 square miles, including hill, wood and wasteland.
56
 The distribution of 
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 In the Regulation of 1900, there is another division of the Maini Valley said to be under the Deputy Commissioner 
and regulated by him/her from time to time. 
56
 By 1923, the number of Mouzas was reduced to 355 as the Forest Department took up 18 Mouzas for reservation 
(GOB 1923:4).     
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areas and Mouzas were: the Chakma chief’s circle (1,221 sq. m.) 134 Mouzas, the Bohmong 
chief’s circle (1, 404 sq. m.) 107 Mouzas, the Mong chief’s circle (703 sq. m.) 88 Mouzas, and 
the Maini Valley under the Deputy Commissioner of the district (269 sq. m.) 26 Mouzas (GOB 
1927:4). As a rule each Mouza had to set aside 50 acres of the best plough lands as the khas land 
for the remuneration of the village officials (the headman).
57
 In other words, besides 
conventional administrative sub-divisions and policing divisions of the district, the Regulation 
created an institutionalized two- tiered traditional chieftain system which abolished the kin mode 
of spatial and social organization and replaced it with a territorial organization of the state. In 
turn, the chiefs and headmen emerged as quasi-feudal elites and their loyalty to their kin was 
weakened.
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An important part of the Regulation was land rules that confirmed state ownership of the 
land that could be neither purchased nor sold among the hill peoples but was only to be used by 
the hill peoples (or at times Bengalis or businesses). The land rules further formalized the 
agrarian relations of the hill peoples, recognizing hill peoples’ customary rights to use forest 
resources for domestic purposes to graze cattle on village pastures, and to occupy non-urban 
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 Ironically, only as many as 86 out of 373 Mouzas had most of the cultivatable plough lands of the CHT, and many 
did not have even 50 acres of plough lands (GOB 1927: 3-8). 
58
 I call chiefs ‘quasi-feudal elites’ because their incomes came mainly from household taxes on jhum cultivators, 
they were allowed to have police forces to maintain law and order, and they also held juridical powers. Nevertheless, 
the practice also created a self-elevation myth of nobility. Although the British did not recognize these chiefs as 
hereditary Indian princes (nor did the CHT become one of the Princely or Native states), all three were endowed 
with a certain aristocratic veneer. Schendel and others observe, “[D]uring the British period, the Chakma chiefs 
presented themselves publicly as Indian princes. They took the South Asian noblemen as their role model, stressed 
the myth about their North Indian origins, became considerably Hinduised and established marriage links with 
prominent families of Bengal. For them, to be raja was to be seen as a member of Bengal aristocracy ... The 
Bohmong and Mong chiefs chose a different style. Their role model was Burmese nobility” (Schendel, et al. 
2001:37-38). Bernot (1967), with his anthropological insight, suggests, “the British created chiefs whose subjects 
recognize them as kings ... the legitimacy of the royal charge is not at all questioned, indeed quite the contrary” 
(quoted in Bertocci, 1996:133). 
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homestead plots with or without formal settlement.
59
 Still, these rights were primarily regulated 
by the chiefs and headmen who were responsible for distribution of both jhum and plough lands 
among the hill peoples for cultivation, save for the overriding power of the Deputy 
Commissioner. In so doing, the land was divided into four categories for revenue purposes: i) 
jhum land; ii) plough land; iii) grass land or pasture; and, iv) non-agricultural land. The Deputy 
Commissioner retained the power for the management or lease of grass land and non-agricultural 
land. Jhum land and plough land on the other hand were placed under the jurisdiction of the 
chiefs and headmen for revenue and management. Jhum land remained as common property of 
the hill peoples and was to be regulated by customs and also at times by the Deputy 
Commissioner. Jhum cultivators were also allowed to move from one Mouzas to another as it 
was a customary practice of the hill peoples. However, the land that came under the plough 
became categorized as individual property with limited hereditary rights of succession, instilling 
a new regime of property and ownership which was to have a lasting influence. Significantly, in 
continuation of previous policy for the plough land in the CHT, the land rules formalized 
financial and other incentives for the hill peoples to take up plough cultivation that included: i) 
rent free plough land settlements on lease for the first three years of the lease; ii) exemption of 
jhum taxes; and iii) agricultural loans (Hutchinson, 1909:68-69).
 
In part, the incentives were 
meant to compensate the cost of clearing plough land for cultivation as plough lands were then 
commonly covered with grass (Hutchinson 1909:93).  Nevertheless, the Chakma, especially the 
Chakma chiefs and headmen, took the most advantage of plough cultivation (Bertocci 1996). 
The Marma elite apparently lacked interest in plough cultivation but they had to take it up, as 
explained by Bertocci: 
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 One of the serious deficiencies of the land rules in the Regulation and the British policy was that most of these 
rights were partially acknowledged and very few were clearly defined (Roy, D. 2004). 
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As Bernot’s fascinating account of this process relates, the would-be notables among the 
Marma took unto themselves the financially arduous and politically demanding task of 
establishing permanently settled and plough cultivated Mouzas of which they became 
headmen, thereby gaining official power over all the inhabitants, including Bengalis of 
their new domain. Thus, in Bernot’s words, ‘[t]hat which financial inducement had been 
unable to accomplish was brought to fruition by the promise of honorific compensation 
...and ‘the coveting of the position of Headmen was the best stimulant inciting the Marma 
to take up the plough’ (Bertocci 1996:1337). 
 
The result of the land rules was economic differentiation among and within the hill 
peoples’ communities: a small group of landed and affluent members of a new social and 
economic class emerged among the Chakma and Marma, alongside a Bengali landed class who 
had fragile land usage rights without guarantee (GOB 1927: 3-11; Hutchinson 1909: 68-9). On 
the other hand, most common hill peoples among the Chakma, Marma and other groups who 
entirely depended on jhum cultivation remained the “human property” of the chiefs, as Lewin 
called the jhum revenue system. By the Regulation, the common people would not only pay 
jhum taxes to the chiefs, headmen or the government, but also had to provide free labour (i.e., 
begar) and meet customary obligations to the chiefs and headmen. Significantly, within the first 
decade of the twentieth century, jhum cultivators were faced with a severe shortage of jhum land 
as the availability of jhum lands and the cycle of jhum quickly declined from 10 to 5 and/or 3 
years, owing partly to the process of forest conservation.
60
 Between 1905 and 1907 the crisis of 
jhum land became so acute in the Maini Valley of the Chakma chief’s circle that the district 
authority was forced to open up 337 acres of Maini Reserved Forests for jhum cultivation 
(Hutchinson 1909: 76-77; CHT 1973b: 30). As I discuss below, the extent to which this crisis of 
jhum land facilitated the subsequent importing of taungya in the forest plantation later needs 
further research.       
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 In the writing of district gazetteers, Hutchinson blamed the increase of the population for the decline of jhum 
lands in the first decade of the twentieth century (Hutchinson 1909: 76-77).    
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Importantly, the Regulation of 1900 formalized and changed power relations into a 
modern administrative system, incorporating rural indigenous elites with limited power into a 
centralized system of state authority. On the one hand, all executive, judicial and financial 
powers in the District were vested in the hands of the Deputy Commissioner, who was given 
special powers by the Governor of Bengal. The DCs of the other districts of Bengal did not enjoy 
these powers. On the other hand, the chiefs and headmen were empowered to collect tax for the 
state in well-defined areas of their territory, irrespective of ethnic background; to adjudicate civil 
and petty criminal matters of their followers; and to dispense justice in traditional courts. Both 
chiefs and headmen would receive a fixed percentage of total revenue in income and lands for 
their service to the state. In addition, the chiefs were allowed to have a tax-free Mouza and 25 
acres of the best arable lands, and a Headman could keep 5 acres of the best arable land in his/her 
Mouzas for his/her service as freehold with inheritable rights (Chowdhury 2002: Appendix 1; see 
also Mohsin 1997: 84). This so-called traditional power structure was actually based on invented 
traditions and customs and resulted in a coercive regime of control and disciplinary power. In the 
Mouzas, records were kept and the headmen monitored every family’s dependents, possessions, 
and mode of cultivation. This system continued upward accordingly: the headmen were under 
the chiefs and the chiefs were in turn under the control of the Deputy Commissioner and also 
formed an Advisory Council of the Deputy Commissioner for the administration of their 
respective Circles. The hereditary rights of succession to the positions of chiefs and headmen 
were maintained in principle, but were always subject to the approval of the central government 
and the Deputy Commissioner.  The Deputy Commissioner of the district not only represented 
the government and sovereign but in fact over time became the sovereign whose forms of 
government and rationalities were taxation, law, administration, and discipline. The individual 
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household remained at the core of the economy, and colonial governmental rationality never 
developed beyond providing agricultural loans to promote plough land cultivation and limit jhum 
cultivation. In fact, there was little concern for the care and welfare of the hill peoples as a 
population: the censuses undertaken from 1872 to 1921 suggest that peoples, castes, and races 
were prominent categories. The hill peoples were rarely counted as population, and the 
population statistics never accounted for the health and well-being of the hill peoples (Hunter 
1973; GOB 1923). 
In the end, although the Regulation of 1900 remained the key instrument of the 
government in the CHT, there were some significant changes in the Regulation and British 
policy in the early 1930s relating to control over land and the restrictions on non-hill peoples 
settling in the CHT. These laws were spelled out in rules 34, 51 and 52. As an amendment to the 
Regulation, rule 34 restricted possession of land by outsiders, with exceptions for industrial, 
residential and commercial use of land (including plantation). Under rule 52, no non-hill peoples 
could enter or reside in the CHT without obtaining permission of the DC; this was made more 
explicit under rule 51, according to which the DC had the power to expel anybody who was 
found to be undesirable (GOB 1935). These changes were meant not only to protect hill peoples’ 
economic interests from Bengalis but also to isolate the hill peoples from political development 
in Bengal, as the CHT was already declared a “Backward Tract” in 1920. This declaration came 
in response to the dramatic increase of the hill peoples’ population as well as to growing anti-
colonial movements across British India, especially the so-called “terrorist” movements against 
the British in Bengal. In effect, the Backward Tract law put the CHT under direct control of the 
Governor-General-in-Council, the executive of the central government; the provincial 
government of Bengal had no ultimate authority in the matter of the administration of the CHT. 
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The 1935 Government of India Act, which provided British India with limited self rule, changed 
the “Backward Tract” status further to that of a “totally excluded area”. As a result, unlike the 
rest of the India, the hill peoples were not provided with the franchise or other political rights. 
Thus, they were to remain isolated from anti-colonialist nationalist movements, and in turn were 
without elected political representatives to decide their political preferences during the partition 
of British India. This relative political isolation continued until the Pakistan regime, as will be 
discussed in Chapter III.  
 
2.4  Forests Management: Taungya and the Birth of Participatory Forestry   
In this section I discuss the forest management in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), particularly the 
management of the Reserved Forests during British rule. I illustrate the improvement to the 
plantation practices and related forest villager system and taungya forestry in the Reserved 
Forests. In doing so, I show how taungya forestry worked in the management of the Reserved 
Forests and as a form of participatory social forestry that emerged concurrently with so-called 
scientific forestry. I further demonstrate that the management and control of the Reserved Forests 
depended on a scientific forestry regime involving a Working Plan and related strategies of 
functional territorialization. However, scientific forestry never achieved its control over the 
Reserved Forests but was fractured by accessibility, ecology and political economy.  
Forest management in the CHT primarily involved timber extraction from the Reserved 
Forests as well as the improvement of timber resources through plantation in the Reserves while 
regulating the movement and transit of forest products from Unclassed State Forests (USF). 
Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 below summarize some of these aspects of forest management. Tables 2.2 
and 2.3 illustrate the differences in revenue from forest products (i.e., timber, fuel wood, 
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bamboo, etc.) before and after the Forest Rule of 1871 as well as the differences in revenue 
between the Reserved Forests and USF in the 1920s and the 1940s. These tables show that the 
overall extraction of timber and forest revenue from the CHT decreased sharply after the 
introduction of forest conservation measures as one-fourth of CHT came under the category of 
Reserved Forests. Partly, this was also because the extraction of timber and other forest products 
from the Reserves were limited. Table 2.4 points to the fact that although most of the Reserved 
Forests came into existence by the early 1880s, the actual success of the territorialization, 
management, and absolutist control of vast and inaccessible Reserved Forests was severely 
limited until the 1920s, with the exception of the Sitapahar Reserved Forest where taungya 
forestry for the plantation of teak as an experiment began in 1871.
61
 However, as the Reserves 
were brought under a Working Plan in the early 1920s, the revenue from the Reserved Forests 
increased to the point that they generated three times more revenue than the USFs in the 1940s 
largely because of increased extraction of timber and other forest products from the Reserves 
(Table 2.3).  
An important event in the management of the Reserved Forests in the CHT before the 
1920s was the creation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Forest Division in 1909. Until then, forests 
of the CHT had been under the control of Chittagong Forest Division, which besides the CHT, 
also had large forest areas in Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar, and lacked adequate staff for 
supervision. As the CHT was made into a separate forest division, all the forest lands within the 
district were transferred to Chittagong Hill Tracts Forest Division. This extended the surveying, 
mapping, and plantation activities of the forest management beyond the Sitapahar Reserve into 
the Kassalong and Renikhyong Reserves; all these Reserved Forests were brought under working 
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 It is relevant to note that plantation of teak through the taungya system in the CHT had gone through a number of 
experiments till the end of 19th century to match the local climate, ecology, and plantation techniques before it was 
standardized in the 1920s by the Cowan working plan. 
97 
 
plans in the 1920s and they continued to be so until the early years of Pakistan rule (Cowan 
1923b; Hutchinson 1909:73-4). Located in far-flung inaccessible areas, the Sangu and 
Matamuhuri Reserved Forests had been completely neglected from management since they had 
been brought into reservation (Cowan 1923a; 1923c). They were neither demarcated and 
surveyed nor supervised by the British. Jurisdiction over the Sangu and Matamuhuri Reserved 
Forests had also changed several times between Chittagong, Chittagong Hill Tracts and Cox’s 
Bazar divisions (FD 1970).  
In the early 1920s, scientific forestry became the norm in the forest management 
practices of the Reserved Forests (namely, Kassalong, Renikhyong and Sitapahar Reserves); 
however, the control of scientific forestry over the Reserves was limited in scope and scale, a 
result of the fractured political ecology of the region. Shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 below, timber 
extraction and plantation were the major planks of the management during British rule. Other 
practices of scientific forestry, such as surveying and mapping of the Reserves, had not been 
conducted scientifically or professionally, with the exception of the local Forest Department’s 
partial and incomplete survey of Kassalong, Renikhyong and Sitapahar for the Cowan working 
plan (see Cowan 1923b; FD 1973b). Although occasional fires due to the “carelessness” of 
employees of timber purchasers or villagers passing by the Reserves were reported, fire 
protection in the Reserved Forests was never undertaken nor became an issue. This was partly 
because fire protection was largely contingent upon controlling jhum cultivation in the USF 
lands in the vicinity of Reserved Forests, which was partially controlled by the localization of the 
hill peoples by the 1900s. Control of the grazing lands was also not an issue: the Reserved 
Forests were closed to grazing all year long, but the hill communities as jhum cultivators had few 
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cattle and the USF land had little restriction on grazing (e.g. FD 1930; 1932; 1933; 1934; 1935; 
1940; 1951; and 1954). 
Under the Cowan working plan (1923-43), Kassalong, Renikhyong, and Sitapahar 
Reserves were divided functionally (i.e., functional territorialization) into various circles such as 
timber circles, bamboo circles, and at times, timber and bamboo mixed circles. Owing to the lack 
of maps and scientific surveys, Kassalong and Renikhyong were partially worked out along the 
river in the accessible areas (Cowan 1923b). Plantation was carried out by clear felling for timber 
followed by the taungya mode of plantation; the hill peoples, namely jhum cultivators, were 
mobilized as forest villagers for taungya forestry. Annual Progress Reports of the Forest 
Department between 1920s and 1940s suggest that the Chittagong Hill Tracts Forest Division 
maintained 4 forest villages on average consisting of 145 households across the Reserved Forests 
(e.g. FD 1930; 1935; 1940; 1951; and 1954). Based on my fieldwork experience with forest 
villagers in Matamuhuri Reserve, which opened for forest villagers in 1952 shortly after the end 
of British rule, I believe that the villages were probably structured according to traditional 
custom under a forest headman and forest karbari(s), and that the villages were settled 
temporarily near the working circles. The benefits for forest villagers of this settlement and their 
participation in forest work seem to have included exemption from paying jhum tax to the hill 
chiefs, cash payment for labor other than plantation, and access to forest products for their own 
consumption. However, the cash payments were “not made until the third year from initial 
plantation” (FD 1933:14). Other practices of forest regeneration appear to have been used on an 
experimental basis at times. Teak dominated the choices of species to be planted along with local 
timber species of toon, jarul, gammar, chapalish, and others. At times, other exotic species such 
as mahogany (swientenia macrophylla) were tried but were unsuccessful (FD 1973b). 
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Table 2.2: Forest Extraction and Revenue Income from CHT before the Forest Rule of 1871 
Years   
 
Timber  Minor Forest Products  Revenue  
Income 
(Rs.) 
Amount of 
Timber  
 (CFT) 
Value of 
Timber 
 (Rs.) 
Value of 
Bamboo 
(Rs.) 
Value of 
Cane 
(Rs.) 
Value of 
Sun 
grass 
(Rs.) 
Total 
 
1865 6,919,060 50,209 55,881 9,101 31,238 179,573 
1866 11,417,808 31,886 98,373 15,407 32,785 217,201 
1867 5,399,867 34,551 64,961 9,791 31,450 173,589 
Source: Lewin (1869:124-127; calculations mine). 
Table 2.3: Forest Extraction and Revenue Income from CHT after the Forest Rule of 1871 and 
Forest Conservancy 
 
Year Type Timber 
(Cft.) 
Fuel 
(Cft.) 
Number 
of 
Bamboo 
 
Number 
of  
Cane 
Total 
Revenue 
Income 
(Rs.) 
Surplus 
Revenue 
Income 
(Rs.) 
1923 -24 
 
RF 21,490 92,126 7,147,296 535,960 47,504 67,665 
USF 287,243 75,043 2,824,996 382,792 94,379 
1942 -43 
 
RF 397,679 111,054 8,911,014 426,836 313,481 141,217 
USF 277,871 169, 239 3,778,770 297,888 81,005 
Yearly 
Average  
(1923-43) 
RF 131,997 116,757 6,665,899 238,556 91,612 43,252 
USF 219,133 92,742 2,301,916 177,323 69,671 
Source: Forest Department (1973b: 43-44) (Minor forest products whose amount or quantity seems vague 
are excluded from the table). 
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Table 2.4: Plantation in Reserved Forests of the CHT, 1871-1943 
Name of the 
Reserve 
Total 
Areas 
(Acres) 
Plantation 
Before 
Working Plan 
(1871-1922) 
(Acres) 
Plantation During the Cowan Working 
Plan (1923-43) 
Total 
 
 
1871-
1922 
1919-
1922 
Sanctioned 
Area Acres) 
 
Plantation 
(Acres) 
%  of 
Sanctioned 
Area 
Sitapahar  15,168 1,113 Nil 3,440 3,305 99 4,418 
Renikhyong 137,600 Nil 55 Nil 1,528 Nil 1,583 
Kassalong 434,240 Nil 190 13,640 4,022 29 4,212 
Total 587,008 1,358 Nil 8,855 Nil 10,213 
Source: FD (1973b:33-36), the calculation and presentation is mine (% in round figures).  
      
Table 2.4 shows plantation by taungya in the Reserved Forests of the CHT from 1871 to 
1943 and also illustrates the gap between the planned and the actual plantation outcomes. Several 
factors are said to have contributed to this gap: the shortage of jhum cultivators; low market 
prices for timber; difficult communication networks; and other factors. The 1931-32 Annual 
Progress Report of the Forest Department explained this gap primarily on economic grounds and 
suggested that these problems were interconnected.  It argued that for working out the plantation 
target, an area must be clear-felled; clear-felled timber had to be carried from the forests for sale; 
and timber had to be sold to market. If the demand and price for timber was too low, the 
plantation work would become economically unviable (FD 1933). This explanation exposes the 
rational economic thinking of the Forest Department but appears silent on sociological causes. 
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Writings and correspondence concerning the CHT by British administrators suggests there was 
much resistance from the hill peoples to work for the government and Forest Department. 
However, what was left out of the discussion was that there was also high demand from every 
government office for free and compulsory labor from the hill peoples. I would argue that there 
were two reasons why the hill peoples resisted working for the Forest Department. First, the 
workload and discipline were highly demanding as there were at least fifty specific tasks 
involved in the plantation through taungya forestry over a five year period. Second, the cultural 
and linguistic gaps that existed between Bengali foresters and hill people jhum cultivators made 
the work coercive and difficult, because communication failure often resulted in corporal 
punishment.  
After the conclusion of the Cowan plan, the plantation work in Kassalong, Renikhyong, 
and Sitapahar Reserves continued from 1943-1952 under a preliminary working plan with a few 
modifications. However, in 1939, there was a significant change in the management of USF as a 
new policy of conservation in USF was introduced through the amendment of rule 41 of the 
Regulation 1900. This rule 41 empowered the Deputy Commissioner of the CHT to regulate and 
control jhum cultivation and the migration of jhum cultivators from one Mouza to another, and 
also included provisions for a Mouza Reserve under headmen. This origin of the Mouza Reserve 
is now contested as an indigenous tradition by an indigenous movement of the hill peoples for 
the recognition of indigenous identity and customary rights, and will be discussed further in 
Chapter VI.   
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2.5  Conclusion              
In this chapter, I have shown that the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) inhabited by many ethnic 
communities for centuries had been a frontier region to the British Empire in British India until 
the 1860s, when the British separated it from the Chittagong plains and created a district under 
exceptional administration. However, soon after the annexation of the CHT into the British 
Empire, almost the entire CHT was designated as a forest land. This making of forest was not 
only due to material interests in timber and revenue; it was also part of the wider discourse and 
practice of sovereign rights over uncultivable waste land, timber trees, and jungle. In turn, by the 
1880s, one fourth of the CHT was made Reserved Forests and the remaining areas were 
designated as Unclassed State Forests (USF), recognizing hill peoples’ access and common 
rights of control over forests and land resources. The hill peoples’ rights to forests were solely 
for items for everyday consumption or household needs from USF production, and they had 
absolutely no rights in the Reserved Forests.  
One consequence of the British land and forest policy was remaking the CHT into a 
feudal like territory; in theory if not in practice, all land and forests belonged to the state. The hill 
chiefs turned into salaried agents or service holders for the state, and their fellow “kinsmen” 
cultivating jhum became property of the chiefs. Concurrently, hill peoples’ agrarian relations 
changed so much that although jhum cultivation remained the dominant form of economic 
activity, plough rent accounted for three-quarters of the district revenue income in the 1920s 
(GOB 1923: 9), which created class and status differentiation within and between the ethnic 
communities.  
Most importantly, British rule also initiated ecological changes in the CHT. The USFs 
controlled by the Deputy Commissioner were highly exploited to meet the timber demands of 
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Chittagong mainly through auction sales and permits purchased by Bengali tradesmen. The sheer 
amount of timber and forest production suggests a different story of deforestation in the CHT 
than the taken-for-granted jhum cultivation. The Forest Department directly managed the 
Reserved Forests and controlled the movement of all forest products, including private 
homestead forests that were also subject to the control of the Deputy Commissioner and Forest 
Department as a rule. While timber extraction and plantation were dominant activities, forest 
management within the Reserved Forests was very much limited to the Sitapahar, Kassalong and 
Renikhyong Reserves. Although it was also limited in scale and scope based on taungya forestry, 
the plantation regime represents the earliest form of participatory forestry, incorporating hill 
peoples’ communities in the management of the Reserves.    
In sum, British rule shaped state institutions, social relations, and most importantly, 
social-ecological relations in the CHT. Apart from the Reserved Forests, the Deputy 
Commissioner held authority for all land in the USFs, and had exclusive powers to regulate, 
grant, and cancel all land settlements, whether they be industrial, commercial (e.g., market place) 
or agricultural (jhum or plough lands). The policies pursued by the colonial government in the 
CHT— including administrative exceptionalism, political isolation and protectionism —were 
mainly guided by British economic interests. As a consequence of these policies, hill peoples 
were marginalized and lost control of their land and forests.  
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CHAPTER III 
The Remaking of Political Forests: Industrialization, Displacement and 
Resettlement  
 
It is doubtful if tribesmen can be converted overnight into industrial labourers. In 
theory one could envisage a ‘resettlement’ of the displaced Chakma; that is 
keeping them to agriculture after transferring them to some other parts of the 
Hills. . . . [I]n all likelihood, this may prove difficult.  But the economic and 
technical considerations which motivated the expansion of such industrial projects 
all over the world, usually lead to an underestimation of the hardship of affected 
people, i.e. the tribesmen in this particular case. [...] If the authorities were to fail 
in re-integrating the displaced tribesmen into the emerging industry or into other 
areas of agriculture the risk would be that these (sic) might either starve, or be 
thrown out on the road like new ‘refugee’ of some sort. 
              — Bessaignet (1958). 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines industrial development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), the 
subsequent displacement and resettlement programs affecting the hill peoples, and the ways in 
which industrialization, displacement and resettlement remade political forests and economy in 
CHT during the Pakistan period (1947 to 1971). The chapter deals with the region of CHT, 
focusing on displacement, dispossession and resettlement of the hill peoples, particularly the 
Chakma. I provide a detailed account of resettlement discourses, policies and practices as they 
took shape and shaped the hill peoples’ cultural geographies, economies, and relations of power 
in the 1960s. I also examine the birth of a new participatory forestry regime for the management 
of Unclassed State Forests (USF) that emerged alongside taungya forestry in the Reserved 
Forests. In turn, this chapter illustrates both the continuity and discontinuity of forest 
management in CHT with preceding institutional practices during British rule. It further explains 
the political ecology and background of the subsequent insurgency war and the strategies of 
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political and territorial control of forests that became hegemonic later during the period of 
Bangladesh rule in CHT. 
To understand the background and consequences of industrialization in CHT, it is 
important to note that CHT became part of East Pakistan (a.k.a. East Bengal, and later, 
Bangladesh) within the state of Pakistan in 1947, at the time of the partition of British India.
62
 
The birth of Pakistan marked a new kind of “imagined community” in South Asia and also an 
ontological break from the British “imperial order of things”. The new order (of men, women 
and things) was associated with a discourse of “modernization” and “development”, more 
specifically industrial development; this development became synonymous with nationalism, 
national integration, and state control of economic activities (Myrdal 1968).
63
 Driven by these 
discourses of modernization and development, industrialization in Pakistan including CHT 
became the principal economic strategy of the state in the 1950s in order to address the economic 
backwardness of Pakistan.
 64
 In part, this industrialization process was also promoted by 
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The position of the Chittagong Hill Tracts had been the subject of a fierce debate between the national elites of 
India and Pakistan, but the region was awarded to Pakistan (Mansergh 1983: 691-92, 737-740). There were protests 
in CHT against Pakistan which were met with a military crackdown at the inception of Pakistani rule (Ali 1993; 
Chakma, S., 1393. B.E. [1985-1986]). 
63
 This is in fact related to the end of World War II and was marked by significant discursive (e.g., nations, 
development, third world, population, etc.) and non-discursive (e.g., spatial organization, state, administration, laws, 
etc.) shifts across the globe by the forces of national imaginations (Anderson 1991). National imaginations and 
international relations established nation-states as the paradigm of society for political liberation and economic 
development to which newly created states felt obliged to conform (Hobsbawm 1991; Hatcher 1975 Giddens 1981). 
These shifts also produced a new order of things and economy, irrespective of states’ political ideologies of 
socialism or capitalism. Pakistan was not an exception.  
64
 The development and industrialization policies of Pakistan favored West Pakistan according to the interest of its 
Punjabi military and salaried classes who governed the country as an alliance of a civil-military dictatorship from 
1958 to 1971. Another explanation for this uneven development is that the elite and ethnic groups of West Pakistan 
considered themselves the ‘core’ of the Muslim nation of Pakistan; hence, East Bengal, including CHT, was 
marginalized (Mohsin 1997). 
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Pakistani elites’ desire for development and their feeling of “deprivation” of resources following 
the partition of the British India.
65
  
The most detrimental effect of industrialization in CHT was the mass displacement of the 
hill peoples, resulting from the construction of a hydro-electric power plant. In particular, the 
twin forces of industrialization and mass displacement significantly changed the discourses and 
practices of political forests, and forest management, in CHT. Changes in the management of 
Unclassed State Forests (USF) were more significant than those of Reserved Forests; however, 
the Reserves were also remade in relation to capital, industry and the state’s need for timber 
resources as well as in relation to knowledge and scientific control of these phenomena. The 
changes in USF were brought about in part by the Kaptai Hydroelectric Plant, and by its 
associated resettlement policies and discourses. The Kaptai Hydroelectric Plant (KHP) was 
completed in 1961, and a reservoir was built which created a large lake and, in turn, displaced 
tens of thousands of hill peoples. The displacement resulted in a number of resettlement projects 
by the Revenue Department but a large number of hill peoples, namely jhum cultivating families, 
were not considered for resettlement and had to remain displaced. At the same time, the Forest 
Department’s resettlement program combined forest plantation with a new form of participatory 
forestry in order to control jhum cultivation; in doing so the program took over a number of 
Mouzas (i.e., revenue units as collections of villages in USF) entirely, further expanding the 
territorial control of the Forest Department in the USF. 
 In what follows, I examine these changes in political forests. I divide the chapter into 
four main sections representing the themes of this chapter. I begin by examining discourses of 
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  Pakistan elites’ desire for development and feeling of deprivation were rooted in the facts of the Partition, namely 
that India inherited most of the area, industrial cities, and forests of British India, whereas Pakistan (encompassing 
regions of Sindh, North West Frontier, and West Punjab, which were generally and constitutionally named as West 
Pakistan) and East Bengal were mostly rural agrarian economies, lacking both “modern” industries and large forest 
areas, except for a few in East Bengal and West Punjab  (GOP 1957). 
107 
 
industrialization, industrial development, and changes in the management of Reserved Forests in 
CHT.  Second, I trace the displacement processes and the resettlement policies, processes and 
practices that led to the marginalization of the hill peoples. Third, I examine the birth of a new 
form of participatory forestry for the management of USF that emerged as part of the 
resettlement of the hill peoples; this introduced a new strategy of political and territorial control 
of forest resources and livelihood. Finally, in the conclusion, I provide a critical review of the 
industrialization, displacement and resettlement discourses as well as their spatial and cultural 
effects on hill peoples’ groups and economy. I also point to the specific effects of resettlements 
and other changes on the hill peoples’ relations to land, forests, and power.  
 
3.2  Industrialization in CHT: Remaking the Reserved Forests 
Beyond the Pakistani elites’ desire for development and wealth, industrialization in CHT was 
directly related to the natural resources of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), namely forests and 
water. This happened in part because of the uneven distribution and quality of forests among the 
provinces of Pakistan. Indeed, with the partition of British-India in 1947, there emerged an acute 
crisis of timber in Pakistan; only East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh) had considerable forest 
areas, mainly in the CHT and Sundarbans. This uneven distribution of forests led to the 
articulation of distinctly different forest policies for East and West Pakistan (“two economies” 
forest policy) and industrialization of forest in CHT. 
The “two economies forest policy” originated in 1949 at a forestry conference in 
Pakistan, and clearly informed the forest policies of 1956 and of 1966 as well as long term 
economic development plans (i.e., Five Year Plans). Briefly, the general discourse and policy of 
forest management for West Pakistan was in favor of conservation through ‘non-territorial’ 
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forest plantation programs along canals, roads, railways, and wetlands. In contrast, the discourse 
and forest policy for East Pakistan was timber extraction to meet the industrial and commercial 
demands of Pakistan, as well as the expansion of territorial control over forest areas for that 
purpose. More specifically, Reserved Forests of the Chittagong Hill Tracts were considered the 
only potential “untapped” resources for Pakistan (GOP 1957).  
 Thus, by the mid 1960s, there were at least nine large-scale industries and seventeen 
small industrial units in CHT directly related to the Reserved Forests, including the Kaptai 
Hydroelectric plant (Ishaq 1971: 156-9). Besides the Kaptai Hydroelectric Plant (hereafter, 
power plant), Karnaphuli Paper Mill (KPM) was the largest industry in Pakistan. The other large 
scale industries included saw mills, plywood industries, rayon industries, and cigarette and match 
factories (Ishaq 1971: 156-7). The KPM was completed in October 1953 by the state agency with 
a World Bank loan of Rs. (Pakistani Rupee) 4.20 million, and later it was transferred to a West 
Pakistani private enterprise, M/S Dawood Industries Ltd. The construction of the power plant, 
the most important industrial establishment in CHT and the very first of its kind in East Pakistan, 
began in 1954 with financial and technical assistance from the United States and was completed 
in 1961.  
The power plant was built on the Karnaphuli River at Kaptai in the center of CHT. The 
choice of the site was in part a historical legacy of the British. Partly, this also happened because 
of the unique geology of CHT. Excluding the region of CHT, the rest of East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) is comprised of flood plains river country that lacks the gradient necessary for a 
hydro-electric project (Ali 1993:178; Chakma, G. 1991).
66
 The power plant created a reservoir, 
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 The idea for a hydroelectric power plant  in CHT was floated in 1906 and a proposal was made in 1946 after 
several studies because the rivers in CHT are the only ones of the then East Bengal that had the potential (Chakma, 
H. et al. 1995:15-7; Ali 1993:178).  
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which at its maximum capacity stands at a level of 108 ft R.L., and also a lake of considerable 
extent (about 256 square miles) (see Photo 3.1 and 3.2 below). The plant was planned to control 
floods in Chittagong, downstream on the Karnaphuli River. It was also envisioned to provide a 
hydroelectric capacity of 12000 KW for East Pakistan, which was thought to be enough power to 
supply industries and irrigation as well as over 18 million people in the central, eastern and 
southern districts of East Pakistan. Finally, and very importantly, the power plant was also 
designed to improve navigating on the waterway in the inaccessible parts of Kassalong and 
Renikhyong Reserved Forests in order to facilitate the extraction of timber (Chakma, G. 
1991:25-26; FD 1960; Chakma, H. et al. 1995: 18; Sopher 1963:347). However, most of these 
projected benefits were never achieved (Bertocci 1996:141; Ahmed 1976).  
One aspect of industrialization was a change in the management of Reserved Forests in 
CHT, mainly in Kassalong, Renikhyong and Sitapahar Reserves. The discourse and practices of 
the management of Reserved Forests continued to focus on timber extraction, and were followed 
by an artificial regeneration of industrial species (such as teak, garjan, and gammer) through the 
work of forest villagers and the taungya system of plantation. What changed in the management 
of Kassalong, Renikhyong and Sitapahar Reserves was the scale and scope of timber extraction, 
plantation and so-called “scientific management.” All these Reserves were surveyed and mapped 
through aerial photography for knowledge of the forests, their qualities, spatial distribution, 
accessibility, and for the practice and control of “scientific management”.  In turn, the forests 
were remade as sites of regulation and accumulation in relation to capital, industry, and demands 
for timber. For example, KPM was given the right for 99 years to extract 100,000 thousand tons 
of air dry bamboo per year as its raw material from the Reserved Forests of CHT, namely 
Kassalong and Renikhyong Reserves (see Ishaq 1971: 156-9; FD 1960). Moreover, in 1959, a 
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semi-government corporation called Forest Industries Development Corporation (FIDC) was 
established and had a state monopoly for timber extraction and marketing in East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh).  FIDC took over timber extraction in the Chittagong Hill Tracts Division from the 
Forest Department, which had already introduced mechanical timber extraction in the accessible 
part of Kassalong Reserved Forests (with financial and technical aid from the US) in addition to 
regular timber extraction using manual labor and elephants.
67
 When the power plant project was 
completed in 1961, FIDC expanded its mechanical timber extraction projects further again with 
financial and technical aid from the USA and Canada (Forestal 1966a). FIDC and KPM 
separately built vast roads and communication networks within these Reserved Forests. These 
networks also connected to Chittagong through roads from Rangamati, passing through Kaptai 
industrial estates. The Reserved Forests to the south of CHT (that is, Sangu and Matamuhuri 
Reserves) continued to remain under Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar Forest Divisions respectively, 
and without any working plan up until 1967.
 68
 Meanwhile, although the Matamuhuri Reserved 
Forest was brought under formal forest management in 1952, its management was limited to 
timber extraction and associated plantation of industrial species through participatory taungya 
forestry in the most accessible parts of the Reserve. Interestingly, this strategy for the 
management of the Matamuhuri Reserved Forest continued even when the Reserve came under 
the working plan in 1967 (see Chapter V). 
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In fact, the Forest Department had intermittently tried mechanical extraction since 1932.  
68
 In 1967, a working plan for Sangu and Matamuhuri Reserves was made for a period of 20 years effective 
immediately based on an aerial survey and inventory of the reserves carried out from 1958 to 1962 with financial 
and technical support from the US. M/S Hunting Aero Survey Ltd conducted a survey under the scheme “Timber 
Extraction by Mechanical Means from the Chittagong Hill Tracts” which included “Inventory project of Sangu-
Matamuhuri Reserved Forests” under the First Five Year Plan and continued under the Second Five Year Plan. Still, 
given its remoteness and inaccessibility, the Sangu Reserve remained virtually untouched and only a forest guard 
was posted to oversee the reserve (FD 1970).  
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The national context and political ecology leading to industrialization in CHT in the 
1960s offers an understanding of the nature of industrialization in East Pakistan in relation to 
rural areas in general and indigenous ethnic groups in particular. Unlike in other parts of 
Pakistan, industrialization in CHT did not aim to transform the hill peoples as laboring subjects 
for industries. There was a clear disjuncture between industrialization, capitalist accumulation, 
and transformation of the rural economy in CHT. Industrialization in CHT was uneven and 
produced a “cultural division of labor” (Hatcher 1975). The hill peoples were not even 
considered worthy of employment in the industries because they were considered to be “not yet 
fitted psychologically or technically to fill up the ranks of industrial labor” mobilized in the 
district (Bessaignet 1958: 61). Unskilled workers came from the other parts of East Pakistan, 
while skilled workers came from all over Pakistan and even foreign countries. In all, 
industrialization in CHT opened up economic opportunities and employment for Bengalis which 
brought almost 100,000 new Bengali plainsmen into CHT for settlement.
69
 A typical example of 
this is the KPM. Out of its labor force of 3290 persons, KPM employed only 14 hill people. The 
picture of employment of hill people was almost the same in all other industrial projects of the 
district (Bessaignet 1958:61; also Ishaq 1971:139). Thus, it was not industrialization per se but 
its effects, i.e. the displacement and subsequent resettlement of hill peoples that brought changes 
both in the life and the traditional agrarian economy of the hill peoples. I will now turn attention 
to this topic. 
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 As it stood, in 1956 there were almost 30,000 unskilled labourers employed by nascent industrial establishments 
in CHT at the expense of the dispossession of the hill peoples. 
112 
 
 
3.3  Displacement, Dispossession and Resettlement 
In this section I consider the cultural geographies of displacement, dispossession and 
resettlement of the hill peoples. This will illustrate the uneven effect of industrialization on the 
hill peoples’ groups and economy, the resettlement policies, and the cultural logic of the hill 
peoples’ choice for resettlement. I have divided this section into two segments: in the first, I 
discuss the nature and scope of displacement and dispossession; in the second, I examine the 
resettlement discourse, policies and practices.       
3.3.1  Displacement and Dispossession 
The industrial displacement of hill peoples began with the Karnaphuli Paper Mills (KPM) in the 
vicinity of Kaptai in 1953, a future industrial zone.
 70
 However, the displacement caused by KPM 
did not raise much concern, as mass displacement of hill peoples was already looming large with 
the future construction of the power plant. In fact, there was a great deal of anxiety among the 
hill peoples, and uncertainty among the authorities and experts, on the extent to which the power 
plant’s dam and reservoir (hereafter, Kaptai dam) would affect people and land in the area. In 
early 1954, an administrative inquiry committee was formed by the government to find out the 
effect of the power plant on administration and the district’s headquarters, Rangamati. The 
inquiry revealed that despite certainty about the inundation of a large area by the power plant 
project, the power plant project authorities and administrative officials in the district were not 
proactive in preparing for the consequences. No cartographic air survey was carried out for the 
purpose of determining the would-be submerged areas; the project authorities even considered it 
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 The KPM displaced about one thousand hill peoples, mainly belonging to the Marma community.   
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“an extremely complicated and expensive affair” and not “necessary.” The inquiry committee 
explained:  
For the preparation of the maps which we required the Irrigation Engineers  made use of 
the existing Survey of Pakistan maps which were really copies of the old Survey of India 
maps showing 5 feet and 10 feet contours. These were enlarged and lines were drawn 
roughly connecting the contours corresponding to 108 ft. R.L.  and all area below R.L, 
108 ft. thus obtained  was colour washed. It is to be expected that the Survey of India and 
Survey of Pakistan maps are reasonably and substantially accurate and should serve the 
purpose. But a map drawn to a scale of one inch to a mile, which means a concentration  
to 1/ 63000 can hardly disclose a depression on the ground unless it were bigger than a 
furlong. Small depression and inlets below this size will be hardly perceptible and cannot 
be plotted and show in a map of such size. […] We also discovered some serious defect 
in these maps, which must be attributed to faulty drawing of contours of the water spread 
area on the maps… [We were] surprised to find that… [t]he maps given to us were…not 
quite accurate (GOEP 1957: 2). 
 
Therefore, there was no concrete estimation of would-be displaced persons. The inquiry 
committee was informed that the Kaptai dam would displace as many as 50,000 hill peoples, 
mostly Chakma, and a thousand Bengalis (GOEP, 1957:1). However, as the construction of the 
power plant progressed, estimates differed as to the number of people, cultivable farm lands 
(including jhum) and areas of Reserved Forests that would be affected. One of the earliest and 
most important studies of the power plant project, displacement and resettlement in CHT was 
David Sopher’s (1963), conducted between 1960 and 1961, just prior to the completion of the 
power plant. Sopher, an American geographer, pieced together in late 1950s Revenue 
Department’s information about the mass displacement of hill peoples; according to him, the 
most conservative estimates suggested about 80,000 people would have to be moved, and 52,000 
acres of plough land would be submerged. Of the estimated 80,000 who would be displaced, 
45,500 were mainly plough cultivators and the other 34, 500 were mostly jhum cultivators. 
Ninety percent of the plough cultivators were hill peoples while the rest were Bengalis. Sopher 
also noted that the actual number of plough cultivators would be much higher than estimated if 
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the number of hill peoples indirectly connected with plough cultivators were included (Sopher 
1963:347-8). For the Chakma, the power plant project would eliminate most of the plough land 
in the middle valleys of the Karnaphuli River and the lower valleys of the Chengri, Kassalong, 
and Maini rivers, as well as land in many other smaller areas (Sopher 1963:347). 
Nonetheless, when the power plant started its operation in January 1962, it resulted in far 
more detrimental consequences for the ecology, economy and people of the CHT than had been 
planned, estimated, and anticipated (Chakma, H. et al. 1995; Chakma, G. 1991). The Kaptai dam 
entirely changed the physical terrain and ecology to the north and middle of CHT. The dam 
formed several large bays joined together by small bays surrounding Rangamati, the only town 
and district headquarters of CHT, as if it were an island in the middle of the district, while 
placing the Chakma chief’s residence under water (see Photo3.2). In particular, to the north there 
formed two large bays in the Chengri River and in the northeast there were bays at Subholong 
and at Kattoli occupying the southern half of Kassalong Reserve. Along the Renikhyong River, 
the Kaptai dam also formed a small bay and beside Rangamati was a very large bay (EPADC 
n.d.:3; see and compare Appendix A: Maps 2, 6 and 7). 
As to the loss of economy, property and displacement, it is now widely held that the 
Kaptai dam submerged 256 sq. m. affecting 125 Mouzas, and uprooted 100,000 people of 18,000 
families (that was one-fourth of the total population of the district according to the 1961 census). 
This included 54,000 acres of plough land which was 40 percent of the plough land of the 
district; 10.5 sq. m. of Reserved Forests; and thousands of acres of USF lands in the valleys of 
the Karnaphuli River and all its tributaries to the north and north-east (EPADC n.d.:2; see also 
Ishaq 1971; Ali 1993:179).
71
 A vocational survey conducted prior to the completion of the power 
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 Despite the loss of thousands of acres of the Reserved Forests to the power plant project, the total area of 
Reserved Forests in CHT remained almost unchanged as the Forest Department brought new areas into reservation. 
115 
 
plant listed 12,428 would-be affected families, of whom 7,143 (58%) were plough cultivators; 
4,000 (32%) were jhum cultivators; 428 (3%) were wood cutters, day labourers, or others who 
were not dependent on land for earnings; and 857 (7%) were shopkeepers and businessmen 
(GOP 1963:15-16). In all, the estimated net loss of agricultural produce per year was worth of 
Rs. 20 million (EPADC n.d.:2). 
Located in the centre and northern part of CHT on the bank of the Karnaphuli River and 
its tributaries to the north and north-east, the hardest hit by the Kaptai dam was the Chakma 
chief’s circle. The Chakma circle, corresponding approximately to the Chakma’ settlements, was 
the largest circle in CHT. The Chakma in general, the largest community of CHT, were 
considered to be relatively economically advanced compared to the other groups in CHT and 
became a well-settled peasant community by the first quarter of the 20
th
 century. There were also 
farmers and landlords comprised of traditional elites among the Chakma (Jahangir 1979). 
According to Sopher’s estimate, the Chakma represented 90 percent of the displaced hill peoples 
and as much as 90 percent of the total displaced plough cultivators; the others were Marma and 
Tangchangya (Sopher 1963:347-8). If the 1961 population census and estimate of 100,000 
affected individuals are reliable, then more than half of the Chakma population was displaced. 
To put it differently, out of a total of 125 Mouzas affected, more than 100 Mouzas were under 
the Chakma chief, and the rest belonged to the Mong chief (GOP 1963; also Ishaq 1971). 
The displacement process began in early 1960 before the monsoon rains and just a year 
before the completion of the power plant. The authorities advised people of the reservoir area by 
announcing through loudspeakers that they should register their choices of preferred resettlement 
locations individually or as a collective, and move to them (Sopher 1963; Chakma, H. et al. 
1995). It is evident that although the government had a resettlement plan, the process of 
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displacement was completely ill-considered and under-communicated. Although there was a Rs. 
2.5 million budget allocation for evacuation and movement of population under the rehabilitation 
scheme (GOP 1963; Rajput 1965), the displacement process was abrupt and led to a skirmish for 
choices among individual families, villages or Mouzas, especially for the Chakma. Sopher 
observes that the Chakma had four options:  “(1) to move to higher ground within their own 
[Mouza] or one nearby or (2) to move away from the vicinity of the reservoir to (a) the 
Kassalong Rehabilitation Areas, (b) unreclaimed flat land in the upper Chengri and Myani 
Valleys, or (c) some other parts of the district.”  Mouzas’ headmen could consult inventories of 
lands and areas, but only a few village leaders were able to get firsthand information of some of 
these areas. “Villagers’ true preferences may have been somewhat modified to conform with the 
majority choices as a result of pressure from headmen or other influential persons” (Sopher 
1963:349). Local Bengali officials also exercised considerable pressure and induced choices 
upon the Chakma in certain directions.  
In some villages, existing factions took opposing positions. A headman might advocate 
staying in the area on high ground in order to “wait and see,” expecting thereby to retain 
his position and prestige as [a] headman and his portion of the jhum fee. Someone else of 
substance might urge a unanimous decision to move to an area such as Kasalong, where 
he could seek new opportunities for formal recognition as a popular representative. A few 
persons of this kind were able to solicit and exploit government favors, especially 
because the established headmen have often been regarded by officials as “too 
conservative” and “uncooperative.” The influence of the chief, though indirectly 
expressed and varying in effectiveness with the closeness of his kinship ties to the 
[Mouza] population, tended to reinforce the recommendations of the headman (Sopher 
1963:350). 
 
In some other cases, Chakma headmen or other prominent villagers “sifted opinions and made 
recommendations in the course of visits” to prospective resettlement areas by individuals or 
small groups. The matter was then further considered within the respective family circles 
(Sopher, 1963:350).  
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Photo 3.1: View of the Karnaphuli River at the Chandraghona feri crossing (Rangamati District) downstream from 
the Kaptai Dam. 
 
 
 
Photo 3.2: View of Rangamati Deputy Commisioner’s residential bungalow, Rangamati, on the shore of Kaptai 
Lake. Near the distant shore, there used to be a Chakma Chief’s palace, until it was submerged under the lake. 
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Narratives of displacement compiled by Horikishore Chakma et al. (1995) suggest that 
the hill peoples’ responses to the displacement process were dawdling and became chaotic as the 
reservoir regime began to inundate the areas permanently in a manner that had been 
unimaginable. Most of the hill people could not think of how the “flows of a river could be 
halted with a dam.”  Some elderly individuals even thought that “the government was doing that 
work to levy taxes. They were rather worried about paying taxes as they did not have to pay such 
taxes then.” Many others thought “the dam would certainly collapse. Why move elsewhere?” 
(Chakma, H. et al. 1995: 28-30). Gyan Bikas Chakma’s recounted memory represents the typical 
choice and action of the displacement process:  
We, who were nearer the dam site, were hit first. Our house was about 15 km upstream 
from the dam point. The flood water engulfed our land and homestead before we could 
realize exactly what was happening. It was chaos. As the flood water surged, people- men 
and women -rushed to the top of the nearby hills with whatever belongings they could 
carry on their heads. They began to clear jungles to create shelters. People labored like 
hell, day and night. Many even lived under trees. But soon it became clear to them that all 
land and habitations had permanently gone under the water (Chakma, H. et al. 1995: 22).  
 
He also remembered some of the worst parts of the displacement:   
It’s all right that human beings see their own good first. But [they] become simply selfish 
then… Few bothered about others at that time. Everyone concerned about his own 
survival, trying to save own belonging (Chakma, H. et al. 1995:22).  
 
There was spread of diseases such as influenza and tuberculosis, and almost every family had at 
least one member who became ill. However, for some families, illness met with a tragic death of 
the family members as they fought between individual and collective choices to move away or 
not during the displacement: 
Shankhamala Chakma, (60), of Keretkaba village in Rangamati Thana said her late 
husband believed that the dam and resulting lake would not last long…if they moved 
even for a few months the schooling of the children would be disrupted…  ‘So, we did 
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not leave the village, rather went up [to] a nearby hill. But as a matter of misfortune, we 
know our son who was the main reason we stayed, died later after a long illness. His 
father also died of TB (tuberculosis). But the water has never gone down again’ 
(Chakma, H. et al. 1995:29).   
 
Many suffered such traumatic experiences during the displacement. Shilbrata Tanchangya is one 
of them; a frail sad figure, who told of his suffering: 
I still hear the booming sounds of the dam gate closing that continued throughout the 
whole night. By the morning the water had reached our door steps. The whole area had 
turned into a sea. We set free cows and goats, hens and ducks, and then begun rush with 
affected people to take their rice, paddy, furniture and whatever else possible to nearby 
hills. Then many people started clearing jungles on the hill to build shelters. Though 
every possible belonging was taken to the hilltop, many still went to their houses to spend 
the night. But many of them had to rush out of their houses at dead night when the 
swelling water touches them while they slept.  We just helplessly watched our beloved 
homes going under the water. This dam turned us into paupers (Chakma, H. et al., 
1995:20).  
 
This story of Shilbrata Tanchangya resonates with the experiences of many Chakma peasants’ 
and farmers’ families. Importantly, it goes beyond common narratives of displaced families or 
communities to point to livestock and poultry, helping to imagine what happened to them, 
otherwise rarely mentioned in documents or writing on CHT, except in Sopher’s account. Sopher 
(1963) noted with an anthropological insight: “A noteworthy feature of Kassalong settlement 
was the scarcity of pigs, partly because Bengali boatmen who had transported many of the 
[displaced] Chakma migrants had refused to allow their pigs on board” (Sopher 1963: 359-360).  
In sum, the Kaptai dam completely inundated the material conditions of the rural peasant 
economy in the north of CHT (that is, its cultivatable and grazing lands) and forced rural hill 
peoples to abandon their cultural economy. The processes of displacement have led many hill 
people to believe that the displacement “was a great conspiracy” against the hill peoples 
(Chakma, H. et al. 1995: 22).  “Conspiracy” is certainly an ideological interpretation of the 
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events. Activist academics have called the displacement an “ethnocide” or “destruction of 
culture” (Schendel et al. 2000). However, for state authorities, the displacement and loss of 
cultivable lands represented different problems; these were problems of planning the relocation 
and resettlement of the hill peoples on the one hand, and controlling jhum cultivation on the 
other. 
3.1.2  Resettlement Policies and Practices 
The resettlement planning had begun before the start of industrialization in CHT. Considering 
the anticipated spatial and cultural effects of the displacement on the Chakma chief’s circle, the 
principal policies for the resettlement were: first of all, maintaining the traditional territorial 
administration of the Chakma circle; and secondly, compensating and resettling displaced plough 
cultivators as a priority (GOP 1963). According to this policy, the Revenue Department (of the 
civil administration in CHT) undertook initiatives to find land for resettlement as early as 1952. 
However, the biggest problem facing authorities was said to be the acute shortage of land for 
resettlement in the district because of the Forest Department’s unwillingness to de-reserve any 
part of the Reserved Forests. It is important to bear in mind here that one fourth of CHT was still 
Reserved Forests; amongst the Reserved Forests, Barkal, Kassalong, Renikhyong, Sitapahar 
Reserves were located to the north and northeast of CHT and of the Karnaphuli River and its 
tributaries, and in most part around the Chakma chief’s circle (see Appendix A: Map 3). The 
Forest Department also had overlapping jurisdiction over USF or lands in Mouzas, and was in 
competition and a conflict of interest with the civil administration in managing the lands and 
people. Therefore, land searches for resettlement by the Deputy Commissioner of CHT in 1952 
could only come up with as many as 22,000 acres of plough lands and 4,000 acres of jhum land 
in CHT which could be resettled with as many as 6,000 families, providing only 5 acres of land 
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for a family. Most of the lands were within the Chakma circle; however, many of them were in 
small parcels inadequate for community settlement (GOEP 1957; GOP 1963).  Thus, the Deputy 
Commissioner argued for the liberal de-reservation of the Reserved Forests, which the Forest 
Department resolutely opposed, emphasizing the “acute shortage of forests, timber and other 
forest produces in Pakistan” (GOEP 1957:9). As an alternative, the Forest Department proposed 
the resettlement of hill peoples in the southern part of CHT in Bohmong circle.
72
 The 
Conservator of Forest even went on to suggest that “If this adversely effects the revenue of the 
Chakma chief it will automatically enhance the revenue of the Bohmong chief and some sort of 
adjustment between them can be effected” (GOEP 1957:10).  
 The plans were discussed in a meeting of the inquiry committee in 1954, and the 
committee expressed reservations about the Forest Department’s plan. The inquiry committee 
suggested that resettlement should be given to the displaced Chakma within the Chakma circle as 
a priority and only those who could not be so resettled should be resettled in other areas within 
the district; in this case, the latter were displaced Bengalis or other groups such as the Marma 
and Tanchaynga. The inquiry committee also emphasized the need to maintain “the unity and 
culture” of the Chakma, and for that matter, the Chakma chief’s circle (GOEP 1957). It appears 
that certain compromises between the Revenue and Forest Departments were achieved, and the 
Forest Department de-reserved 26,026 acres of Kassalong Reserve for resettlement programs.         
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 In more technical detail the Forest Department proposed as many as 2,749 acres of plough land and 46, 500 acres 
of upland for the resettlement of 2,669 displaced families. The plan suggested that no less than 25 families would 
form a group, with displaced families divided into three categories i) those who depended entirely on jhum; ii) those 
who depended partly on jhum and wet rice cultivation; and iii) those who entirely depended on wet rice cultivation. 
Accordingly, the first group in each family would be offered 60 acres of uplands for jhum, 6 acres in a year for a 10 
year cycle. The second group in each family would be given 2.5 acres of plough land and 25 acres of hilly lands for 
jhum; and for the third group, each family would be given 4 acres of plough land (GOEP 1957, Appendix, pp. 13-
21). 
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The Revenue Department began its resettlement programs under the rehabilitation and 
compensation scheme in early 1959 and continued until 1965, involving a total expenditure of 
Rs. 19.6 million. However, much of the amount was spent for physical construction of roads, 
government offices and residential quarters, markets, religious centres, schools and other 
facilities (Rajput 1965: 27).  
As far as the resettlement was concerned, the scheme was influenced by ethnicity and the 
class positions of the displaced while providing displaced families compensation for lands, 
allotting them non-submerged land for cultivation and homesteads, and assisting them to bring 
their land into production (GOP 1963; Rajput 1965). Sopher (1963) observes that up to 1961, a 
total of 4,938 families including Bengalis were resettled with 24,801 acres of land. Without 
exception, the Marma and Tangchangya who moved from the lake area went to the Matamuhuri 
valleys closer to the border of Chittagong district in the Bohmong Circle. Of the hill peoples, 
only 2300 Chakma displaced families (of plough cultivators) were given resettlement land in the 
Kassalong tracts, the biggest resettlement area with 10,000 acres of plough land made out of the 
de-reserved part of Kassalong Reserve. The land area of the Kassalong tracts was mechanically 
divided into blocks of varying width running from the river bank to accommodate the hill 
peoples of one Mouza. There were 570 Bengali displaced families who also received settlement 
within Kassalong; they comprised one-sixth of the households relocated in the area, to the 
dismay of many Chakma. These Bengalis were settled on the best Kassalong land near the bazaar 
and administrative headquarters of Marishaya that was 2000 acres of level and cleared land, 
almost ready for ploughing. Other Bengali cultivators who lost land to the Kaptai dam also 
received special inducement to resettle in areas next to the costal lowlands of Cox’s Bazar 
district, such as the vicinity of Sialbukka and Faisyakhali (Sopher 1963:350). This illustrates not 
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only how resettlement worked on the ground, but also how resettlement was shaped by cultural 
politics and differences. 
By 1965 when the resettlement scheme ended, the government claimed that it had 
resettled 10,271 displaced families over 18,690 acres of plough land and 21,477 acres of uplands 
(Rajput 1965). Although I cannot ascertain the accuracy of this claim, it is certain that a great 
majority of displaced Chakma families were not considered for resettlement programs, 
particularly families of jhum cultivators and labouring classes (i.e., day labourers, bamboo or 
wood cutters, etc.). There were at least 4000 families of jhum cultivators and 428 families of 
labouring classes (as mentioned before). What happened to them is still not documented. In a 
footnote, one account reports that 1,200 families of jhum cultivators moved into Kassalong 
resettlement areas (Recter 1967:77). In all accounts I know of, there is no report of what 
happened to the labouring classes.   
Interestingly, a large number of Chakma peasant families who were living in Chengri and 
Shubholong valleys could not decide whether to move away or to stay near their submerged 
lands. Significant to this indecision was the hope of a crop during the low water regime of the 
Kaptai dam. In these two areas, “a point commonly made was that the surrounding hill could 
always be used for jhum as a last resort and also by way of insurance” (Sopher 1963: 354).  So, 
the displaced Chakma families in these areas moved their villages to higher ground and hill areas 
(at times 40 to 50 feet) and resettled themselves locally. Still, there were around 5,000 Chakma 
families (consisting of about 40,000 people) who could not resettle themselves; they took refuge 
in India in 1964 under the Indian government’s program of “Operation Karuna (Mercy)” and 
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were resettled in Arunachal province. They call the journey Bara Parang meaning the “Great 
Exodus” (Chakma H. et al., 1995:20-22). 73  
A significant aspect of resettlement was the limited access to land, a new phenomenon in 
CHT. This limitation was a result of the policy of land distribution and cultural practices of land 
claims. The government set a policy of only compensating plough land cultivators, not jhum 
cultivators or other displaced groups; its rationale for this policy was the paradoxical and 
deceitful claim of limited land availability for resettlement. For plough land cultivators, the 
government policy was that every family would get one acre of new plough land per acre of 
plough land the family had lost, but this was limited to a maximum one acre per person in the 
family, and also to a maximum of ten acres per family. For example, a family of six persons that 
lost three acres would be given three acres; a family of six that lost ten acres would be given six 
acres; a family of twelve that lost twenty acres would be given ten acres of plough land. 
However, in the case of a family that lost more than ten acres of plough land, the family might be 
given additional “suitable hilly lands for gardening or terrace cultivation” (GOP 1963: 17). 
“Equity” and “justice” in the distribution of land were claimed to be the rationales for the policy; 
as I will argue below, this claim does not stand up to scrutiny. In putting the policy into practice, 
the government further marginalized displaced plough cultivators by their cultural capital and 
legal entitlement. In other words, to claim land compensation for land in the submerged valley, 
the government required written application and documentation of legal proof which is usually 
considered to be a practice of “high culture.” The practices show the lack of consideration of the 
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 The government seems to have tried preventing migration to India but failed. At first the refugee Chakma families 
were given settlement in Mizoram but on Mizo refusal to accept Chakma into their region, they were made to 
resettle in Arunachal Pradesh, where they are still living. The Bangladesh government still does not recognize these 
refugees and they were not part of the repatriation of hill peoples from India according to the CHT (Peace) Treaty of 
1997 (see also Schendel 2000).   
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cultural and social contexts of the hill peoples to whom the practices of bureaucracy and culture 
of writing were very unpopular and, at times, unfamiliar.  
Therefore, it turned out that 8,000 displaced families lacked the necessary documentation 
to have their cases considered. Of the remaining 10,000 displaced families who could claim 
legitimate land rights in the submerged valley, only a fraction could fulfill documentary and 
other requirements required by the government. As a result, only those of a fortunate few could 
receive land compensation, as much as 10 acres as a maximum contingent upon the size of 
family, which fell far short of the loss sustained by most families (Ali 1993). Furthermore, these 
policies only applied in Kassalong resettlement areas, the largest and best managed resettlement. 
Evidently, only a few got the maximum 10 acres of plough lands as the average family size was 
around 7 members (according to the 1961 census) (GOP n. d.).  
Narratives of Kassalong resettled families suggest that the problem is not only that most 
of them received some parts of upland along with plough lands, but also that much of the plough 
lands was subject to flooding during the full reservoir regime and monsoon season. Lack of 
grazing lands for livestock animals for ploughing further compounded the problem. In other 
resettlement areas where resettlement land was fragmented and dispersed, the policy of plough 
land compensation could hardly work out and, therefore, in many cases the policy was to 
negotiate for cash compensation far below the market price (Chakma, H. et al. 1995: 35-37; see 
also Sopher 1963).  
The resettlement brought about a significant change in land use and agricultural 
production, which the government claimed to be “a new field for economic rehabilitation for 
better prospect” (GOP 1963). The new land use involved mixed-plantation of fruit orchards and 
agricultural plantation by hill terracing under the assistance of the Department of Agriculture and 
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the Rehabilitation Department. By 1965, the displaced families of 1,921 ex-farmers and 2,650 
jhum cultivators were brought under these programs (Rajput 1965). The programs included 
cultivation of pineapple, orange, mango, litchi, lemon, guava, jackfruit, cashew nut, and banana 
as well as rubber. In 1965, an in-depth comparative study of the agricultural economics of 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (including areas of Kassalong resettlement, and locally resettled Baradam 
and Mitingachari mouzas) concluded as follows:
74
     
This resettlement programme has not yet developed entirely satisfactorily and many of 
the resettled people have to supplement their income by jhuming. Taking over of former 
jhum lands for mixed plantations and the increased jhum activities of displaced families 
have together caused significant nature of jhuming in the Hill Tracts. Jhuming has spread 
where it scarcely existed before.  Moreover, in many areas the length of jhum cycle had 
decreased. . . In some places, the cycle has eliminated completely (Recter 1967: 99). 
 
Evidently, life became an unmitigated disaster for the majority of displaced hill peoples. For the 
hill peoples, the main problem of horticulture plantation was shortage of food, let alone adapting 
to new agriculture, poor hill soils, and inadequate government support for credits and marketing 
(Recter 1967:71-88). Still, as I will discuss next, for state authorities, mixed fruits plantation was 
the only potential alternative to jhum cultivation for hill peoples’ livelihood strategies and 
became a key strategy for the control of political forests in USF later during the insurgency and 
counter-insurgency period in CHT. This strategy was generally attributed to the discourse of 
“optimum land use” that originated in the mid 1960s from a state sponsored study of land 
classification in the USF with the assistance of foreign experts and aid; however, my research 
found that the strategy was originally articulated locally by the Forest Department in CHT in the 
late 1950s as part of the resettlement program at that time (see Chapter IV). To my knowledge, 
besides the taungya, this resettlement program of the Forest Department is one of the earliest 
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 The other areas included in this study were jhum cultivators of Bandarban and plough cultivators of Khagrachhari 
from the non-submerged areas. 
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forms of agro-forestry based participatory community forestry in practice. How did this form of 
agro-forestry mobilize communities for the control of political forests? What were the programs, 
how were they structured, and to what effects? To explore these questions, I turn to the next 
section. 
              
3.4  Beyond Taungya Forestry: Resettlement and New Participatory Forestry 
Years before the power plant was to be completed, jhum cultivation emerged as a potentially 
serious problem for state authorities. Alongside the planning of resettlement for would-be 
displaced hill peoples, state authorities and experts also began planning an alternative to jhum 
cultivation, as well as a policy of a permanent end to jhum cultivation.
75
 As the following 
statement of Pakistan’s Second Five Year Plan of 1960-65 illustrates:   
Jhum is a primitive technique of cultivation. It hugely destroys forest. Using permanent 
methods of cultivation by using more advanced technology of social development, jhum 
cultivation can be abolished. In many areas, land may not be found to settle jhum 
cultivators permanently; therefore, jhum cultivators should be made employable for 
vegetable cultivation, or cash crop cultivation on a small piece of land, or fodder 
cultivation (GOEP 1960: 53; translation mine). 
 
Beyond its “primitiveness” and “ill effects” on forests, jhum cultivation was also considered as 
the cause of multifaceted problems for the sustainability of land, soils, and most importantly, the 
Kaptai dam and the rivers in CHT (GOP 1964; EPADC n. d.). Therefore, in 1962, the Forest 
Department took up a very different kind of resettlement project for jhum cultivators in 
combination with forest plantation programs, creating a new category of political forests and 
participatory forestry in USF lands. The resettlement project, the Working Schemes for the 
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 Recall that the discourse of ‘moral economy’ in opposition to jhum cultivation had been the dominant discourse 
providing the main rationalities upon which the economy, communities, and state in CHT were built, 
accommodating the ideology and interests of foresters and the Forest Department in Bengal (see Chapter II). 
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Protected Forests of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, had two schemes: “the Pilot Project for Jhum 
Control and Jhumia Rehabilitation,” and “the Soft Wood Plantation in East Pakistan”. A 
significant aspect of this resettlement project is that it was not in fact a physical resettlement of 
unsettled jhum cultivators per se, but a resettlement of jhum cultivators into mixed fruit 
cultivation as a mode of living as well as a strategy to control jhum cultivation.  
The resettlement programs further represented new ways of thinking, acting, and acting 
on action of others, in relation and opposition to jhum cultivation in CHT. In part, the ideas, 
structure and programs of this resettlement project drew upon a plan for the gradual elimination 
of jhum cultivation in CHT (GOP 1964: 46-48). The plan was prepared in 1959 by a divisional 
forest officer at the instruction of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, of which the Forest 
Department was then a part.
 76
 The plan proposed several strategies to control and eliminate jhum 
cultivation;  these were: i) planned jhum cultivation; ii) leasing out lands for tea and rubber 
plantation; iii) horticultural research; iv) conservation of ridge top of hills for water while using 
the lower slope of hills for fruit orchards; and importantly iv) an immediate complete land 
utilization survey. In detailing out planned jhum cultivation, the plan combined some of these 
strategies and suggested that all jhum cultivators in each Mouza be compelled by laws or 
rewards to be organized for jhum cultivation in a consolidated block, and to grow cash crops, 
namely, fruit orchards or rubber and tea gardens. This method of cultivating jhum into blocks for 
growing cash crops would be continued up to five years contiguously to the previous year’s 
cultivation. After the five years of planned jhum cultivation and replacing jhum lands with fruit 
orchards, rubber plantation and tea gardens, a survey of each Mouza would be taken to determine 
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 Wolfgang Mey suggested that the project originated in Forestal’s recommendation under the Master Plan of 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Project (see Mey 1984:106). This argument is also reproduced in my MA thesis 
(Chowdhury 2002).       
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if the crops could provide full time employment of the entire population of the Mouza; if not, the 
project would be continued for another five years. To the end of the project, the ownership of the 
fruit orchards or rubber plantation and tea garden of each Mouza would be given to the 
community and the rules for the management would be framed under section 28 of the Forest 
Act of 1927 (that is, the provision of “Village Forest Rules”). Alternatively, an account of each 
jhum cultivator would be kept; in the end, an area equivalent to the area of one’s fruit orchards or 
rubber plantation and tea garden was to be settled with him/her (GOP 1964: 46-48).   
In putting this plan into a resettlement project, the Forest Department created a new 
category of forest, i.e., protected forest in USF according to sections 29 and 30 of the Forest Act 
of 1927, under a newly created forest division in CHT called Jhum Control. This protected forest 
took up six Mouzas entirely and one Mouza partially, a total of 35,226.6 acres of USF in the 
submerged area amid the loss of cultivable lands and displacement. The areas comprised three 
separate blocks known as Maini (13,363.8 acres), Renikhyong (9,747.5 acres), and Khaskhali 
(12,115.3 acres). The Maini and Renikhyong blocks are situated on the fringe of Kaptai dam near 
the Kassalong and Renikhyong Reserves respectively. The third, Khaskhali block, is situated on 
the border of Chittagong and at the intersection of the Chittagong and Rangamati roads (GOP 
1964).  
This resettlement project represents both continuity and discontinuity with taungya 
forestry and the management of the Reserved Forests. In part, the project followed the discourse 
and practices of scientific management of the Reserved Forest, such as a working plan regime, 
and the functional territorialization of landscapes into working circles, ranges (cutting series), 
and beats (felling series). Thus, the land areas in all blocks were divided into sixty acres of 
compartments based on qualities of lands which then were organized conveniently into beats, 
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ranges and working circles. An important difference in this land planning aspect of the forest 
working plan was a fruit working circle for the permanent settlements of jhum cultivators and 
their livelihood programs along with soft wood working circles for the plantation of forests 
(GOP 1964).   
In this projecting and designing, the project aims were “to educate both, [foresters] and 
the local people in the best form of land use ... by which the [jhum cultivators] can be made self 
sufficient without doing much damage to the land” (GOP 1964:ii).  Thus, jhum cultivation was 
banned in the protected forest areas of which 21, 277.7 acres were to be planted with fast 
growing softwood, and the remaining space (13, 948.9 acres) was to be mixed fruit gardens. For 
the resettlement, participation and benefits were instituted and defined in the law somewhat 
differently than those of the existing and past practices of taungya forestry in the Reserved 
Forests: each jhum cultivator family joining the project either by choice or by force of the law 
would receive a piece of selected land for taungya cultivation to produce their yearly food and 
vegetables, while planting and raising forests and mixed fruits trees under the direction of the 
Forest Department. The family would also receive wages for working year-round in the taungya 
plantation to supplement their income for the year, and had to work for at least three years. The 
Forest Department was to keep the records of the areas of mixed fruit and forest plantations for 
individual families of jhum cultivators over the years. At the end of the project, each jhum 
cultivator family was to receive the settlement of equivalent areas of plantation in the mixed fruit 
gardens for livelihood and income. Alternatively, any individual family of jhum cultivators who 
planted fruit trees in their cultivable jhum lands and raised mixed fruit gardens for five years 
would receive the land settlement of the mixed fruit gardens that had been planted and raised 
(GOP 1964:16).  
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Nonetheless, the project did not do well in practice. It had only raised 1900 acres of forest 
plantation and 2000 acres of mixed fruit plantation by 1967 when it got reframed and 
programmed differently under a project called the Master Plan of Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Development Project. The Master Plan project was based on a discourse know as “optimum land 
use” that emerged from a state sponsored study of forests, land, soils, and water resources in 
USF in the mid 1960s (Forestal, 1966a, 1966f). Although the Master Plan project ran until 1975, 
its forest scheme could not begin during that time; it was only after 1975, at the conjuncture of 
insurgency and counter insurgency, that the discourse of optimum land use came to further 
prominence and articulated with forest expansion through plantation programs (which I will deal 
with in the next chapter). As for the question of what happened to hill peoples who had been 
living in the area before it became Protected Forests, I could not ascertain if they were displaced, 
made to join, or voluntarily joined the resettlement project.
77
 Nevertheless, it is certain that the 
Protected Forests dispossessed the population of the hill peoples who joined the program as they 
were cut off from their traditional and civil administration associated with customary rights to 
cultivation in the Mouzas according to the Regulation of 1900.  
 
3.5  Conclusion and Discussion  
By the time of the partition of British India, the forest resources of East Pakistan (East Bengal) 
had been seriously curtailed; still, East Pakistan remained the better forested region in Pakistan, 
and CHT became the major forest region of East Pakistan in addition to a portion of Sundarbans 
(GOP 1957; FD 1960). As a result, differential policies of forest management between West 
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 My interview with Divisional Forest Officers of Jhum Control Division in Rangamati did not go well. The officer 
was a young university graduate and protectionist; he even prevented me taking notes of the display board in the 
office. Other Divisional Forest Officers in the Rangamati Forest circle including the Deputy Conservator of Forest 
(DCF) and Conservator of Forest (CF) were highly cordial and helpful. In particular, the DCF office helped a lot by 
sharing some information about the Jhum Control Division, including a recently updated brochure.         
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Pakistan and East Pakistan emerged. Forests in CHT became subjects and objects of industrial 
development and other policies, which in turn greatly shaped and changed the discourse and 
practices of political forests and the control of both USF and the Reserved Forests in CHT. 
Concerning industrial development, the effect of the power plant was the most 
detrimental and significant. Before the Kaptai dam, jhum cultivation was well adjusted as an 
agricultural practice given the climate, land topography and economy. There was also a large hill 
population that lived by plough cultivation in the middle Karnaphuli River valley and the lower 
Chengri, Kassalong, and Renikhyong valleys (EPADC n. d.; Recter 1967). However, the entire 
economy, ecology, and agrarian relations in the northern part of CHT were changed as the 
Kaptai dam unsettled and dispossessed one fourth of the hill peoples of CHT.  
The resettlement of the displaced hill peoples’ families met with failure. A common 
reasoning for the failure is technical, i.e., the lack of a comprehensive plan, lack of coordination 
among the government agencies, and lack of a long term policy (EPADC n. d.). The hill peoples 
considered the failure in political and ideological terms (Chakma, H. et al. 1995).  Both 
arguments have their merits and share of truth as they respectively represent the discourses of 
science and politics. However, both arguments are missing concreteness; that concreteness is to 
be found in the discourses of forests which produced the land crises. Nevertheless, the cultural 
logic of hill peoples’ resettlement and territorial choices, specifically, the Chakma resettlement, 
was an illuminating example of hill peoples’ own sedentary character, and a territorial choice 
that proved that the common stigmatization of the hill peoples as “nomadic tribes” is not only 
misleading but also out of place.  
The remaking of political forests and participatory forestry had differential impacts on the 
Reserve Forests and USF. In the Reserved Forests, the remaking of forests was associated with 
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industrial needs for timber and with the scientific management of forests and landscapes. The 
practices of taungya forestry in the Reserved Forests remained unchanged. Rather, changes in the 
practices of participatory forestry emerged along with the discourse and practices of the 
resettlement.  The resettlement programs reframed the control of forests through the introduction 
of a new form of participatory forestry in USF. Although it is mostly unknown how this worked 
out on the ground and in practice, it appeared to be least successful, in my view, for reasons to do 
with agricultural programs. It seems to me that programs of jhum control and mixed fruit 
horticultural gardens were more futuristic and driven by fear, cultural biases and scientific 
discourses. They lacked common sense and concerns for the hill peoples’ needs for cultivable 
land which was of great significance to them as the basic means of their livelihood and survival. 
The latter concern is essential for any development program to be successful in practice.  
The resettlement programs also introduced considerable changes in the hill peoples’ 
relations to jhum lands, a common property in USF, and led to the beginning of a private 
property regime on USF lands in CHT, although customary rights of hill peoples to use USF 
forest resources for domestic purposes remained unchanged. Because of the general crises of 
cultivable plough lands after the Kaptai dam, state authorities adopted policies of upland 
settlement in USF for individual right holders (lease with perpetuity, or for a specific period) as 
part of compensation of plough land loss to the displaced families that included the rights to sell 
or lease the land (see Dewan 1991). This land settlement policy not only undermined hill 
peoples’ common generic customary rights over jhum land but also misrecognized them 
deliberately. Moreover, an amendment was made to Rule 34 of the Regulation of 1900 in order 
to allow Bengalis to receive land legally by purchase, lease or grant in USF, provided they 
resided in CHT (Amin, M. 2000:33 footnote). The amendment aimed to facilitate Bengalis 
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taking advantage of the economic opportunities opened up by industrialization in CHT. Thus, 
different forms of individual rights over USF lands emerged in the 1960s to become a dominant 
policy and practice for the control of land and forests in USF only later.  
These changes in USF not only contrasted with and altered the previous policies and 
practices of the management of USF; they also contained an inherent contradiction and danger 
for the land revenue administration and customary rights of hill peoples over lands in general and 
non-urban homestead plots in particular. A crucial contradiction in the land policy was that 
although jhum cultivation was not officially banned, the customary rights to common land on 
which jhum cultivation relied were no longer recognized or regarded as valid by the Pakistani 
state. New land settlements could only occur on the basis of individual property rights for fruit 
horticulture or commercial industrial use. The policy posed a serious threat to the traditional 
administration of CHT, as jhum cultivation was the primary source of the Chiefs’ revenues and 
was fundamental to the traditional administration of the chiefs and headmen system upon which 
the revenue and civil administration of CHT was built. This policy also meant that the Deputy 
Commissioner’s powers to regulate, grant, and cancel land and land settlements in USF became 
more exclusive and absolute.   
Concurrently, there were also several changes to the regulation of 1900 that sought to 
replace the British paternalistic policy of protection of the hill peoples. Although these changes 
were a result of the discourse and policy of Pakistani Muslim nationalism and national 
integration, they were significant to the political control of USF forests and land and are worth 
repeating. 
78
 The first of these changes was the introduction of a three-tiered local government 
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 The discourse of Pakistan Muslim nationalism constructed hill peoples as the “enemy of Pakistan” or equally as 
“pro-Indian” while reinventing racial and anthropological discourses of tribe and primitive to describe “deficiencies” 
of the hill peoples in need of improvement (CHT Commission, 1991: 12; Organizing Committee, 1986; 44; 
Schendel et al. 2001: 110). 
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system (District Council, Thana Council, and Union Council) into CHT along with the rest of the 
country.
79 
Although this local government system did not replace the traditional administration of 
the CHT, it surely undermined the traditional system. Under this new system, directly elected 
representatives to the Union Councils (known as Basic Democrats) had more power than 
traditional leaders (chiefs and headmen) because they controlled not only state welfare resources 
and funding to local communities and their distribution but also local development funds. The 
second change to the Regulation of 1900 was abolishing the special status of CHT in the 
constitution as a “Tribal Area.”80 The third important change was ending the power of the 
Deputy Commissioner of CHT (i.e., Rule 51 of the Regulation of 1900) to expel non-indigenous 
hill peoples or Bengalis from CHT; this came on the order of the Dhaka High Court that Rule 51 
violated the freedom of movement of Pakistan citizens within the country guaranteed by the 
Pakistan Constitution (Amin 2000: 44 footnote). This ruling reversed the legal protection that hill 
peoples had enjoyed, and opened up CHT legally for Bengalis. At the same time, the local and 
civil administration was completely staffed by Bengalis, while hill peoples in the government 
administration in CHT were transferred to other parts of the country (Mohsin 1997:46; Ishaq 
1971: 251-271). The sitting Chakma chief at that time, Tridiv Roy, called this change in 
administration “the Bengalisation of the Tracts.”81 Although the regulation of 1900 remained the 
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 In 1948, the government disbanded the Frontier Police Force that was composed solely of the hill peoples of the 
CHT: “its members were posted to other districts while provincial (Bengali) police forces were deployed 
permanently to CHT” (Ali 1993:177). 
80
 The CHT was initially administered by the Ministry of State and Frontier Regions, a ministry that dealt with the 
former partially or totally excluded areas. In 1955, CHT, being defined as a “Special Area”, was placed under the 
Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs and administered by the Central Government, directly through the Deputy 
Commissioner in CHT (Organizing Committee 1986:43). In the first constitution of 1956, the region was able to 
save its special status; but not for long. The Constitution of 1962 did not totally abolish the Regulation; it redefined 
CHT as a “Tribal Area”, and offered a kind of limited autonomy for CHT and other “tribal” areas of West Pakistan. 
However, shortly afterward, in 1963, the Acting President of Pakistan, Fazlul Quader Chowdhury, applying 
executive authority, abolished this special status for CHT. The CHT was removed from the list of tribal areas. 
81
  Chakma chief Tridiv Roy writes: “Ninety percent of government functionaries posted to the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts were Bengalis who, barring notable exceptions, apart from lining their own pockets, set about the 
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key apparatus of the control of USF and the civil administration, the changes in laws and 
administration altered the relations of power, resulting in Bengali domination and the further 
marginalization of the hill peoples. In turn, these changes, along with memories of displacement 
and dispossession, sowed the seeds of ethnic conflict between Bengalis and hill peoples which 
later turned hill peoples’ nationalism into armed resistance after Bangladesh independence. How 
this ethnic conflict happened, and the extent to which it shaped social relations and the relations 
to forest, land and power in Bangladesh, I will consider in the next chapter.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Bengalisation of the Tracts. In the recruitment to Class I and II services, not even 5% was taken from amongst the 
hill people although there were qualified candidates. Even in Class III and IV jobs plainsmen were given 
preference” (Roy, T., n. d.; quoted in Schendel et al. 2001:77).  
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CHAPTER IV 
Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency and Development: The End of the Forest 
Commons 
 
4.1  Introduction          
When I was a young boy my father moved our family from Bamu (of Lama Upazila) to 
Tain (of Alikadam Upazila) near the Matamuhuri Reserved Forest. It was just before 
Bangladesh independence. The Pakistani army, Razakar (pro-Pakistan militia) and 
Muktijoddha (Bengali freedom fighters) had been at war in Lama Hills and Aziz Nagar. 
The hill peoples were increasingly migrating into Tain and Alikadam. Times were hard. 
After a few years in Tain, my father moved to Kolapachar deep inside the Matamuhuri 
Reserve, because there was little land available for jhum. With few people in the reserved 
forest we had plenty of land to jhum and we were happy; there was plenty of rice, 
vegetables, sesame, cotton and other products even if we did about one acre jhum. During 
this time we also had cows, pigs, chickens and hens. Compared with Tain, we often had 
more rice than needed and it was often wasted, left unused or decomposing on the ground 
since markets were scarce and no one would buy rice at home. But we, the Tripura, were 
forced to leave the Reserve as a war broke out among Shanti Bahini, the Mro (Murucha), 
and the army. There were some Tripura in the Shanti Bahini along with Tanchangya, 
Marma, Mro and Chakma. The Mro joined with the army and started killing the Chakma; 
they told the Tripura and Tanchangya to leave the Reserve. We fled our home with 
nothing but the clothes on our backs. The army took us to Umtoli near Alikadam Bazaar 
and told us that the Tripura would live together and would receive land to build homes 
and jhum to raise fruit gardens and forests. In the end, we (Tripura) families came to this 
(Golden River) village after two years in Umtoli. The Forest Guard and Forest Officer 
came and showed us each plots of land that were scattered across the area. I lived here for 
only three years: the jhum was no good and I was forced to work in the forest plantation; 
so, I returned to Kolapachar. Although I have little money, I am happy since I do not 
have to think about how to get food every day.   
 
Robin Chandra was 50 years old when he recounted this story to me.  I met Robin coincidentally 
during my fieldwork at Golden River village when he came to the village to take his father-in-
law and mother-in-law to live with him. Golden River is the one remaining forest village of 
displaced families of the Matamuhuri War who were resettled under development programs in 
the Tain Range of Lama Forest Division between 1985 and 1987. Understandably, Robin was 
busy since he was leaving the next day and had much work to do, specifically preparing 
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traditional luggage to carry all of his in-laws’ belongings. He also wanted to visit friends and go 
to the nearby market for tea with many of them.  Robin agreed to the interview at the request of 
his father-in-law, Ram Chandra, a 75 year old man who belonged to one of the poorest families 
and lived on income he received from selling sun grass and fuel wood. Interestingly, Robin 
spoke Bengali well and he became very passionate while relating his story to me. On the same 
day, I also interviewed Ram Chandra with the help of Rui Tripura, my local research assistant 
and a neighbour of Ram Chandra. On the next day, I joined the villagers to see off Robin, Ram 
and Ram’s wife, Rupa Chandra, and felt extremely sad to witness the tragedy of Ram and Rupa 
becoming “refugees” again. More sadly, Ram had sold his homestead land to Rui before leaving 
the village, and I had to offer my assistance in writing the unofficial land agreement.  
The stories of Robin and Ram underscore contemporary changes in the economy and 
society in CHT. In particular, they offer colourful images of changing relations to the land and 
forest in USF (Unclassed State Forests), and of the continued reproduction of dispossession, land 
alienation, and marginalization of hill peoples across CHT. These changes were a direct result of 
counter-insurgency and were in part a continuation of the earlier policies of land and resettlement 
undertaken by Pakistan. It is important to reiterate that USF in CHT refers to the entire land area 
of CHT excluding the Reserved Forests. Divided into numerous Mouzas (i.e., revenue units), 
conventional civil and traditional administrations of CHT are built on USF. The USF includes 
both plough land and jhum land. The latter was forest common until the early years of the 
Pakistani regime, at which point it began to change, as discussed in Chapter III. 
To situate my experiences at the Golden River community in the field of forces and 
sedimented practices of forest and development in CHT, it is important to repeat that the hill 
peoples have been subject to war and at times armed conflict since 1971. The Bangladesh war of 
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liberation began in East Pakistan against the Pakistani military regime in March 1971 and ended 
by December in the same year. The hill peoples appeared either indifferent or divided during this 
period. However, a new war between Shaniti Bahini – an armed wing of Jana Samhati Samiti 
(JSS), the regional political party of CHT – and Bangladesh Security Forces began in CHT in 
1975 as the JSS turned into an insurgency movement. The insurgency and counter-insurgency 
continued until 1997. 
Beyond militarization and pacification, important counter-insurgency strategies included 
Bengali settlement, reorganizing civil administration, and development. Counter-insurgency 
Bengali settlement in CHT began in 1979 and continued until 1985. By the time the policy was 
brought to a halt, an estimated total of 400,000 rural poor Bengalis – approximately 80,000 
families – had settled across the CHT with each family receiving a land lease grant of 5 acres in 
USF, with perpetuity of individual rights. This policy of state sponsored Bengali settlement was 
“considered to be effective counter checks on the insurgent movement by way of their counter-
intelligence and supplying auxiliary military support to the Bangladesh army” (Haq 2000:55). 
Bengali settlement also entailed expansion and changes in civil administration for the service of 
Bengalis, and in turn, between 1981 and 1984, the CHT district was divided into three districts, 
namely Bandarban, Kahagrachari, and Rangamati.
82
 The districts were further sub-divided into 
twenty- five sub-districts or Upazilas with populations between 20,000 to 40,000 under a 
magistrate as the chief executive officer (UNO) and several government departments and offices 
(see Appendix A: Map 2). This abolished the British administrative system of sub-division in the 
district and reorganized Police Stations or Thanas under the new administration. In the end, the 
counter-insurgency remade the state in the region into what can be termed an “overdeveloped 
                                                          
82
 In part, the changes in civil administration in CHT in the early 1980s were part of a countrywide policy of 
decentralization and re-territorialization of civil administration. 
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state.” An important change and an addition to the new administration was the Hill District 
Councils (HDCs), which were established in 1989 with a two-thirds majority of the hill peoples 
as part of the CHT Accord of 1988. The District Councils have limited authority over small 
industries, health, primary education, agriculture and some other matters. The Peace Treaty of 
1997 reorganized HDCs and added two new institutions to supplement and coordinate the district 
councils at national and regional levels respectively: the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Affairs (MOCHTA) and the CHT Regional Councils. However, the political and administrative 
roles of these bodies have not yet been fully clarified (CHT Commission 2000; JSS 2011) 
The idea of development as a strategy of counter-insurgency emerged as early as 1976 in 
a high level meeting among the state authorities and bilateral and transnational donor agencies on 
the eve of full-scale insurgency (ADB 1979:1-2). The government and their international allies 
of bilateral and trans-national development agencies
83
 appeared to agree that while the 
insurgency was clearly a problem of “loyalty” of the hill peoples to the government, 
fundamentally it was a problem of “under development” of the CHT region (Wilson 1987:96). 
This belief led the government to establish the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board 
(CHTDB; hereafter, Development Board) – a regional development authority – to plan, 
implement and coordinate ‘development’ in the CHT in the same year. In terms of its 
organizational link to bureaucracy of the state, the Development Board was placed under the 
control of the Cabinet Division, with the supervision of the chief executive of the government 
(i.e., the Prime Minister or President, depending on the regime in power). At the regional level, 
though the Development Board was initially run by civilian bureaucrats, the top executive 
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 This includes Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) of the U.K. 
Government, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the New Zealand Aid Programme, United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), 
World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank (WB) (see 
Arnes, 1997, for the roles of foreign aid in the militarization and development of CHT).    
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position was soon filled by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Chittagong Cantonment 
and continued to be so until 1994. Significantly, the Development Board was granted an 
unrestrained power for acquisition of land in CHT and extra- constitutional legal immunity for its 
actions (see GOBD 1976).  
The key development programs of the Development Board included resettling hill 
peoples to industrial forest or rubber plantations, and financing Bengali private entrepreneurs for 
commercial rubber production with a lease of industrial land.  In addition to the Development 
Board, the Forest Department emerged as an important agency for carrying out programs in 
collaboration with the Bangladesh Security Forces. The main logic of development has been to 
transform the agrarian economy of jhum cultivation with industrial forestry, commercial rubber 
plantation and horticulture, based on the discourse of “optimum land use,” a derivative discourse 
of the land use classification study of CHT in 1966. The result has been that development and 
other counter-insurgency programs, namely state-sponsored Bengali settlements, have withered 
away the common property regime of forest and land in USF almost completely.
84
 In turn, there 
emerged in lands and forests of USF an individual property regime on the one hand, and absolute 
state property regime of forest on the other.  Both have not only changed hill peoples’ customary 
access rights over land and forest in USF but have also led to the continued reproduction of 
dispossession, land alienation and marginalization of the hill peoples.    
To account for the political ecology of insurgency and war, this chapter begins by 
examining the period of Bangladesh rule in CHT and provides an account of contemporary 
changes in the hill peoples’ relations to forest, land and power. This account will be continued in 
chapters V and VI. As such, this chapter focuses on counter-insurgency ‘development’ programs 
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 In part, the changes were facilitated by the amendment of the Regulation of 1900, namely Article 34 regarding 
transfer and lease of the land through a military ordinance NO. SRO 72-L/79 in 1979 (see GOBD n. d.). 
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and explores the way in which development has changed forest commons and land relations in 
USF during the insurgency and war. In particular, I examine the afforestation and resettlement 
programs of the Forest Department in Lama Forest Division and their related effects on the lives 
and livelihood of the hill peoples’ communities. 85 Unlike the forest resettlement after the 
inception of the power plant during Pakistani rule, the forest plantation and resettlement 
programs were specific development programs that were designed to be a new kind of 
participatory forestry for both the environmental security and livelihood strategies of the hill 
peoples. I chose Lama Forest Division mainly because of my fieldwork with a resettled hill 
peoples’ community which provided me with the opportunity to explore further development 
programs in that region. However, Lama Forest Division is important in its own right: it is one of 
the six forest divisions that were created for the control and management of USF during the 
insurgency and war, and an important site of insurgency and counter-insurgency development in 
the southern part of CHT.  
In what follows, I first discuss the cultural geography of the insurgency movement to 
provide the context of afforestation and resettlement programs. I then consider optimum land use 
discourse and the ways it was articulated in the plans and projects of development, forest 
expansion and resettlement of the hill peoples.  In doing so, I will pay specific attention to the 
project, Integrated Afforestation and Jhumia Rehabilitation (IAJR), a scheme of the Special Five 
Year Plan of Chittagong Hill Tracts Region (1985-1989). Drawn up in 1984 at the height of the 
counter-insurgency war and the internal war among Shanti Bahini, the IAJR project played an 
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 At present, there are nine forest divisions in CHT which almost correspond to the political and administrative 
boundaries of the region. The new forest divisions along with the year of official notification are: USF Division, 
Rangamati (1976), Kapati Pulpwood (1978), Bandarban (1982), Bandarban Pulpwood (1982), Khagrachhari (1985) 
and Lama (1985). The jurisdiction of Chittagong Forest division over Sangu Reserve was transferred to Bandarban 
Forest Division in 1982, and the Cox’s Bazar Forest Division jurisdiction over Matamuhuri Reserve was transferred 
to Lama Forest Division in 2001. The previously existing forest divisions were: CHT North, CHT South, and Jhum 
Control (see Map 5).         
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instrumental role in the resettlement program of Lama Forest Division. I take up the case of 
Lama Forest Division as a third theme to explore counter-insurgency development programs and 
the ways in which they shaped and changed the practices of forests in USF within the Lama 
Forest Division. I then examine the effects of development on the life, livelihood strategies and 
social structure of the resettled community of Golden River. In sum, my analysis here provides a 
South Asian example of insurgencies, counter-insurgencies, and their related effects on land and 
forest commons. This will show that, much as in Southeast Asia, counter-insurgency in CHT 
targets land relations of hill peoples to alter the land usages of jhum cultivation in favour of a 
new economy of horticulture, rubber and state forest (Vandergeest and Peluso 2011).   
    
4.2  Insurgency: Cultural Geographies of the Movement       
The insurgency movement originated in the mid-1950s as an underground student protest 
movement – the Hill Student’s Association – against the backdrop of the Kaptai Dam and 
anticipated dispossession of the hill peoples. The Association was at the heart of the protest 
against the Kaptai dam, and its prominent members were radicalized within a Marxist world 
view and associated with the then East Pakistan Student Union (a Pro-Chinese leftist student 
organization in East Pakistan). As early as 1962, they confronted the military rulers’ ban on 
political activities in CHT by opening primary schools in CHT areas with a view to establishing 
direction and “political consciousness” among the hill peoples.86 In 1966, the leadership of the 
Association formed the Chittagong Hill Tracts Welfare Association (CHTWA). This proto-
political organization was concerned with compensation and resettlement of the displaced 
families and successfully mobilized the hill peoples to seek their cultural and political 
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 Interview with J. B. Larma, the Chairman of CHT Regional Council and the President of the JSS. 
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recognition. In 1970, it successfully contested one of the two seats from CHT in election for the 
provincial legislative assembly of East Pakistan; the CHTWA’s candidate Manabendra Narayan 
Larma, a young lawyer, won the election (Kisha 1996). In hindsight, this brought the main 
protagonist of the insurgency movement into the political forefront. However, the movement was 
overshadowed and marginalized by the autonomy movement in East Pakistan (1966 -70) and the 
subsequent Bangladesh war of liberation in 1971 to which the leadership of CHTWA appeared 
either indifferent or divided.   
Nonetheless, on 15th February 1972 − immediately after Bangladesh obtained 
independence − the CHTWA leadership regrouped and formed the Jana Samhati Samiti (JSS), a 
regional political party of hill peoples, and M. N. Larma became the leader of the new 
organization. According to some accounts, the JSS originated from the Rangamati Communist 
Party, which was formed in 1970 by some “radical” leaders of the CHTWA who advocated 
armed struggle for the realization of hill peoples’ political, economic and cultural rights (Montu 
1980:1510; but see also, Kisha 1996; Chakma, S. 1393 B. E. [1985-1986]).
87
  
Before turning into an insurgency movement, the JSS participated in peaceful political 
campaigns from 1972 to 1975, amid preparation for a guerrilla war. Re-elected as a Member of 
Parliament (MP) in the national parliament in 1973, M. N. Larma had led the movement within 
the parliament for hill peoples’ cultural recognition and for the “political autonomy” of CHT; 
Larma lobbied the government until early 1975, but achieved neither goal. The latter demand of 
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According to Montu, Manabendra Narayan Larma and his younger brother Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma were the 
extremists in the CHTWA (Montu 1980), and these two brothers were also the leaders said to have established the 
Rangamati Communist Party (RCP) in 1970 (Ibrahim 2001:73). Given the RCP’s clandestine nature due to a ban on 
the Communist Party during the Pakistan regime, it is plausible to infer that the CHTWA remained an umbrella 
organization for the RCP. 
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autonomy was partly guaranteed by the Regulation of 1900 and later denied during Pakistan rule 
(see Chapter III).  
In December of 1975, the JSS initiated an insurgency for political recognition of the hill 
peoples as a “nation”, calling for “autonomy” of CHT with the status of a province. This 
followed the military coup in August 1975 and the subsequent rise of a military dictatorship in 
the country. This conjuncture was significant since it altered the politics and power relations in 
the country and regional relations between Bangladesh and India, a staunch ally during the 
Bangladesh war of liberation and the post-liberation government. The insurgency also followed 
the creation of the Shanti Bahini (Peace Force) and preparations for guerrilla war in 1973.
88
 The 
Shanti Bahini mobilized the hill peoples’ political activists belonging to the Chakma, the Marma 
and the Tripura, together with pro-Pakistani militias of the Chakma (Chakma, S. K. 2011). 
Regarding the choice of guerrilla war, J. B. Larma, the ex-guerrilla Commander of the Shanti 
Bahini and now the Chairman of CHT Regional Council, explains in an interview with me
89
:  
The cause of the plight of the hill peoples is lack of political power. This is mainly 
because of undemocratic and feudal leadership in CHT since British rule and also 
because of the military rule and Bengali chauvinist nationalism, expansionism and 
Islamic fundamentalism since Bangladesh independence. Therefore, as in the case of any 
political movement, the first and foremost objective of the JSS political movement is 
taking control of political power against state violence and oppression. Given we, the hill 
peoples, are small in numbers, and our economic condition, we had no option but to 
choose guerrilla armed struggle; peaceful political movement against state violence was 
not a practical alternative, let alone effective.  
 
The conjunctures that led the JSS to mobilize Shanti Bahini were the state violence 
against the hill peoples as well as the Naga and Mizo insurgency movements of India. Even 
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 The Shanti Bahini was formed in January 7, 1973. 
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 I had about eight hours of interviews with J. B. Larma that were conducted in five appointments between July and 
August 2008 in Dhaka and Chittagong Hill Tracts. The interviews were conducted in Bengali, and the translation is 
mine. 
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though many hill peoples, including the Mong chief Mong Pru Chowdhury, had joined the 
Bangladesh liberation movement and war, immediately after Bangladesh gained independence 
the hill peoples came under indiscriminate attacks by Bengali freedom fighters. This was in part 
due to the hill peoples’ alleged support for the Pakistan military, and the pro-Pakistani roles of 
Tridiv Roy, the Chakma chief, and Aun Shue Pru, a member of the Bohmong chief’s family 
(Chakma, S.1393 B.E. [1985-86]). Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India is said to have 
intervened to stop this post-war violence but it was simply replaced with systematic state 
violence.  As early as August 1972, an emergency was declared in CHT and the army was 
deployed as an ‘Aid to Civil Power’ to fight Maoist guerillas of a pro-Chinese Communist Party 
as well as pro-Pakistani militia forces including Naga and Mizo insurgents of India. In 1973, 
both Bangladesh and Indian armies carried out a joint operation mainly against Naga and Mizo 
insurgents, who had been given sanctuary in CHT by Pakistan since the 1950s; the armies 
successfully pushed the insurgents of India out from CHT (Ali 1993, but compare Mohsin 1997). 
It is important to note here that the CHT had a strategic significance for the Naga and Mizo 
insurgents. Its geographical contiguity with the region of Naga Hills and Lushai Hills was 
important and both regions were inhabited by different indigenous groups (or “tribes”). In 
addition, like CHT, these regions had been ruled by the colonial British with similar kinds of 
administration and laws, and there have been comparable movements both in Nagaland and 
Mizoram (Ali 1993: 22-57). These critical conjunctures of the Naga and Mizo ethno-nationalist 
movements seriously impacted the hill peoples. On the one hand, these nationalist movements 
created a sense of insecurity; on the other, they provided a model for nationalist struggle that 
could be reproduced by the hill peoples for their cause (Chakma, S. 1393 B.E. [1985-86]: 99). 
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The government responded to the insurgency by formally declaring a counter-insurgency 
war in CHT in October of 1976 (BA n. d.). The insurgency and government response to it 
continued until 1997 in what Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1998) deem a “low intensity conflict” 
(cf. Penz 1993). Nevertheless, despite internal war within the JSS during 1982-1984, the war 
between Shanti Bahini and the Bangladesh Security Forces intensified throughout the 1980s and 
both sides changed their tactics, attacking the civilian population and turning CHT into a “theatre 
of civil war” (Ali 1993:198). The main catalyst underpinning the increased combat and change 
of strategies was state-sponsored Bengali settlement into the CHT. In the beginning of the 1980s, 
the Bengali settlement also prompted policy debate and internal conflict within the JSS and the 
leaders were divided into ideological and strategic camps of “pro-Indian sovereignists” and 
“anti-Indian autonomists” (Shelley 1992:116-117). In 1982, the internal conflict of the JSS 
turned violent and resulted in a war among the groups of Shanti Bahini in which M. N. Larma, 
the founding leader of the JSS, was killed in November of 1983. By early 1984, the “anti-Indian 
autonomists” led by J. B. Larma had gained control over the insurgency movement (Chakma, S. 
K. 2011: 182-192).  
The wars of the 1980s had several effects of critical significance for ending the 
insurgency and war in 1997. First, infighting among the Shanti Bahini meant they lost control in 
the southern Bandarban district of CHT, in part because the insurgents in the south supported a 
renegade faction that surrendered to the government (Chakma, S. K. 2011:188-89). The  
“renegades” also got themselves into the Matamuhuri war —a local war among the Shanti 
Bahini, the Murucha and the army in Matamuhuri Reserve and adjacent areas of Lama and 
Alikadam Upazilas — which paved the way for military control of Matamuhuri Reserve (this 
will be discussed further in chapter V).  
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Second, but more importantly, the insurgency and war displaced almost the entire 
population of the Rangamati and Khagrachhari districts, including the Bengalis, and thousands in 
the Bandarban district, mainly in Alikadam and Lama Upazilas. The displaced Bengalis from the 
villages of Rangamati and Khagarchari districts were relocated in cluster villages near security 
camps (Ibrahim 2001: 250-252; Shelly 1992). Among the displaced hill peoples of the 
Rangamati and Khagrachhari districts, approximately 100,000 (mostly Chakma) fled to the 
Indian state of Tripura as refugees, and another 100,000 Chakma, Marma and Tripura were 
forced to live in cluster villages which at times were programmed through resettlement schemes 
of the Development Board or Forest Department. In Bandarban district, the displaced Chakma, 
Tanchangya and Tripura of Alikadam and Lama Upazilas were resettled only through the Forest 
Department, which includes the Golden River community that I discuss in this chapter; however, 
the Murucha were given refuge in Matamuhuri Reserve.  
Finally, the war of the 1980s forced the insurgents and military led government to 
negotiate a political resolution.  Although the negotiation eventually failed, domestic and 
international politics forged a political will in the early 1990s for ending the insurgency and war. 
At the domestic level, in 1991, Bangladesh returned to a parliamentary democracy after a mass 
movement pushed out the military regime. At the international level, an international human 
rights group, the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, published a landmark report on the conflict 
and resulting human rights violations in CHT (CHT Commission 1991).  
The second event that led to cessation of the counter insurgency war was military support 
from Bangladesh for the Gulf War of 1990-91 in which the UN sanctioned the invasion of Iraq 
that forced out Iraq from its 1990 occupation of Kuwait. At this point, the government negotiated 
a cease-fire with the insurgents and established renewed dialogue between the government and 
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the JSS. Progress on these fronts continued until 1997 when the insurgency ended with a Peace 
Treaty, although the conflict still continues to a lesser degree.  
To conclude this section, let me return to some of the cultural, ethnic and spatial aspects 
of the insurgency pertinent to this chapter’s discussion. Key to the development of the 
insurgency was the emergence of new educated and middle class political elites and youth in the 
1960s who were independent of the traditional elites of CHT; this was especially the case among 
the Chakma (Chakma, S. 1392 B.E. [1985-86]:99).
90
 Unsurprisingly, a strong Chakma presence 
also existed in the JSS and Shanti Bahini, which has at times led the news media and the 
government to refer to the insurgency as a “Chakma movement” (cf. Organizing Committee 
1986:49, 52; Schendel 1995:125 ).   
The insurgency also had an unequal spatial impact on the north and south of CHT due to 
the fact that the Chakma predominantly inhabit the north of CHT. The movement was also 
stronger in the northern districts of Khagrachhari and Rangamati than in the southern district of 
Bandarban, which was reflected in counter-insurgency programs and the violence throughout the 
conflict.
91
  
As for the ideological basis of the insurgency, the movement articulated more of an 
ethno-nationalist than a Marxist or Maoist stance, although it was influenced by Marxist-
Leninist-Maoist propositions about state, society and nations in relation to ethnic communities. 
Thus, the political programs expressed or articulated since 1972 by the JSS have never been 
independence or statehood but a “regional political autonomy” for the CHT’s hill peoples. 
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 In a fine analysis, Siddhartha Chakma, an anonymous writer from the hill peoples, qualifies the middle class in the 
context of CHT saying that the new political elites “formed a middle class among the hill peoples not by the 
standard of income or occupation, but in mind and intellect” (Chakma, 1392 B.E. [1985-86]:99, my translation) 
91
 For example, there were thirteen reported mass killings of hill peoples by Bangladesh security forces during the 
1980s and 1990s, and all of them took place in the north, whereas there were none in the south (see Levene 1999).  
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Furthermore, the JSS ethno-nationalist discourse advocated cultural innovation and articulation 
of a Jumma identity of the hill peoples as an alternative to identities of “hill men”, “tribals” or 
“Upojati” as prescribed by the state.  Jumma as a collective identity emphasizes the ethnic 
difference of the hill peoples with respect to Bengali identity while at same time downplaying 
ethnic differences among the hill peoples themselves.  Although many JSS publications 
expressed socialist ideals such as establishing an equal society free from imperialism, capitalism, 
and capitalist-bureaucratic exploitation, the movement’s modus operandi expressed clearly a 
democratic sentiment of the hill peoples that demanded a representative and elected local 
government to replace the administrative systems of traditional elites and an overpowering 
bureaucracy. Besides insurgency, these political oppositions were grounded within a vast 
network of grassroots’ organizations, like a de-facto state, and the following quotation from my 
interview with J. B. Larma illustrates this. In the interview, I asked Larma how the JSS became 
so successful in mobilizing the grassroots support of the hill peoples; Larma replied: 
Yes ... we did not have only the political and war programs but also social programs and 
many organizations such as village panchayat, jhum cultivators’ association, 
woodcutters’ association, and also departments of agriculture, finance, education, health, 
justice, women’s welfare, child welfare, etcetera; I mean all kind of departments that 
people need in a society. We also had many social programs, for example, education. We 
encouraged parents to send their children to primary schools and communities to build 
primary schools. Our policy for building a school was that everyone in the community 
should help. Whoever had capacity to donate money would do so, and who did not have 
money to donate would provide material support such as bamboo or labour. For young 
adults, we encouraged vocational or technical education. Similarly, for income and 
economic improvement, we encouraged communities to raise fruit and horticulture 
gardens, and jhum cultivators to help each other. We also worked on health issues and 
how to be healthy. ... For example, we campaigned for sanitation, safe drinking water, 
iodine, and anti-malaria. We discouraged puja or religious prayer for wellbeing and 
protection from disease and strongly advised people to visit doctors. As a matter of fact, 
we had a group of doctors and a complete health department.              
 
However, my fieldwork and interviews with forest villagers in Matamuhuri Reserve 
suggest that the insurgency movement coerced jhum cultivator hill peoples, and I heard several 
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fragmented stories about the Matamuhuri war and social conflict between the Murucha and 
Shanti Bahini. What stands out about local hill peoples’ divided loyalties to the insurgency 
movement was not only the internal conflict or the differences of ethnicity, locality and 
leadership in Shanti Bahini, but also the domination of the local hill peoples by the insurgents. In 
particular, the insurgents who were predominantly Chakma imposed control over economic 
activities of jhum cultivation and bamboo extraction from Matamuhuri Reserve and also over 
social justice, namely, over “customs” of liquor making and sometimes “illegitimate” 
matrimonial relations between nieces and uncles among the Tripura. They also imposed an 
elaborate system of tax regime on jhum, domestic animals, bamboo and timber collection. It is 
relevant to note here that bamboo and timber were mainly collected by the Forest Department, 
government agencies and private businesses through Bengali labour or at times the hill peoples.  
Recently, Sneha Kumar Chakma, an insurgent commander, wrote an autobiography titled 
Jeebonalekhyo (Life Stories) in which he partly admitted this tax regime and prohibition of 
cultural practices such as ‘adultery’ (Chakma, S. K. 2011:126-127). These political oppositions 
within the insurgency movement are examples of what Vandergeest and Peluso (2011) call 
“alternative civilizing mission”. The extent to which the alternative civilizing mission of the JSS 
was effective needs further research; however, it is certain that until the internal war of the JSS in 
1982, the insurgency had operated from the Reserved Forests of CHT and exercised effective 
control over violence and resources across CHT. It further helped maintain the Reserves from 
illegal logging and deforestation; this was especially the case in Matamuhuri Reserve which was 
only deforested following the Peace Treaty of 1997, as I discuss in Chapter V. A similar scenario 
existed in other Reserved Forests of CHT and can be gleaned from newspaper reports that I read 
from office’s files in the Tain Range. Nevertheless, to turn to the question of how and the extent 
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to which counter insurgency development altered forest relations in USF, let me consider the 
discourse of “optimum land use”, a key instrument of counter-insurgency development in CHT.  
 
4.3  “Optimum Land Use”:  A Discourse of ‘Counter-Insurgency Development’  
 
Photo 4.1: USF Land in Alikadam Upazila, Lama Forest Division. Note the hills that have been denuded and burned 
for rubber plantation by Bengalis. 
 
What is the discourse of optimum land use? How and by whom does it get articulated into 
development projects, programs and resettlement of the hill peoples, and to what end?  
The optimum land use discourse is mainly an environmental discourse of science − a technology 
of “power/knowledge” to use Foucault’s phrasing (Foucault 1991) − for thinking of how to 
govern relations among land, forests and hill peoples during insurgency and war.
92
 The discourse 
originated in a government commissioned study of land usage and soil capabilities of the USF of 
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 John H. Bodley’s Victims of Progress has represented the discourse since 1975 as a textbook case of development 
dispossession of indigenous people (Bodley, 1975:9-11; 1999:16-18). It has since appeared and been cited 
frequently in human rights reports, journals and articles as evidence of ethnocentric development policies of the 
State. A critical discussion of the discourse is still missing. 
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CHT in the late 1960s (Forestal 1966b; 1966c).
93 
The study was conducted by an eleven-person 
team of experts from Forestal International Ltd., Vancouver, Canada (Forestal) including an 
agronomist, biologist, economist, engineers, foresters, geologist, soil scientist and others, and 
was supported through Canada Colombo Plan (Forestal1966a).
94
 In the end, it produced nine 
volumes of authoritative and original knowledge on forests, land, soil, and water resources of 
USF (Forestal 1966a, 1966b, 1966c, 1966d, 1966e, 1966f, 1966g).
 95
 Of these voluminous 
reports and technical details of the Forestal study, the following summary paragraphs are the best 
representation of the discourse: 
The basic conclusion of this study of land use in the Chittagong Hill Tracts is that the 
age-old practice of shifting cultivation, attuned as it may have been in the past to the 
environment, can no longer be tolerated. . . . A change to a system of permanent intensive 
agriculture must be made now wherever possible, and the fertility of the soil will have to 
be maintained through better farming methods and greater input of fertilizer. . .  
 
The inescapable conclusion is that the great majority of the land area in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts is forest land and the optimum land use on all but a small portion should be 
the production of fast growing tree species and bamboo. This is not waste, despite the 
population pressure. The demand for wood and pulpable fibre is as great, if not as critical, 
as the demand for food. . . . More of the Hill Tribesmen will have to became wage 
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  It is certain that the discourse of “optimum land use” is a part of a global discourse of land use; the genealogical 
account of the discourse is beyond the scope of this dissertation research. In their use of land and soils classification 
on which the discourse is based, Forestal’s reports referred to the land and soils classification of the United State 
Agricultural Department (Forestal 1966b, 1966c). Vandergeet and Peluso (1995) suggested a similar state project of 
land classification in Thailand for forest control in 1960s and 1970s through foreign aid (Vandergeest and Peluso 
1995:412), as well as post-colonial states’ strategies of control of jhum cultivation across Southeast Asia 
(Vandergeest and Peluso 2006; cf. Blaikie 1985; Zimmerer 1996).          
94
 The study was funded by foreign aid from Canada under the Colombo Plan programs (Forestal 1966a). The 
Colombo Plan was a system of bi-lateral cooperation between the Commonwealth countries, initiated at the first 
meeting of the foreign ministers of the British Commonwealth of Nations in Colombo, Ceylon (Sri-Lanka), January 
9 to 15, 1950 (see Bryant 1961; Blackton 1951). 
95
 The Forestal report that articulated the discourse of optimum land use is a rare document; Canadian National 
Library and Archive and the University of British Columbia have volumes IV, VII and VIII of the report. Because 
volumes VII and VIII are cartographic materials and volumes IV is on fisheries development in Kaptai Lake, they 
were not of much use for my purpose. In 2006, the Resource Sharing Department, York University, Canada, helped 
me find some of other volumes of the report and borrowed them from Swedish University of Agriculture Sciences. 
During my fieldwork in Bangladesh I found the entire collection of the report in the residential office library of the 
Deputy of Commissioner, Rangamati, but was denied access to it. In the end, in 2008, I collected the report 
(excluding the cartographic volumes VII and VIII) from the storage room of the Bangladesh Agriculture 
Development Corporation (BADC), Dhaka. 
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earners in the forest or other developing industries, and purchase their food from farmers 
practicing permanent agriculture on an intensive basis on the limited better land classes 
(Webb 1966:3232; emphasis added).   
 
This conclusion is primarily based on steepness or slopes on the land and its soil qualities 
or what can be termed as “functional territorialization” (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). In 
particular, the Forestal study classifies the topography and geomorphology of USF  — nature’s 
vertical and inner intelligibility and knowledge  — into sixty-three categories, of which twelve 
cover 96.6% of 3,894 square miles of USF. These most extensive twelve types are further sub-
divided, based on the steepness of land (Forestal, 1966b).  Of the 96.6% of the whole area, the 
classification of land is as follows:  
D  Land with high slopes representing 40 plus percent slopes  77.5%  
C-D  20 to 40 plus percent slopes      01.2%  
C  Undulating to rolling bumpy 20 to 40 percent slopes  15. 5%  
B  Mainly low bumpy up to 20 percent slopes    02.8%  
A  Plain alluvial land up to 5 percent of slope     03.4% 
 
A close reading of Forestal reports and recommendations reveal many irreconcilable 
contradictions. For example, class D land represents some of the best soil in CHT but is only 
recommended for forest plantation because of its steep slopes which, Forestal argues, severely 
restrict “permanent agriculture”. The argument for “the demand of wood and pulpable fibre” in 
the above statement is dubious, even on its own account. Forestal’s inventory of the Reserved 
Forests of CHT showed that the forest resources of the Reserves could support approximately 20 
times the annual production of lumber in East Pakistan in the 1960s and two more paper mills 
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with a capacity equal to that of Karnaphuli paper mills (Forestal 1966e.1:8). What, then, is the 
Forestal logic of optimum land use and afforestation?   
In fact, forest plantation must be established over much of the areas outside reserves, as a 
soil conservation measure. Due to present adequate supply of raw material from the 
Reserved Forests, these new plantations must have their justification solely in their 
protective value. The situation may well arise, however, whereby new plantations are 
more feasible and economic than the Reserved Forests (Forestal 1966e: 8). 
 
Notice that the sketchiness of Forestal’s logic and justification is neither based on needs of 
timber nor rational economic motive but on the apprehension and anticipation of the future 
feasibility of forest extraction.  Notwithstanding the limitations of Forestal’s recommendations, 
and its discourse of optimum land use, a Master Plan, Chittagong Hill Tracts Development 
Project, was drawn up based on that discourse in 1967 for a twenty year period. The Master Plan 
project aimed to bring as many as 200,000 families of jhum cultivators under the Standard 
Agriculture Holding (SAH) program, while raising half a million acres of forest by 1987; 
however, it only ran until 1972.  During this period, it brought only 1702 families of jhum 
cultivators under the SAH program (ADB 1979: 64), and failed to begin the proposed forest 
plantation.
 96
  
A new way of thinking of the discourse of optimum land use began in 1976 at the 
conjuncture of the insurgency and war with the establishment of the Development Board in 
CHT, as I mentioned earlier. This resulted in a multi disciplinary reconnaissance mission led by 
the ADB (Asian Development Bank). The experts of the appraisal mission reconfirmed the 
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 The Master Plan project was drawn up by the East Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation (EPADC), 
which was renamed Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC). In 1974, the project was 
transferred from BADC to HDB, Horticultural Development Board. Besides 6 acre plots, the SAH program 
provided loans from the Agricultural Bank in cash and kind of TK. 5,500 to be repaid over 10 years with three years 
of grace period at 8 percent interest. HDB was supposed to restart its program in 1974 but failed to do so, only to 
begin again in late 1978 under the Development Board to be known as “Jothua Khamar” (collective farm), the very 
first project of the Development Board. See ADB (1979); Mohsin (1997); and Haq (2000) for technical details of 
Joutha Khamar and its critics. 
156 
 
“needs of development” in the CHT and shared the government’ concern about the security and 
sovereignty of the state. They also found optimum land use discourse as the ‘sound base’ of 
development intervention, projected and programmed under Chittagong Hill Tracts Development 
Project (CHTDP), a multi-sector project funded by ADB and United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) during 1979-93 (ADB 1979:4). CHTDP programs included commercial and 
market oriented production of fruit, rubber and forest as well development of communication 
infrastructure and institutional agencies to support resource use and productivity.
97
 The 
objectives were to provide “alternative strategies for food and ecological security” that, at the 
same time, would preserve the “socio-cultural integrity of tribal population,” and as an 
experiment to work out “a hill development concept capable of a model for future replica” (ADB 
1979). To this end, CHTDP had two resettlement schemes: Upland Resettlement Scheme and the 
Afforestation and Settlement Scheme. Though both schemes were somewhat identical in terms 
of resettlement policy, the upland resettlement scheme was carried out solely by the 
Development Board involving resettlement of the hill peoples on a rubber plantation, modelled 
as “collective farming” (ADB 1994). The other scheme involving forest plantation and 
resettlement entailed creating a new forest division, Rangamati Unclassed State Forest Division, 
to be managed by both the Development Board and Forest Department. In its detailed planning, 
the scheme reads:  
 The main objective of the Afforestation and Settlement Scheme is to afforest the steep 
slopes outside of the reserve[d] forest, which are now being used for shifting cultivation, 
with suitable timber species that would benefit the economy, and provide improved 
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 Since 1976 CHTDB has mobilized numerous development projects of roads and communication network 
alongside resettlement of the hill peoples (CHTDB, n. d., 1999, 2000; CHT Commission, 1991). Until then there 
were only 96 kilometers of all weather roads in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Originating in Chittagong they linked to 
Rangamati (then the District Headquarter), Kaptai (industrial town), and Ramghar and Bandarban (then sub- 
districts of the region) (ADB 1979: 11). At present, all the districts and sub-districts of CHT are connected through 
vast networks of roads with concrete surfaces, except for three sub-districts of Rangamati, i.e., Barkal Upazila, 
Belaichhari Upazila and Jurachari Upazila (BA n. d).    
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income and living conditions for the shifting cultivators and other landless families in 
CHT. [...] Integrated with this will be a settlement scheme for 300 families. . . In addition 
to a 0.25 acre house plot, they will be allotted 5.0 acres of upland for horticulture crops 
and bamboo. The settlers will clear, plant and subsequently maintain the afforested land 
and will be paid wages for these activities. They will be allowed to agro-forestry on the 
area being afforested each year. In addition, they will share the future income harvesting 
of plantation timber (ADB 1979: 24). 
 
The fine print of CHTDP emphasized that each of the settler families would receive a 
supply of horticulture crops material free of cost, Tk.600 as subsistence allowance, and Tk. 600 
as a housing grant in the first year of settlement (ADB 1979: 92). After five years from the 
implementation of the program, the government would decide whether the legal status of forest 
land ought to “be declared community forest or certain parts allocated to individual settlers” 
(ADB 1979: 24, footnote 2).  
With the planning of CHTDP, the optimum land use discourse was elevated as a self 
evident truth and became a “material force” for the interests of the state and actors that was 
articulated through the practices of resettlement, forest and development intervention. 
Accordingly, the Development Board redesigned the Standard Agriculture Holding (SAH) 
program in accordance with CHTDP to be known as Joutha Khamar (collective farm). The 
program was to resettle hill peoples with 5 acres of upland and financial support for horticulture 
and rubber plantation. The project ran between 1976 and 1983, and reportedly established 59 
Joutha Khamar(s) across the CHT. On average each Joutha Khamar had 60 households (CHTDB 
n. d.). In turn, CHTDP became the model of development in CHT and all the projects that 
followed CHTDP during the insurgency and war were designed with it in mind. In Table 4.1, I 
present a list of these development projects and programs that together have created another five 
new forest divisions in CHT over USF land in addition to Rangamati Unclassed State Forest 
Division. Unsurprisingly, the optimum land use discourse has remained the fundamental 
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rationale for all these projects. For example, consider the opening statement of the Integrated 
Afforestation and Jhumia Rehabilitation (IAJR) project:    
The Unclassed State Forests of Chittagong Hill Tracts region are in critical condition due 
to loss of practically all top soils from the area, caused by the repeated jhooming (i.e., 
shifting cultivation).  The age old practices of shifting cultivations... have deteriorated the 
soils to such an extent that [the cycle of shifting cultivation has been reduced from seven 
to ten years into a two to three year interval]. In addition to this, the excessive and 
continuous erosions of soils [from the areas] are silting up the bed of the main rivers 
along with their tributaries at an accelerated rate, resulting in floods [both in the region 
and Chittagong plains] and causing great threat to reduce the lifespan of the lone hydro-
electric project of the country. . . . Forestal Forestry & Engineering International Ltd., 
Canada, reveals that the land use problems in the districts are so critical that immediate 
attention be given to take the problems on priority basis . . . The recommendations clearly 
spell out that D & C/D Classes land . . . of the Chittagong Hill Tracts region should be 
put under permanent tree covers, i.e., forest cover within this century. These 
recommendations were also subsequently supported by the Asian Development Bank 
mission during 1976-1978 (FD 1984: 3).   
 
As seen in Table 4.1 below, during the insurgency and war, the Forest Department implemented 
seven forest plantation and resettlement projects including the scheme of CHTDP. A significant 
aspect of these was their integrationist approach to forest plantation and resettlement programs. 
The approach seems a strategy; on the one hand it helped state authorities to impose direct 
control over USF in order to increase wealth and revenue, and on the other hand it produced 
disciplined and subjugated subjects of land use in order to differentiate ‘enemies’ and 
‘ordinaries’, as the counter insurgency demanded. Further, the integrationist approach suggests 
that state authorities and transnational experts recognized the tension between forest plantation 
afforestation in USF and livelihood issues of the hill peoples; this illustrates the way in which, as 
in the past, the  making of forests is contingent upon the making and unmaking of agrarian 
relations.   
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 Second and importantly, these projects altogether have alienated a quarter million acres 
of USF land but resettled no more than 3,045 families of hill peoples out of a projected total of 
7,680 under various forms of participatory forestry.
 
 
Table 4.1: Afforestation and Resettlement Projects in USF 1979- 2000
98
 
Source: ADB 1979, FD 1980; 1981b; 1984; 1993; 1994.  
 
Third, if not in practice then in their plans, all the projects attempted a ‘new model’ of 
participatory forestry in USF, which remained vague about the legal status of planted forests and 
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 The projects Welfare of Rehabilitated Jhumia and Afforestation around Security Camps 1992-93 to 1996-97 and 
Ashrayan (Rehabilitation) are excluded from the list. 
Name of  Project/Years Projected 
Plantation 
(Acres) 
Projected 
Resettlement 
(Number of 
Families) 
Afforestation and Resettlement, CHTDP  
(1979-80 to 1984-85) 
18,000 300 
Afforestation in the USF of CHT (First Phase) 
(1980-81 to 1984-85) 
 
50,000 1,500 
Development of Pulpwood Plantation in the USF of 
CHT (Second Phase)   
(1980-81 to 1984-85, extended to 1988) 
  
34000  840 
Integrated Afforestation and Jhumia Rehabilitation 
in the USF of CHT (Special Five Year Plan) (1984-
85 to 1988-90) 
 
55,000 4,000 
Development of Pulpwood Plantation in the USF of 
CHT (Special Five Year Plan)  
(1984-85 to 1989-90) 
9,943 140 
Afforestation and Settlement  in USF of CHT 
(Second Phase) (1989-90 to 1994-95) 
 
23,734 550 
Afforestation and Rehabilitation of  Jhumia families 
in USF of CHT (Third Phase)  
(1994-95 to 1999-2000) 
27,318 350 
Reported Total 217,995 7,680 
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limited subsistence allowances. The model was clearly different from the earlier models of 
participatory forestry that were designed as part of forest resettlement following the Kaptai dam 
(discussed in Chapter III) and also from the taungya forestry of the Reserved Forests. The 
following paragraphs of the IAJR project plan make the point:       
The scheme envisages afforestating 55, 000 acres of Unclassed State Forest areas of 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (Rangamati), Bandarban, and Khagrachhari districts during the 
plan period. Along with [the] afforestation the scheme also envisages rehabilitation of 
4000 Nos. of landless shifting cultivators (i.e., Jhumia families) over 20,000 acres of 
Unclassed State Forests land. The rehabilitation programme includes allotment of 5 (five) 
acres of land to each family [for homestead, agriculture, forestry and horticulture]. The 
rehabilitation programme also includes financial help for construction of houses, 
[agriculture and horticulture instruments and supplies], and the cost of land improvement. 
Provisions also exist for rewarding the shifting cultivators for their best performance in 
raising crops in their allotted areas as well as in raising successful plantation ... [T]he 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board has submitted another scheme [for 
developing the rehabilitation centres to provide infrastructure facilities, such as 
community centres, primary schools, water supply, dispensaries, roads, etc.]. [...] The 
afforestation work will be carried out by the Jhumia families... [They will be allowed] to 
practice Agro-Forestry in the plantation areas and [will be paid] wages...for afforestation 
work. This will substantially improve the economic condition of the Jhumia families. To 
create a sense of participation and to associate the Jhumia families in implementing the 
scheme properly, it is accepted that rehabilitated Jhumia families will have the right[s] 
over the plantation and forest produce as per signed agreement between the Jhumia 
families and the Govt (FD 1984: 4 -5).          
             
An important change in this model of participatory forestry was the third phase of the 
forest plantation and rehabilitation project. Designed after a twenty-year long forestry master 
plan (1993-2013) and a new forest policy of 1994 which endorsed participatory social forestry as 
a national policy, the third phase of the project included the hill chiefs and headmen among the 
beneficiaries of income from harvesting forest plantations (see FD 1994).  
Finally, in the project plans, there was hardly any mention of the context of the 
insurgency and war, nor the state’s concern for security and sovereignty. The IAJR project plan, 
however, provided some indirect evidence to the connection between the forest plantation 
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programs and counter insurgency. Regarding the selection of lands to be brought for 
afforestation and resettlement, the project plan states:   
The [Mouzas] for afforestation and rehabilitation have been provisionally selected by the 
Law enforcing Agencies, District Administration, Chittagong Hill Tracts Development 
Board and Forest Department and the guiding factors for the selection were exigency and 
necessity for rehabilitation of landless jhumia families which may vary, if required. These 
are difficult areas, no doubt, and the execution of work in these areas will be a 
challenging task. The successful implementation of the scheme, therefore, depends very 
much on timely fulfilment of assurance given by the Law enforcing Agencies, the District 
Administration, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board (FD 1984:6).          
  
Notice that forest plantation projects were contingent upon “law enforcing agencies” 
which was a local phrasing that referred to the Bangladesh army in CHT. Nevertheless, my 
reading of the review reports of these projects confirms that the landscapes and peoples of CHT 
did not offer an easy way out for implementation of the projects; on the contrary, they proved to 
be a messy and uncertain terrain. Thus, to explore the connections of counter-insurgency, forest 
projects and resettlement on the ground, I turn next to the case of Lama Forest Division. 
 
4.4  Lama Forest Division: Counter-insurgency, Afforestation and Resettlement  
 Lama Forest Division was established in 1985 along with Khagrachhari Forest Division and 
they are the last two of six new forest divisions that were created during the insurgency and war 
(see Appendix A: Map 5). At present, Lama Forest Division comprises the land area of 
Alikadam, Lama, and Naikhyongchari Upazilas (sub-districts) of Bandarban district.
99
 This 
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 Between 1982 and 1984, prior to the formation of Lama Forest Division, Alikadam Upazila was part of Lama 
Police Station or Thana.   
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includes 41 Mouzas with an area of about 337,783 acres of USF land, and the Matamuhuri 
Reserved Forest.
100
  
Notwithstanding militarization and war, the counter-insurgency programs in the localities 
of Lama Forest Division began with the Development Board’s Joutha Khamar project of 
resettlement of hill peoples. Between 1977 and 1983, the project had established eleven 
‘collective farms’ and resettled about 650 families of hill peoples in these localities. Lama 
Upazila had seven farms, and Naikhyongchari and Alikadam together had the remaining four 
(CHTDB, n. d.). The Joutha Khamar project soon followed and at times went along with Bengali 
settlement. As a matter of fact, Alikadam, Lama, and Naikhyongchari Upazilas were major 
locations of early Bengali settlement between 1979 and 1981 and, according to a conservative 
estimate, Lama alone had about 7,500 Bengali families settled during this period, 
Naikhyongchari had 1,956 Bengali families, and Alikadam 750 families (Ibrahim 2001: 149). 
This Bengali settlement together with the Joutha Khamars resulted in the alienation of about 
70,000 acres of USF land in Alikadam, Lama, and Naikhyongchari Upazilas. During this period, 
the Development Board further alienated about 35,686 acres of USF land (as many as 1,427 
plots, each plot about 25 acres) for commercial rubber production by Bengali private 
entrepreneurs in these localities (Rasul 2009: 84-85). Most of these land grants of industrial 
rubber plots were given to Dhaka based businesses, civil and military officials and their kin 
members, and at times, patrons (IWGIA 2012:22). Though the leases required the lease holders 
to plant rubber or other industrial crops, only a few did so until the Peace Accord of 1997; 
instead, they used the land as an opportunity to acquire industrial loans from banks without 
developing the lands, and at times they transferred the land to third parties (thereby violating the 
                                                          
100
 The Matamuhuri Reserve had been under Cox’s Bazar Forest Division and was transferred to Lama Forest 
Division in 2001. 
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lease contact). Interestingly, during my fieldwork in Alikadam Upazila, when I had the 
opportunity to observe a monthly meeting of the Upazila administration (see Photo 1.12 in 
Chapter I), I came to learn that most of the lease holders did not even pay land taxes and were 
tax defaulters; and Mouza headmen ended up paying the default lease holders’ taxes at the 
request of the UNO (Upazila executive officer) on hope of future reimbursement.           
Forest development programs — afforestation and resettlement of the hill peoples —
began immediately in the localities with the formation of Lama Forest Division in 1985.
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Between 1985 and 1999, these programs alienated 22,385 acres of USF land irrespective of the 
legal status of land, but only raised 9,827 acres of forest plantation (teak and local species of 
timber and softwood). The sites of the land and forest plantation are all within 10 km of the 
administrative centers and/or security camps, clearly determined by the convenience of security 
and communication rather than land quality. Importantly, although the resettlement program was 
said to be the core of all projects’ forest plantation plans for a forest labour regime and for the 
improvement of livelihood of the hill peoples, it was not so in practice. In Table 4.2, I present the 
list of projects, projected plans, and their implementation status, that were carried out in Lama 
Forest Division; this shows that resettlement programs in Lama Forest Division were not only 
insufficient but also irregular.  
According to an official brochure of the Lama Forest Division, the division only resettled 
309 families, of which 259 were in the Tain Range between 1985 and 1996, and 50 were in the 
Duluchari Range during 1993-94. However, the brochure reports that the resettled villagers of 
the Duluchari Range abandoned the resettlement immediately, but it does not mention why 
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 In Tain Range Office, I found documents that showed that even before Lama Forest Division was to be formed 
officially, the Deputy Commissioner of Bandarban District sent a phone message in October of 1984 to Lama Police 
Station that thousands acres of land were provisionally to be given to Lama Forest Division for the Integrated 
Afforestation and Jhumia Resettlement project. 
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(Lama Forest Division 1999). This means that the forest plantation and other forest work in the 
Ranges falling within Lama and Naikhyongchari Upazilas must have been done through wage 
labour of Bengali settlers. 
Why were resettlement programs so irregular and insufficient? During my fieldwork in 
Tain Range and Golden River village community, I wondered about this question and I also 
struggled to understand who got resettled and where. I moved in and out of the Golden River 
village to the Matamuhuri Reserve and to the Lama Forest Division office. Through travelling 
and letting stories of field sites travel with me from the resettled villagers to the forest villagers, 
and by consulting forest staff and officers, project documents and office records, it became 
evident to me that the practice of resettlement was dependent on local factors of insurgency, 
military success against insurgents, and availability of wage labour. I also gathered that the 
establishment of Lama Forest Division and the resettlement programs within it were in fact a 
direct result of the Matamuhuri war and associated displacement. As noted at the outset of this 
chapter, during the Matamuhuri war the army forcibly removed the Chakma, the Tripura, and the 
Tanchangya from Matamuhuri Reserve and adjacent areas on account of their high participation 
rate and support for the insurgency. The Murucha were aligned with the army and formed the 
Mro Bahini as part of the Village Defence Party (VDP), a paramilitary force which became a 
junior partner of the army in the Reserve. However, the Marma forest villagers remained 
undisturbed and silenced for strategic reasons. According to all accounts of resettled families in 
Golden River, there were as many as 500 displaced families of the Matamuhuri war. The 
following narratives of Tripura informants resonate with most accounts of displacement that I 
heard: 
During the war the army came to our village and told us that all of us Tripura had to 
move out to Alikadam. Everyone was in panic. The army is the government, what could 
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we do! They did not give us time; we were about 70 men, women and children brought 
near the bank of Matamuhuri River. There were many boats waiting. In two boats, 
children, old men and women were brought to Alikadam Cantonment. Adult men were 
not allowed in boats but had to walk. The army had stopped moving all Challes (piles of 
bamboos put together to float along in the river) at Alikadam in the Matamuhuri river to 
let people cross the river and walk over it to come at Alikadam. I walked to Alikadam 
and then the Cantonment. On my way to Alikadam, I had seen many boats rushing to 
Alikadam and the army everywhere. 
 
All night and through the next two days, people came; all were Tripura, Tanchagya, and 
Chakma. 
 
We, Tripura and Tanchangya, were given three days to bring back our rice,
102
 pigs, cows 
and clothes from our houses, but the Chakma could not go back. At the house I had four 
pigs, 20 hens and chickens and 2 tons of rice, etc. I did not pick up chilli and ginger from 
the jhum. But when I went back I could bring (500 kg) of rice and clothes only. On the 
last day, I saw that the army and their Khaki people (Ansar- a Bengali paramilitary force) 
were breaking down houses and then burning them, village after village. They burnt my 
house in front of me and told me it cannot stand empty because the Shanti Bahini will 
hide there. 
 
We all stayed in the cantonment for two months and, afterward, we were taken to Umtoli 
to settle temporarily. 
        
From my reading of documents in Lama Forest Division and Tain Range, I further 
gathered that out of the 500 displaced families, 200 were resettled in Lama Forest Division 
between 1985 and 1987 and the remaining displaced families of the Matamuhuri war were 
resettled in Bandarban Forest Division and Bandarban Pulpwood Forest Division.
 103
 In other 
words, 200 families of the Matamuhuri war who were resettled in the Tain Range were the main 
success of the resettlement programs of Lama Forest Division. Of the remaining 59 resettled 
families of the Tain Range, 50 families were reported to have been mobilized from kin members 
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 Rice was the common thing they could bring back because a cheaper price of rice could easily mobilize Bengali 
labourers and buyers in Alikadam Bazaar. However, because of the distance from Alikadam to the villages and 
terrains, there were many families who were physically unable to either go back or to find others to help them.  
103
 The documents here include resettlement registers, files, and communication letters. 
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of the resettled families of a Tripura community in the Range during 1993-94. This, however, 
appeared to be a scam; in fact, only a handful of hill peoples’ families had been resettled. The 
scam was mainly spearheaded by some of the Forest Officers of Lama Forest Division but also 
involved a few first-generation members of resettled families. In response to my inquiry, the 
Tain Range Officer denied the scam and argued that the families themselves had abandoned the 
program; however, the resettled families of Golden River disagreed with the Range Officer. 
 
Table 4.2: Resettlement and Forest Plantation of Lama Forest Division by Projects during the 
Insurgency 
Name of Projects/ Year
  
Projected 
Resettlement 
Name of the 
Ranges    
Plantation 
(Acres) 
Number of 
Resettled 
Families 
Afforestation on USF and 
Jhumia Resettlement 1st 
Phase (1980-85, Extended 
to 1989-90) 
Nil Tain 140 Nil 
Nakyongchari 1240 Nil 
Duluchari 320 Nil 
Sangu 80  
Special Five Year Plan 
(1984-1990) 
450 Tain 3000 200 
Sangu 1000 Nil 
Afforestation on USF and 
Jhumia Resettlement 2nd 
Phase (1992-95) 
100 Tain 1070 50 
Nakyongchari 730 Nil 
Duluchari 380 50* 
Sangu 700 Nil 
Development of Resettled 
Jhumia and Afforestation 
around security camps 
(1993-94) 
Nil Tain 405 Nil 
Nakhyongchari 345 Nil 
Sangu 20 Nil 
Afforestation on USF and 
Jhumia Resettlement 3rd 
phase (1996-99) 
25 Tain   694 9 
Nakhyongchari 473 Nil 
Total 575  10,597 309 (259) 
Source:  Lama Forest Division (1999; asterisk in the original represents abandonment of the   
resettlement). 
 
Many forms of corruption exist in government institutions in Bangladesh, and the Forest 
Department is no exception. However, what saved all the displaced of the Matamuhuri war from 
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the corruption of the Forest Department was the involvement of the army in the resettlement 
process. This should not be a surprise, as the resettlement happened at the height of the war, the 
internal war of Shanti Bahini, and the negotiations between the government and the “renegade” 
faction of Shanti Bahini. According to the resettled villagers of Golden River, it was the army 
who selected them for the resettlement in Tain Range and grouped them into 50 families headed 
by men, mainly husbands (and at times sons or sons- in- law in the case of families headed by 
widows). Among the documents of Tain Range Office, I also found all the names of the resettled 
families by ethnicity, gender and family size, and at times a group picture of the family was 
attached to its name. There were 121 Tripura, 69 Tanchangya and 10 Chakma families who were 
made part of the IAJR project and resettled in four villages near the security camps at Lama- 
Alikadam Road. According to the IJAR project plan, each resettled family was provided with a 
plot of 5 acres with individual property rights for homestead and horticultural plantation 
including forest trees. They all seem to have received about Tk. 17,200 each over a three-year 
period as allowance for livelihood and the cost of household construction, horticultural 
plantation, and a cow. In addition, all the families also received a copy of a written agreement 
between them and the Forest Department. Signed by the Divisional officer of the Lama Forest 
Division, the agreement confirmed the participatory nature of the forest plantation and 
accordingly, the resettled families would receive 25 percent of the total income after the cost 
from thinning and 10 percent from the final harvest. Unlike taungya forestry, the participation in 
forest work by the resettled families was limited to compulsory labour for men in forest 
plantation activities in exchange for wages organized under a village Karbari of resettled 
families. The rule of thumb was, as local informants and resettled families explained, each 
household had to provide a male labour for 5 days a week over five years from the beginning of 
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the forest plantation. Alternatively, every resettled village had to give 30 male labourers per day 
for 5 days a week over the five years. However, extra male labourers were always welcome and 
wages were paid according to market price.  
However, within five years of resettlement, almost all the villages of resettled families of 
Tain Range were completely deserted by the resettled families apart from the Golden River 
village. Around the same time, the Forest Department initiated the process of making the 
plantation forest in Lama Division into a Reserved Forest. Completed in 2002, this made 13,375 
acres land out of 22,385 acres of Lama Forest Division into reserved forest under the Forest Act 
of 1927, in contradiction of the IAJR project plan. This reservation of planted forest in USF was 
done in all new Forest Divisions across CHT, amid a protest movement of the hill peoples that 
was organized by a citizen group, the Committee for Protection of Land and Forest Rights. The 
movement was mainly based in Rangamati city, though it originally began in 1994 in Rajosthali 
Upazila, and was led by Sudatta Tanchangya, an ex- Maoist indigenous activist belonging to the 
Tanchangya community. After the Peace Treaty and up to 2004, the movement successfully 
mobilized both traditional and political parties’ elites and became a mass movement of the hill 
peoples. The strategies of the movement included large public gatherings in cities, litigation, 
seminars, and lobbying the government and ADB. The key demand of the movement was and 
still is to cancel the reservation of USF land that was alienated by the Forest Department during 
the insurgency and war for forest plantation and resettlement programs. The movement regularly 
received national press coverage and the support of national NGOs and environmental activists. 
This was in part because it articulated the opposition to the ADB’s countrywide Forestry Sector 
Project. The movement has apparently failed to achieve its goals (see also Gain 2002:187-221), 
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and surprisingly, it had hardly any effect on the communities in Lama Forest Division as they 
were completely unaware of the movement as such.  
Nonetheless, in Lama Forest Division, there was a local resistance to the reservation of 
forest in USF land by a group of the Murucha through legal means. Their resistance took the 
form of filling an official petition to the Forest Settlement Officer of Bandarban district in 
accordance with the Forest Act of 1927, complaining that the proposed reservation included 
acres of individually owned land and risked displacement. In Tain Range Office I read 
documents that pointed to the fact that the complaint was withdrawn through a letter to the 
Settlement Officer signed by a handful of petitioners admitting their ignorance and false claims. 
In fact, the communities in Lama Forest Division were coerced by the Forest Department and did 
not receive legal or political help from the movement leader of the Committee for Protection of 
Land and Forest Rights or local government Hill District Councils. Strangely enough, as I will 
discuss in Chapter V, despite hill peoples’ collective opposition, the ADB’s Forestry Sector 
Project got implemented in Matamuhuri Reserve; most of the prominent indigenous leaders and 
political activists whom I met found it impossible to believe because the law requires the consent 
of the Regional Council for any development program in CHT (see also Chapter I). This 
underscores the fact that both the indigenous movement and hill peoples’ political parties of 
CHT are disconnected from local indigenous issues, at least in Bandarban district; they tend to be 
elitist, a feature I will explore to some extent in Chapter VI. In the next section, I will consider 
how and to what extent counter-insurgency development and resettlement changed the life and 
livelihood of the hill peoples’ communities.    
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4.5  Development Effects: Life Aspects of Golden River  
Bengali Bazaar, a roadside market place, stands next to Tain Range Office and a military camp at 
Alikadam-Lama road, the main road of communication from Cox’s Bazar, a plain land district, 
to the areas of Lama and Alikadam Upazilas. Situated on Silver Road, Golden River is a twenty-
minute walk up the road from Bengali Bazaar and some Marma villages; there are some 
neighboring Murucha villages at a distance of the road. Far from Golden River at the end of 
Silver Road lies a large Bengali settlement, which moved there during the 1980s. At present, 
Golden River stretches about 2 square kilometres and has a total of 43 households, of which 20 
are the original resettled families, 10 are beneficiaries of the resettled families, 8 are sons and 
sons-in-law of the remaining resettled families, and 5 are new residents. The new residents 
include a school teacher, a distant relative of a resettled family, and a family of three generations: 
Rana Tripura, his son, and his grandson. Interestingly, Rana Tripura is one of the displaced of the 
Matamuhuri war; he was resettled in Tankabotee under Bandarban Forest Division in 1986. He 
claimed to have been displaced again in 1990 by the Forest Department as the department 
reclaimed the land given to him. In 1994, Rana, his son and his grandson again resettled in Tain 
Range and received allowance for livelihood and the cost for household construction over a 
period of three years. The land to which they were entitled was promised but they had not 
received it by 2008.  
Unlike the common Bengali’s perception about hill peoples’ communities being “tribes” 
or “clan” groups, Golden River (as in the villages in Matamuhuri Reserve) reminded me a lot of 
Bengali rural villages where I grew up before moving to the city. Though the community of 
Golden River shares Christianity as its religious faith, villagers are divided into several 
denominations, mostly Baptist with some Catholic, Evangelist and Full Gospel. The main 
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organization of social life in the Golden River is the hamlet; there are three hamlets, separated by 
rivulets, bamboo forest and jungle with an elusive boundary of where each begins and ends. 
Each hamlet has its own Karbari, or Village Headman, the lowest position of traditional 
administration of CHT, though all of them are not recognized by the Bohmong chief or local 
Mouza headman. In fact, this organization of the village and the communities emerged recently, 
in the early 1990s, until when the villagers had been spread far and wide and the community had 
been under a Forest headman (with no binding relation to the local Mouza headman). This 
circumstance of Golden River at present also emerged in part from the land policy for the 
resettlement program. At the time of the resettlement, each of the resettled families was offered 5 
acres of USF land, including homestead plot. The families were forced to construct houses on 
their allotted land plots, despite protests by the villagers. Sibu Tripura, aged 65, recalled the 
skirmish at Golden River:  
We were brought here [Golden River] in trucks around noon by the army and then left to 
the Forest Department. Sreeram Tripura was selected as [Forest] Headman by the army, 
and had visited the place before with others; and he told us Tripura could not live in this 
place; the land and hills were very sandy, and there were only a few flat plains. But we 
had to move here. The Range Officer returned the next day along with Munshes (Forest 
Guards). By then everyone was unhappy because no one had had good sleep during the 
night: we made a few makeshift houses for women and children to sleep and thus men 
had to sleep under open sky. The Ranger and the Guards showed everyone the plots with 
a map and pointed where to make house, how many rooms, and how long. Everyone 
became angry and no one would follow the Guards’ instructions. The Headman then told 
us: ‘What do we do now? The government’s decision is final, and we have to live here 
but let’s make our house as we wish to.’ On the third day, we received Tk. 1,500 as house 
allowance and we constructed houses under the Guards’ watch. If one failed to follow the 
Guards’ instruction they broke the houses, and Biju Tripura was once so mad he chased a 
Guard with a long knife up to Lama-Alikadam Road.   
 
From my inquiry into the immediate past of Tripura society and economy before the 
Matamuhuri war, it becomes evident that the Tripura used to stay in a place for about 3 to 5 years 
at a time, depending on the availability and fertility of jhum land, and that they were an affluent 
172 
 
peasant community. Tripura custom dictated that when they changed a village site, the Karbari 
would try to find a place mainly in and around flat plain hills by rivers or rivulets. If the Karbari 
found a place, he would visit the place with other men of the village, mainly elders, to select a 
site on the bank of the river/rivulet for everyday use of water and bathing, and a site for the 
Shashan or graveyard. Afterwards the Karbari would ask the villagers to cut jungle growth 
around the settlement site and each male villager would choose his household location. During 
his sleep at night, the Karbari then tried to divine through dream whether or not the place would 
be good for the community’s well being. Among the villagers, each household head of a family 
would also dream about the suitability of the location for his household and the well-being of his 
family. If the Karbari and most villagers had good dreams and felt good about the site of the 
settlement, the place would get selected and the villagers would move out to the new settlement. 
If not, the search for a new place would begin again. I would argue that the violation of this 
cultural logic during the resettlement at Golden River explains in part why some villagers of 
Golden River abandoned the village. 
Economic reasons also figure prominently in the villagers’ accounts of why they stayed 
or left Golden River. By all accounts, economic hardship and lack of food security are the main 
reasons for abandoning the resettlement village. Sova Tipura, wife of Sibu Tripura, stated 
succinctly in her broken Bengali “lok besi, jhum kom, ar khana nai. Palabeiyto!” ([We had] 
more people, [but] little jhum, and [there was] hardly enough food [for all]. [Some could not stay 
here], but must leave [the village]). Sibu helpfully explained:  
A village of fifty families was unconventional, too many to be living on jhum cultivation 
in any place. Harvest from jhum in the area was also not good. In fact it was so scanty 
that men in the families had to find wage labour work for daily bread and butter, and still 
wages were not enough for a family to survive here. Therefore, those who did get plain 
land in their plots could not have survived in living here and left the village at their first 
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opportunity in 1990,  and a few others later followed them, mainly to Matamuhuri 
Reserve. 
 
The above statement about the relationship between the plain land in plot and staying in 
the village is credible but partial. From the survey I conducted in Golden River, I found only 12 
households out of the 20 resettled families had between 20 and 80 decimal plain lands in their 
plots. Another factor that influenced the villagers’ choice to stay put in Golden River was the 
leadership role of Moniram Tripura. The villagers I interviewed agreed that Moniram played a 
critical role in sparing Golden River from complete desertion. In the early 1990s Moniram 
successfully lobbied the local Mouza headman to become a Karbari (village headman) in the 
Mouza and brought most of the community households together into a new settlement site. 
However, this caused an unintended conflict among the villagers which was exacerbated by 
competition among the churches and a flow of resources from them, and led to the current 
divisions of hamlets of which one consists of only three households (including the household of 
the Karbari).  
In economic terms, the communities of Golden River have remained jhum cultivators as 
they were in the past, but have turned into marginal ones with limited access to land and 
resources. In Table 4.3 below I summarize the main livelihood strategies of the remaining twenty 
original resettled families by household based on the survey I conducted. Table 4.4 below 
presents statistical comparisons of livelihood strategies among the three groups of Golden River: 
the twenty original resettled families, beneficiaries and the remaining others in the village. 
Table 4.3 shows that 63 percent of the resettled families engage in at least four 
occupations for their livelihood, of which jhum cultivation, wage labour and selling fuel wood or 
sun grass figure prominently, and as many as 65 percent of these resettled families have access to 
plough land through ownership or sharecropping.  
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Table 4.3:  Livelihood Strategies of the Resettled Families   
Livelihood Strategies Rank of Livelihood Strategies by Households 
Primary Secondary Tertiary Quaternary %  Households 
Jhuming 6 1 6 3 80% 
Selling fuel wood & sun 
grass 
4 10 2 0 80% 
Wage labour 5 4 5 1 75% 
Farming 4 2 2 0 40% 
Horticulture garden 0 0 0 6 30% 
Sharecropping 0 2 2 1 25% 
Home garden 0 0 2 2 20% 
Small business 0 1 0 1 10% 
Salaried jobs 1 0 0 0 5% 
Rent 0 0 1 0 5% 
Not applicable 0 0 0 6  
Total Households (N) 20 20 20 20  
Data Source: Household Survey by the Author (March 15 to 21, 2008).  
 
Interestingly, only 6 households (30 percent) of the resettled families have some income from 
horticulture gardens, a strategy that was envisioned as the main future livelihood strategy for the 
resettlement. In other words, 50 percent are mainly marginal jhum cultivating wage labourers, 30 
percent are marginal jhum cultivating farmers, and 10 percent are marginal farmers and wage 
labourers. Of the remaining 10 percent representing 2 households, one household head is 
primarily a businessman, and the other is dependent on income from a job. In plain language, 
this means that more than a half of the original twenty families are primarily living on income 
from wage labour supplemented by jhum cultivation or farming, and more than a quarter of them 
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could depend on income from farming for most of the year but have to engage in wage labour 
from time to time. 
Table 4.4 is a statistical comparison of livelihood strategies among the twenty original 
resettled families, beneficiaries and the remaining others in the village according to household 
and the multiplicities of livelihood choices. This shows that the economic conditions of the 
beneficiaries are little better than those of the twenty original resettled families. Their different 
degrees of dependency on jhum cultivation, wage labour, and selling fuel wood or sun grass can 
be explained in part by increased dependence on jobs and rents among the beneficiaries. In fact, 
the beneficiaries are mostly sons or siblings of the absentee resettled families and they have 
better education than their parents’ generation.  
 
Table 4.4:  Livelihood Strategies of the Resettled Families in Comparison with the Beneficiaries 
and the Remaining Others   
 
Occupation  Resettled Families Beneficiaries Remaining Others  
Jhum 80% 50% 77% 
Selling fuel wood & 
sun grass 
80% 10% 85% 
Wage labour 75% 30% 77% 
Farming 40% 30% 8% 
Horticulture garden 30% 40% Nil 
Sharecropping 25% 30% 46% 
Homestead garden 20% 20% Nil 
Small business 10% Nil Nil 
Salaried jobs 5% 60% 38% 
Rent 5% 40% Nil 
Total Households (N) 20 10  13  
Data Source: Household Survey by the Author (March 15 to 21, 2008).  
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In contrast, and understandably, the remaining others of Golden River, mostly the sons or sons-in 
law of the resettled families, are among the poorest in the village, depending mostly on jhum, 
wage labor or selling fuel wood and sun grass . Unlike the beneficiaries, they are all completely 
landless families, their houses are built on their parents’ or neighbour’s homesteads, and they are 
also more likely to be sharecroppers, as much as the beneficiaries are rent collectors. In sum, the 
survey reveals that only a handful of Golden River families have some kind of food security for a 
year, while others struggle acutely or to some degree.        
In hindsight, what surprised me about the economy of Golden River communities was the 
persistence of jhum cultivation and poverty. In my attempt to understand this, I found that jhum 
cultivation persisted not because Tripura are “tribes,” “primitive” or do not know about other 
uses of land or wet rice cultivation, but because of jhum’s relative importance for the production 
of staple food for hill people in the ecological context of CHT. Poverty among the communities, 
however, seemed to be more of a structural issue, though it is admittedly a multifaceted problem. 
It was structural because the horticultural settlement meant that the communities would depend 
on wages for income and buy food from the market. Unsurprisingly, most of the households in 
Golden River failed to raise horticulture gardens; instead, they used their lands to grow sun grass 
and for occasional jhum cultivation, because they argue they do not have capital or resources to 
develop the land. Over the years, they remained dependent on incomes from wage labour and 
other minor occupations for their livelihood. Some of the Golden River communities had even 
sold their land, and a few had lost access of the land to Bengalis (including a Bengali 
anthropologist who seems to have conducted research in the region). This land grabbing by 
Bengalis has been a chronic problem in CHT since Bengali settlement, and is well documented 
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by human rights groups (CHT Commission 2000; Adnan 2004). Meanwhile, the Lama Forest 
Division alone earned more than a million US dollars since its establishment up to 1999, an 
average of Tk. 3,859,657 or about US$ 85,000 a year even if counted conservatively (US$1.00= 
Tk. 45.00) (Lama Forest Division 1999).    
In sum, the effect of “development” has been structural poverty for hill peoples’ 
communities and the loss of customary access to land and forest in USF. Partly because of this, 
the communities at Golden River have grown more religiously conservative. Some families were 
even divided by religious faith in order to gain access to various churches’ resources, which were 
mainly low position jobs, support for schools, and children’s education, and at times financial 
assistance. An unintended consequence of all of this has been individual and collective suffering 
due to the loss of Tripura cultural identity and traditions, namely Puja (worship) and Boisuk 
(New Year’s celebration). All the men and women whom I interviewed or spoke to informally 
shared this opinion but some insisted they would rather die as disciples of Jesus or Mother Mary 
than change faith again. Others seemed more pragmatic, saying “It would not be possible,” or “I 
myself cannot change my faith, how will I change?” There were also changes in relationships 
between Karbari, Headmen and the communities. Neither the Karbaris nor the communities ever 
paid jhum taxes to the local Mouza headman, only the land tax. On the matter of civil disputes or 
justice, though the Karbaris and Headmen oversaw petty family and land disputes in the 
communities, I found that the Union Council of the local government was more powerful than 
those of Karbaris or Mouza Headmen. The positions of the Karbaris became more ceremonial 
and also a social link to the outside world rather than holding much importance for internal 
solidarity and significance.       
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4.6  Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the origins and cultural geographies of the insurgency movement and 
counter-insurgency development programs, and illustrated the resulting changes in forest, land 
and agrarian relations of the hill peoples and relations of power in Mouzas as they exist today. 
This chapter has shown how the counter-insurgency greatly transformed the control of Unclassed 
State Forest (USF) land and agrarian relations through the introduction of a private property 
regime in USF and other programs, including forest resettlement. I have argued that the changes 
in the hill peoples’ relations to land and forest in USF are directly related to insurgency and 
counter-insurgency in the region. In particular, the counter-insurgency development has resulted 
in the end of the common property of forest and land in USF which had come to exist in part 
through the making of forests in CHT in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In turn, there 
emerged in USF an individual property rights regime over forest and land on the one hand, and 
state property of forest on the other hand, which has reinforced the dispossession, 
marginalization and land alienation of the hill peoples. I have shown that the key rationale 
behind the changes is the discourse of “optimum land use,” an environmental discourse of land 
use. Originating in the 1960s, the discourse mobilized both the state and non-state actors 
(transnational donors) on the eve of the insurgency, and was projected and programmed in order 
to transform the land use of USF and the economy of the hill peoples for development in the 
region. Focusing on Lama Forest Division, I have also examined the development and 
resettlement programs of the Forest Department and shown that the effect of development has 
been structural poverty and inter-generational inequalities within the hill peoples’ communities. 
In part, the problems of ‘development’ programs are not only that they are coercive but that they 
are also ethnocentric, lacking knowledge of food security needs and the culture of the hill 
peoples.       
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CHAPTER V 
Counter-insurgency and Political Forests: Matamuhuri Reserve, Forest 
Villagers, and Social Forestry 
 
Government agencies are continually reclassifying and remapping territory to 
account for how people have crossed earlier paper boundaries. State land 
management agencies are forced to recognize local rights deriving from local 
classification, modes of communication, and enforcement mechanisms. Programs 
such as those awarding limited land rights to cultivators in reserve forest areas are 
simultaneously a state attempt to contain people’s activities and a state response 
to what people had done to undermine previous such policies.   
               —Vandergeest and Peluso (1995: 416). 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, I return to the story of Matamuhuri Reserve that I have discussed in the outset of 
this dissertation to examine and illustrate i) counter-insurgency effects on Reserved Forests; ii) 
contemporary changes in the economy and community life of forest villagers (i.e., taungya 
cultivators); and iii) practices and programs of social forestry, as emerging strategies of political 
forests for the management of Reserved Forests in CHT. As mentioned in Chapter II, 
Matamuhuri Reserve came into existence in the 1880s during British rule and had remained 
without formal management of the Forest Department until the early years of Pakistani rule. In 
the early 1950s, the Reserve was brought under formal management of the Forest Department 
but without any working plan. In 1967, a working plan was introduced for the management of 
the Reserve, which formalized the practices of industrial extraction of timber and other forest 
products, including taungya forestry according to scientific forestry (see Chapter III). Like the 
other Reserved Forests of CHT, the Reserve was one of the focal points of the insurgency and 
counter-insurgency war from1975 to 1997, in particular the Matamuhuri war. As noted partly in 
Chapter I, the effects of the insurgency and counter-insurgency on the Reserve were colossal and 
manifold; to repeat, the Reserve is now largely controlled by the army and mostly without tree 
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forest cover because of illegal logging. In part because of these recent changes in political 
control and forest cover, the Reserve has been brought under a new strategy of management and 
political control which is commonly known as “social forestry.” Therefore, to complement my 
discussion in Chapter IV on counter-insurgency development in USF, in this chapter I delve into 
details of counter-insurgency and its effects on Matamuhuri Reserve. I illustrate the ways in 
which the insurgency and counter-insurgency affected altered or facilitated ecological and 
economic changes in the Reserved Forests and their communities of forest villagers. In so doing, 
I wish to extend Peluso and Vandergeest’s account of the effects of insurgency and counter-
insurgency violence on political forests, suggesting that insurgency and counter-insurgency not 
only help to extend political forests but also produce new frontiers, a space of resources and 
people at the margin of the state, that is less integrated and without formal authority of the state 
(Peluso and Vandergeest 2011; but compare Scott 2009). 
However, the main focus of this chapter is on social forestry programs that were 
implemented in the Matamuhuri Reserved Forest from 2002 to 2006 as part of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) assisted Forestry Sector Project (FSP). It is important to note here 
that the FSP was the largest social forestry project in Bangladesh and the first mainstream social 
forestry program in CHT.
104
 I argue here that the introduction of the social forestry regime in 
Matamuhuri Reserve, primarily motivated by deforestation and encroachment in the Reserve, 
was in fact linked to the insurgency and counter-insurgency. I show that as in much of South 
Asia and Southeast Asia, social forestry in Matamuhuri Reserve has remained a form of state 
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In its original planning, the CHT component of the FSP was to be implemented in the USF lands of Lama and the 
Bandarban Forest Divisions from 1996 to 2001. However, the plan generated mass opposition in 1998 among the 
hill peoples with the participation of all regional political parties and traditional elites of CHT as well as several 
local NGOs including Taungya; as such, the plan was only partly implemented in the Matamuhuri Reserve. See 
Gain 2002: 187-221, for descriptive details on the indigenous opposition to social forestry in CHT. 
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intervention, as the discourse of social forestry reinforces the authoritative role of the Forest 
Department and the state’s commercial and revenue interests (Sundar 2000a, 2000b; Peluso 
1992; Gururani n.d.; but compare Agrawal, A 2001; 2005; Agarwal, B 2000; Rangan 1997). 
Unlike colonial Village Forest Councils of Kumaon, India
105
, or taungya forestry in South Asia 
and Southeast Asia that were based on a communal property system and the usufruct rights of all 
village residents, the social forestry programs of FSP represent a more formalized system of 
rights over access to resources based on ‘social citizenship’106 rather than membership of 
particular village communities, bearing important significance for participation and equity, 
especially gender equity. Nevertheless, Moses (1997) reminds us that an analysis of community 
based resource management is not likely to be successful if it does not take up what he calls 
“cultural ecology,” going beyond narrow definitions of economic interest, utility and value. 
Considering the modalities of social forestry, including choices of species, I argue that social 
forestry in Matamuhuri Reserve is more detrimental than the anticipated benefit of revenue 
incomes, and that social forestry not only risks dispossession of hill peoples of the Reserve but 
also the ecology of the Reserve.  
In what follows, I draw upon fieldwork undertaken in Matamuhuri Reserve and 
Matamuhuri Forest Range to describe the ecological and social contexts of the Reserve, followed 
by an inquiry into the nature and process of deforestation in the Reserve. These sections help to 
explain the effects of the war and counter-insurgency development on the Reserve during the 
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 Village Forest Councils of Kumaon were established in 1930s in Uttarakhand and United Province founded on 
Class I and “civil” forests and have continued to date, numbering an estimated 4,805 councils by 1995 (Agarwal, B. 
2000). Supervised and managed by both forest and revenue departments, these councils comprise a small body of 
elected representatives from the villages and are responsible for the improvement and protection of forests, while 
controlling and monitoring villagers’ access to them (Agrawal, A. 2005; Guha 2001; Tucker 1984). 
106
 I use the term social citizenship to refer to those institutional practices such as private property, work, welfare, 
education, democracy and so forth, through which citizens, either as individuals or as members of a group, become 
actors in civil society and exercise their citizenship. 
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period from the 1970s to the 1990s, and in turn, they also describe the conjunctures and changes 
in ecology and economy within which the social forestry program began. Next, I describe recent 
changes to the centuries’ old institution of the ‘forest village system’ and its relations to the 
forest resources and power relations. In this section, I further compare and contrast the economy 
and livelihood strategies of two hill peoples’ groups, namely the Marma and Murucha, to 
illustrate the ways in which the insurgency and counter-insurgency have changed ethnic relations 
in terms of access to resources as well as power relations in the Reserve. This follows an account 
of how social forestry practices changed and shaped the communities, economy and ecology of 
the Reserve. In sum, this chapter serves to clarify the practices, risks and limits of social forestry 
in the management of the Matamuhuri Reserve in particular, and the emerging practices of the 
management of the Reserved Forests in CHT in general.       
      
5.2  The Matamuhuri Reserve: Local Political Ecology  
This section describes the social history, ecology and geography of Matamuhuri Reserve as well 
as recent changes in the ecology and cultural geography of the Reserve caused by the insurgency 
and counter-insurgency. The focus of this section is on changes in the human ecology of the 
Reserve and its adjacent areas, where Bengalis emerged as dominant group. Thus, this section 
explains how Bengalis became major participants and beneficiaries of the social forestry 
programs that will be describe later in this chapter. 
The Matamuhuri Reserve is situated in the territory of Alikadam Upazila (or sub district) 
of Bandarban district and currently falls under the administration of Lama Forest Division (see 
Appendix A: Maps 2 and 5). The Reserve comprises 102,854 acres of land along the 
Matamuhuri River and is the second largest Reserved Forest of CHT, consisting of more than 
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half the total land area of Alikadam Upazila.
107
 Bordering Myanmar in south, the Matamuhuri 
Reserve runs parallel to the Sangu Reserved Forest in the east and is contained within hills rising 
1600 to 2400 feet above the river, which separate drainages of the Matamuhuri and Sangu rivers. 
The Matamuhuri River originates in the southern end of the valley and forms many streams 
joined by hundreds of creeks. From the headwater, the river is still the only means of 
communication into the Reserve from Alikadam Upazila proper, and runs approximately 64 
kilometers to the end of its northern boundary at Babupara and 128 kilometers to its entry into 
Maheskhali Channel in Cox’s Bazar district.  
When the Forest Department brought the Matamuhuri Reserve under formal forest 
management in 1950, the forests in it were intact even though the Forest Department had not 
policed them. This was primarily because the locality was isolated with a relatively small 
population of hill peoples.
108
 The Alikadam proper was then part of Alikadam Mouza, a revenue 
unit of traditional administration, a remote rural settlement like other Mouzas under the control 
of the Lama police station (i.e., Lama Thana). Its only link to the outside world was through the 
city of Chokoria of Cox’s Bazar district, a two-day journey on the Matamuhuri River either by a 
small boat in the rainy season or bamboo rafts in winter (GOEB 1954:3).
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 According to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, the land area of the Matamuhuri Reserve is said to be 65,011 
hectares (BBS 1986), which appears to misrepresent the land area of the Reserve. My calculation of the land area of 
the Reserve is from the Matamuhuri Range Office which corresponds to the forest inventory of the Reserve in the 
1960s (see FD 1970). The total land area of the Mouzas of Alikadam Upazila is 23,569 hectares or about 58,240 
acres (BBS 1986). 
108
 This fact can be gleaned from the census of 1961 that counted the hill population by the Mouzas of CHT. 
According to the census, the six Mouzas which now form the Alikadam Upazila were then parts of Alikadam Union 
and had as many as 6,381 hill peoples (GOP n. d.).  
109
 There was no road to Alikadam Upazila until 1982. 
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Photo 5.1: USF land near the northern boundary of Matamuhuri Reserve. Notice the bamboo raft passing on 
Matamuhuri River from the Reserve. 
 
 
 
Photo 5.2: Some hills and land in Matamuhuri Reserve. 
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Photo 5.3: Riverbed (during dry season) in Matamuhuri Reserve. Alap Alam, one of my research assistants, is seated 
in the picture.   
 
 
Photo 5.4: Bengali sharecroppers in Matamuhuri Reserved Forest harvesting winter vegetables. Beyond them, one 
can see hillside cash crop cultivation with social forestry plantation in the background. 
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Photo 5.5: Visiting a social forestry plantation site in Matamuhuri Reserve. In the image are my research assistant 
Bhubon Chakma (left) and a Marma forest villager (right). I am taking the picture.  
 
 
 
Photo 5.6: Lama Forest Department meeting with forest villagers (referred to in Chapter I). The Divisional Forest 
Officer is seated in the foreground.  
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Photo 5.7: Matamuhuri Forest Range meeting with Bengali participants in a social forestry program, Matamuhuri 
Reserve. Myself and my research assistant Bhubon Chakma attended the meeting (not in the picture). 
 
 
 
Photo 5.8: Forest Officers and Forest Guards confiscating illegally extracted timber near Matamuhuri Forest Range 
Office. 
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Uffo Marma, the first Forest headman, confirmed to me that no human settlement had 
existed inside the Reserve before the 1950s, although the Murucha, the Khumi, and the Tripura 
lived near and around it in other Mouzas. Interestingly, Marma described the Reserve “as if it 
was a green sky under the sky.” Reminiscing about his early days as a forest villager in 1950s, he 
stated, “even on a broad sunny day when I got inside the forest, I could barely see the sun or 
sunlight but only the shadows of leaves and trees. If you had a weak heart, the forest would scare 
you.” This observation echoes the first scientific inventory of the Reserve conducted from the 
late 1950s to the early 1960s through aerial photographs and field sample surveys.  According to 
this inventory, the Reserve was a relatively thick dense forest of timber trees and bamboos of 
local species with only a small area under grass cover. The trees, like the other reserved forests 
of CHT, were a mixture of deciduous and tropical evergreen species; the latter were 
predominant, with civit, garjan, chapalish as the principal species. These three hardwoods 
comprised half or more of the commercial timber volume of the Reserve, with the remaining 
volume comprised of fifty different species of tropical hardwoods.  However, bamboo 
untypically represented over 46 percent of the land as bamboo cover. It also grew as understory 
of tree forest in low hills and on the banks of creeks or streams (FD 1970). Unfortunately, the 
inventory does not provide accounts of the fauna inside the Reserve. However, in my interviews 
with forest villagers, they named ten to twenty species of birds in the Marma language that I 
could recognize only as peacock and wild hen. The Reserve also had large numbers of bears, 
deer, elephants, monkeys, tigers and wild pigs.  Presently, with the exception of sparse wild hen 
and deer, the birds and animals seem to have disappeared entirely.  
Since the 1980s, the political ecology of the locality of Alikadam has changed greatly due 
to the counter-insurgency and administrative development. The population of Alikadam Upazila 
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was estimated at 34,000 in 2001, of which Bengalis accounted for 59 percent and the 
communities of the hill peoples 41 percent. Among the hill peoples, the Murucha (Mro) make up 
as many as 7,676 persons, followed by the Marma (3,046), the Tripura (1,196), the Tanchangya 
(1192) , and the Chakma (389). These population statistics of hill peoples are dubious. 
Nevertheless, if we use them as a reference point, half of the population of Alikadam Upazila 
lives within 5 kilometers of the Reserve, namely in Alikadam Bazaar and Nyapara. Alikadam 
Bazaar is a rural town as well as the administrative headquarters of the Upazila with a weekly 
market place and the office of Matamuhuri Forest Range. Bengalis and Marma comprise the 
population of the town. On the other hand, Nyapara, located just across Alikdama Bazaar by the 
Matamuhuri River, is a densely populated Bengali village contiguous to the northern boundary of 
the Reserve. Popular estimates of the population of Nyapara are about 10,000, and no less than 
40 percent of it is said to be Rohingya refugees from Myanmar who arrived in the 1990s. 
Significantly, both Alikadam Bazaar and Nyapara are located next to the prime river valley plain 
lands of the Upazila which are mostly occupied by Bengalis. 
An important aspect of the current demography of Alikadam Upazila is the disappearance 
and dispossession of the Khumi, one of the hill peoples’ groups that inhabited the locality. 
According to local narratives, most Khumi had left the locality of Alikadam to neighbouring 
Naikhyongchari Upazila by the early 1970s, displaced by the influx of the Chakma and 
Tanchangya who were pushed out by the Kaptai dam in the 1960s and later by Bengalis in the 
1970s. The majority of the Bengali population of Alikadam Upazila is not part of the state 
sponsored Bengali settlement of 1980s; rather most are voluntary migrants from Cox’s Bazar 
district. Bengali migration to Alikadam locality began with the establishment of the Alikadam 
Cantonment in 1974, which led to the development of road communications and connected the 
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locality for first time to Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong districts in the early 1980s. This reduced the 
two day boat journey from Chokoria to Alikadam to an hour by motor vehicle. Significantly, the 
Cantonment and militarization in the locality helped to further Bengali migration. The 
Cantonment was also a key factor in ‘turning’ the locality, as Bengalis filled all positions of state 
administration, local government, and civil society institutions in the Upazila in 1984, in addition 
to taking control over trade, commerce, and businesses. Alikadam Upazila is currently well-
connected to the district headquarters of Bandarban, Cox’s Bazar, and Chittagong by roads with 
concrete surface and inter-city bus service.  
 
5.3  Deforestation of the Matamuhuri Reserve  
Much as in other part of Southeast Asia and South Asia, deforestation as an environmental 
problem has been a key rationale for social forestry programs in Bangladesh (Asaduzzaman 
1989). The dominant accounts of deforestation in Bangladesh also follow conventional and 
institutional (e.g., UN, World Bank, ADB) explanations that link deforestation with the rate of 
population growth and destructive forest clearing by ‘uncaring farmers,’ who are primarily the 
rural poor and shifting cultivators (GOBD 1993: vii-viii; but compare, Gadgil and Guha 1993; 
Guha 2000; Peluso 1992; Rangan 1995, 1997; Rasul 2007; Shiva 1987). In this section, I 
challenge these dominant institutional and conventional narratives of deforestation in order to 
support my contention that social forestry in the Matamuhuri Reserve is largely matter of control 
of the Reserve and conflicts between the Forest Department and the army. I hold that 
deforestation is a spatially and ecologically differentiated process that varies across time, 
contingent upon the political economy of a particular place and the regime of governmentality. I 
also show that deforestation in the Reserve is connected to both institutional management 
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practices well as political processes of insurgency and counter-insurgency, involving three 
distinct processes: management policies and practices, encroachment, and illegal logging. 
Although these processes overlap and are concurrent with each other, they are differentiated by 
the agents involved and their roles in specific forms of deforestation.  
Turning first to the management policies and practices in the Reserve, the general 
management policies of Matamuhuri Reserve were from the outset geared toward gradual 
conversion of heterogeneous forest, coinciding with industrial plantation of high yielding local 
timber species and teak, through clear felling, commercial exploitation of forest resources, and 
policing. In 1960, the Reserve was also coupled with forest industries – namely the Forest 
Industry Development Corporation (FIDC), and the Karnaphuli paper mill – for the commercial 
exploitation of timber and bamboo. In 1967, as a twenty-year working plan came into the effect, 
the working plan divided the Reserve into 30 blocks and 55 compartments, and re-arranged them 
into four working circles for hardwood timber, softwood timber, bamboo and overlapping 
bamboo. In doing so, the working plan proposed to convert 27,107 acres of timber forest cover 
area (including the plantation before the working plan) into a plantation of: a) high yielding 
hardwood timber for a maximum of 60 years, and b) softwood timber species for a maximum of 
30 years. Considering the cost of timber extraction and the difficulties of timber transportation, 
the plan constricted the annual timber extraction program to high timber quality forest (i.e. the 
matured trees of the principal species) in the area of the annual plantation programs through 
FIDC. For the pure bamboo forest, the plan set the conservation period to 4 years before 
commercial extraction.  
However, the working plan remained incomplete until 1995, when the Forest Department 
ceased regular timber extraction and annual plantation programs as a result of increased illegal 
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logging (but continued to extract bamboo under a provisional plan). Meanwhile, the Forest 
Department converted only 13,908 acres of timber forest cover into hardwood timber forest 
through clear felling and taungya forestry in the most accessible parts of the Reserve (on both 
banks of the river up to fourteen miles from the northern boundary), about half proposed by 1985 
in the working plan. Although the Forest Department had reasonably regulated the annual 
extraction of bamboo
110
 and other minor forest products little coordination existed between FIDC 
and the local Forest Department.  In fact, as many forest villagers told me, for the most part the 
FIDC operated an unchecked timber extraction program through private contractors from the 
most accessible part of the Reserve because of difficulties moving the timber logs along the 
river, uneven high hills and steep slopes. Thus, the high mature forest cover of the principal 
species disappeared due to unsustainable logging by FIDC. At the same time, industrial 
plantation programs wasted a large quantity of timber in the plantation areas through taungya 
forestry.
111
   
The encroachment on the Reserve by the hill peoples was not a typical phenomenon of 
forest encroachment by agrarian rural communities or big businesses that are prevalent in the 
plain lands districts of Bangladesh; it was an outcome of the insurgency, counter-insurgency 
development, and the Matamuhuri war. The encroachment began as early as 1972 when Shanti 
Bahini, the guerrilla force of the JSS, took shelter in the Reserve to train and prepare for armed 
insurgency. The Matamuhuri Reserve, along with the Sangu Reserve, provided the Shanti Bahini 
with shelter within a large inaccessible terrain as well as routes to the southern parts of CHT 
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 The bamboo was generally sold to private purchasers or the contractors of the Karnaphuli paper mill through 
permits. 
111
 These facts can be constructed to support generalized meta- narratives by environmental critics who cite state 
demand for commercial timber and revenue as key to the deforestation of South Asia across time and space.  
However, these generalizations risk over-simplifying the complex processes of deforestation by ignoring specific 
local ecologies. 
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(through the Sangu and Matamuhuri rivers’ networks). The Shanti Bahini are said to have used 
the Reserve as a base for guerrilla operations in the south of CHT, controlling deep interior parts 
of the Reserve until 1984, when the Matamuhuri war drove them and their supporters from the 
Reserve. By most accounts of forest villagers, the effect of the insurgency on deforestation in the 
Reserve was limited in scope and space. According to Mingsey Murucha, an ex-insurgent 
member whom I interviewed, the Shanti Bahini had a number of strategic villages in the 
Reserve, mainly between Chiampra Mouza and Kurukpata, for concealing supplies of essential 
goods and spying on military movements. In the insurgency supported villages, the households 
could not have numbered more than 250, comprising about 1500 Chakma, Tripura and 
Tanchangya. In part, this was also because of the cultural logic of jhum cultivation practices 
related to the concept of the ‘best land.’ According to the forest villagers, the best land refers to 
bamboo forest in relatively high hills with large flat tops that logically forces a long fallow 
period of jhum cycle to allow regeneration of bamboo forest and other vegetation.  
The current encroachment on the Reserve, specifically the Murucha settlement, emerged 
following the Matamuhuri war along with the militarization of the Reserve. As part of the army’s 
counter-insurgency strategy, Murucha villagers were provided with firearms and training to form 
a paramilitary force known as the Mro Bahini. Given that the Murucha had been part of Shanti 
Bahini and that it was common knowledge among hill people that the army was acting against 
their interest, the sudden alliance between the army and Murucha was surprising (see Chapter 
IV). A popular explanation of the alliance points to the social and political conflict between the 
Murucha and Shanti Bahini (CHT Commission 1991, 2000). The JSS leaders generally deny this, 
blaming instead the army and its “colonial policy of divide and rule.”  My interviews of local 
leaders of the Mro Bahini and the JSS, government and forest officials, and Bengali elites, 
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revealed that the Murucha are generally considered a “simple, primitive and backward 
community” because of their “exotic” ways of life. In the context of war and insurgency, this 
discourse of the ‘Murucha’s primitiveness’ seems to have shaped the army’s attitudes and 
rationalities: they considered the Murucha a favourable but inferior ally whom they could 
control, while overseeing vast unfamiliar and difficult terrain of the Reserve “for security and 
sovereignty of the nation,” which was the army’s pledged duty.   
As such, in the mid-1980s, the Murucha settlement, jhum cultivation, and military 
operations not only began to alter the tree and bamboo forest cover in the interior part of the 
Reserve but also brought illegal logging to the Reserve. Molla Nasir Mia, a forest guard, 
explains:  
Before the Matamuhuri war, the army had only one temporary camp in Jalanilipara but 
following the Matamuhuri war, the army built four camps. The first was Poamuri camp in 
1985 next to the border area and the last was Kaliachara in 1991 which shifted the 
temporary camp from Jalanipara forest village and is called Jalanipara camp by the army. 
In the area of the camps, the army needed to clear the trees and jungle for security, so the 
army asked Bengali contractors to clear fell the trees and take them free of royalty.  
 
“The army must have needed it and I do not see anything wrong in it,” I naively told Mia to 
encourage him to openly speak his mind and further explain his thoughts.  
Sir, you are a Bengali, I am Bengali too and I think you know there is a wise saying in the 
country areas, ‘do not let the [angel of death] know your home, once he knows your 
home he will always be there.’ Bengali are [the angel of death] for forest. Once the 
Bengalis started clearing the forest in the army camps, they became less fearful about the 
Forest Department. . . Moreover, there were plenty of burned trees as the [Marma and 
Murucha] did jhum. [So] . . . in the name of forest clearing for the army, the burned trees, 
the third class non-timber trees, the illegal logging was going on. And our Forest 
Department did nothing to stop it.  
 
Yet, Mia carefully avoided mentioning the Forest Department staff’s role and their 
alleged corruption in the deforestation process through illegal logging. I witnessed illegal 
logging during my fieldwork in the Reserve, and it could have occurred only with the active 
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cooperation or tacit compliance of the Forest Department since transportation of timber and other 
Reserve products depended solely on the Matamuhuri River controlled by the Matamuhuri 
Range Office.   
This form of illegal logging continued until 1996 and was concentrated in the interior part 
of the Reserve; it gradually increased, likely through the availability of labour of Rohingya 
refugees and the demand for firewood for tobacco cultivation in Lama and Alikadam Upazilas 
(including the Reserve). 
However, in 1996 the intensity of illegal logging increased dramatically, involving 
thousands of Bengali and Rohingya labourers. This fact can be gleaned from Table 5.1 below, 
which shows that the number of forest crimes increased in 1995-96 to almost four times from the 
number previous years, and so did the amount of seized timber. Figure 5.1 helps to visualize this 
scenario, showing that revenue growth occurred in sudden bursts for one or two years followed 
by a few years of decline, and there were  some parallels in the growth and decline of revenue, 
seized timber and forest crimes. Ananta Tripura, a villager of Rizaroa, described the scene of 
illegal logging as “a festival like a soccer game competition.” When I asked what he meant, he 
had trouble elaborating his metaphor but repeatedly emphasised the scene of men and women 
watching the cutting and the spectacular sights and sounds of felling the giant trees. The 
metaphor may not fit within the contexts of the larger political economy, but it does reveal the 
social feeling of the hill peoples about illegal logging and also reminds us of the classes of agents 
with their particular roles (e.g., the players, managers, referees, etc.).  
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Table 5.1:  Revenue, Amount of Confiscated (Seized) Timber, and Number of Forest Crimes in 
Matamuhuri Forest Range by the Fiscal Year from 1979-80 to 2006-07     
  
Years 
Revenue Income 
(Tk.) 
Consficated  
(Seized) Timber 
(Cft.) 
Number of 
Registered Forest 
Crimes 
1979-80 51,022.0 Nil Nil  
1980-81 442,578.0 Nil Nil  
1981-82 502,425.0 Nil Nil  
1982-83 322,285.0 Nil Nil  
1983-84 137,693.0 Nil Nil  
1984-85 474,141.0 Nil Nil  
1985-86 554,197.0 Nil Nil  
1986-87 784,305.0 Nil Nil  
1987-88 755,756.0 Nil Nil  
1988-89 1,026,750.0 Nil Nil  
1989-90 2,738,791.0 202 4 
1990-91 2,440,930.0 71 10 
1991-92 3,430,372.0 1,214 7 
1992-93 2,870,622.0 331 6 
1993-94 2,892,556.0 381 11 
1994-95 4,068,120.0 1,174 13 
1995-96 3,802,155.0 5,576 44 
1996-97 895,268.0 4,227 46 
1997-98 713,756.0 6,425 81 
1998-99 2,588,839.0 5,339 68 
1999-00 5,972,723.0 19,489 173 
2000-01 9,296,492.0 30,361 79 
2001-02 3,582,202.0 32,889 51 
2002-03 2,681,260.0 6,497 37 
2003-04 4,830,564.0 9,701 47 
2004-05 4,626,400.0 17,957 38 
2005-06 4,706,715.0 11,606 36 
2006-07 3,506,478.0 7,846 33 
Data: Collected from Matamuhuri Forest Range Office. 
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Figure 5.1: Annual Increase in Revenue, Seized Timber and Forest Crimes 
 
 
 
Data: Collected from Matamuhuri Forest Range Office. 
 
Illegal logging was a frequent talking point during my fieldwork in the Reserve, and I 
heard stories of several individual fragmented momentary experiences from the forest villagers 
which, while informative and insightful, are brief and thin in narrative. Nevertheless, it became 
clear to me from these accounts that mass illegal logging continued until 2000 when the entire 
planted forest of 13,908 acres was completely felled. As a result, with the exception of the most 
remote and inaccessible areas, the tree cover of the Matamuhuri Reserve was lost almost 
completely, though the bamboo forest remained unharmed for the most part. In hindsight, I can 
still recall my utter surprise during my first visit to the Reserve, and I wrote in my field diary: 
Traveling with forest officers by a boat to Meringchar, ten kilometers to the south from 
the [Matamuhuri Forest] Range office, I could not help but notice only a few patches of 
new plantation and a few bamboo forests on low hills here and there whereas masses of 
hills on both banks of the Matamuhuri River are completely denuded. When approaching 
the village 30 feet up in the valley from the river bank, I also saw hundreds of dried large 
tree stumps all around the village. And I was too surprised, and looking at the faces of 
forest employees I was literally afraid; and I could not ask anyone why a reserved forest 
was without trees. 
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Thus, in an effort to understand illegal logging, I asked all the forest villagers I 
interviewed the question how and by whom did it happen. The forest villagers generally blamed 
Bengali timber businesses of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar districts as well as Bengali and 
Rohingya wood cutters. The villagers also hinted at corruption among the Forest Department’s 
officers and staff. Nevertheless, when I reminded them of the army, the police, or the executive 
officer and the magistrate of the Upazila (i.e., UNO) and asked why these people did not prevent 
it, the villagers commonly expressed their helplessness and tended to avoid the question; they 
felt they could only explain what they had seen, known and thought of themselves, not the ways 
and whys of other people’s actions or failures to act. Interestingly, they also believed the 
government knows or should know “everything.”    
I further interviewed a number of JSS leaders, local indigenous elders, and the Range 
Officer, all of whom offered two different types of explanations for the phenomenon. The Range 
Officer in particular pointed to the fundamentals of market principles and the state’s policy, and 
argued:  
There is no prime or single cause [to the illegal logging] but there are many causes. First 
of all, I must say, there was a clear lack of forethought from the part of the government. 
We had 5,651 hectares of planted forest of valuable timber trees, and many of them 
completed the rotation of harvesting period. Yet, the Forest Department could not begin 
harvesting the forest because of the moratorium on timber harvest declared [by the 
government] in 1988. This had created a huge gap in the timber supply against the 
increased demand of timbers in markets in the country, and as a result the timber price 
went very high. ...I think the opportunists had taken advantage of the market demand and 
price hike, and unfortunately the political turmoil in the CHT did work in their favor.  
 
 
For the Ranger, the list of “the opportunists” was long and included not only the local “corrupt” 
officers and staff of the Forest Department and timber businesses but also local political elites 
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and the entire administrative machinery of the government. The Ranger did not explicitly discuss 
the army’s role but conceded a strong link existed among the local timber businesses, the Bengali 
political elites, and the army in CHT. I think the connection between market demand for timber, 
corruption among a few powerful persons, and illegal logging is more a theoretical than 
empirical statement.  It is also in sufficient because it does not explain why illegal logging 
happened only at this historical conjuncture, when demand for timber in Bangladesh has always 
been high. 
The local JSS leaders I interviewed, however, had a different argument but without 
definite proof. They unambiguously believed that the mass illegal logging was a “state 
orchestrated event” in anticipation of the signing of the Peace Treaty of 1997 and its 
ramifications.  I first found the argument too farfetched to be acceptable, and I pressed the JSS 
leaders to explain why anyone should believe their account. However, most JSS leaders could 
not provide any answer; I realized I might have silenced them. Meanwhile, I found letters 
between the Forest Department and the local chapter of the JSS that suggested organized 
resistance to the illegal logging. These letters were in piles of old office records in the 
Matamuhuri Range Office which were momentarily held in the Range Office and were 
scheduled to be burned (see Photo 1.10).
112
 Following this, I further interviewed Ongsanu 
Marma, who was the convenor of the local JSS chapter and leader of the anti-illegal logging 
campaign. Ongsanu did not offer any additional insight beyond his own life story and how he 
became involved in the anti-illegal logging campaign.  A detailed elaboration is beyond my 
scope here, but his activism against illegal logging arose from ‘social citizenship’, not his 
political position, party ideology or environmentalism. He considered “the forest as a resource 
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  In the pile of old office records I also found the plantation journal of 1952-60, the villagers contact form, the 
map of block divisions of the Reserve, and the working plan, all of which helped shape much of the argument of this 
chapter. 
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belonging to the state” and thought he should help the Forest Department to stop illegal logging. 
In 1998, after several petitions to the Forest Department, he obtained its consent to campaign 
against illegal logging at a time when most timber in the Reserve had been cut down. 
Accordingly, Ongsanu started his campaign by seizing illegally extracted timbers.  He argued, “I 
did so because I thought timber should be sold through regular auction by the Forest Department, 
and in turn, the state would get its revenue income [of millions] and the country would be more 
developed.” Another aspect of Marma’s stories that led me to seriously reconsider the JSS 
argument was his narrative about social sentiments during the Peace Treaty:
113
  
Suddenly everything got changed around here as everyone became sure of the Peace 
Treaty. We [the hill peoples] were not sure what was going to happen after the Peace 
Treaty but we felt happy as Bengalis were telling us we, the hill peoples, would become 
independent, and they seemed very afraid. I cannot tell you how good I felt on those days 
but then before the Treaty was to be signed, thousands of Bengali and Rohingya came 
into Alikadam and started cutting trees in the Reserve days and nights. I think they 
[timber merchants] may have thought ‘if the Treaty gets signed, the hill tracts would be 
for the hill peoples and that is why they might think let’s get the forest and trees out as 
soon as possible.’            
 
To further consider the possibilities that the JSS argument represented reality, I made queries 
about the other Reserved Forests of CHT during my fieldwork. I found that illegal logging was 
not unique to Matamuhuri Reserve; it occurred across the Reserved Forests of the CHT. 
 What does this mean? In my view, these events are consistent with the history of 
conflicts between Bengalis and the hill peoples. Whenever Bengalis and/or the state have come 
under anticipated threat or actual physical attack by the hill peoples, whether by insurgents or 
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 I have long been familiar with Bengali social sentiments toward the hill peoples and the anti- Peace treaty protest 
movement led by the then opposition, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its allies, the right wing conservative 
alliance. In 2001, during my MA fieldwork research in Rangamati, a Baurua woman also told me, “the CHT is now 
the Chakma country, and Rangamati is its capital.” She did so to sympathize with me as “non-tribal, and non-
indigenous” to the CHT, like the Baurua, when she found me struggling to access library resources at the Tribal 
Cultural Institute overseen by a Chakma person. I could not connect the sentiment with the politics of resources and 
control in general and illegal logging in particular until I empathetically listened to Ongsanu. 
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commoners, the immediate reaction of Bengalis and /or the state have been an economic 
blockade of the hill peoples. Bengalis could do this as they had monopoly control over markets 
and businesses. Considering the general Bengali reaction to the Peace Treaty, which included 
anxiety and the probable loss of economic control over resources, I wish to argue that illegal 
logging was a political and economic backlash by Bengalis in response to the Peace Treaty.
114
 
Nonetheless, as shown in Table 5.1, illegal logging has remained a constant problem in 
the Matamuhuri Reserve; on average, from 2003 to 2006, there were 35 criminal cases a year. 
While living in villages in the Reserve, I also saw approximately 200 woodcutters carrying axes 
and hand saws every week, passing the villages of forest villagers to the interior of the Reserve, 
where hill peoples’ villages and forests are controlled by the army. Some woodcutters I 
interviewed told me that only about 40 percent tree cover existed in the border areas past the 
Poamuri army camp, the most remote army camp in the Reserve close to the Myanmar border.   
 
5.4  Forest Villagers: Communities and Economy 
This section describes recent changes in the communities and economy of taungya cultivators 
and associated ‘forest village system’ which existed until recently in the Matamuhuri Reserve. 
This will illustrates the differential effects of counter-insurgency on the forest villager 
communities, namely the Marma and Murucha forest villagers, and their relations to forest 
resources and power. The section further demonstrates that there was growing ethnic, economic 
and social differentiation among and within the hill peoples groups. I argue that the most 
significant factor contributing to this differentiation was penetration of market forces in the 
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 This is my view as a Bengali, and it was also expressed by some of my Bengali informants, including timber 
merchants and political elites in Alikadam, who wished to remain anonymous. 
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economy of the forest villagers. The penetration of market was in part facilitated by counter-
insurgency.  
Until the Matamuhuri war, the forest villagers of the Matamuhuri Reserve had lived 
mainly in Rizaroa, Jalanipara, and Buchipara villages composed of members of the Marma, the 
Murucha and the Tripura ethnic groups. Among these villages, Rizaroa is the oldest and was 
inhabited by both the Marma and Murucha, separated by a residential settlement (i.e., hamlet) 
with a Karbari (i.e., village headman).  On the other hand, Jalanipara (located two kilometers 
southwest of Rizaroa inside the Reserve) was inhabited by Murucha and Tripura, and they too 
had their own Karbari while living in separate hamlets. Between Rizaroa and Jalanipara, 
Buchipara was a single community village of the Murucha, also with its own Karbari. The 
population of forest villagers was then no less than 800 (113 households), of which the Murucha 
were 450 (63 households), the Marma 204 (31 households), and the Tripura 107 (9 
households).
115
  
By all of the forest villagers’ accounts, the first group of the hill peoples to inhabit these 
forest villages in the Reserve were Uffo Marama’s parents, his extended families, and co-
villagers of thirteen Marma families. They first settled in Nayapara in 1950, but moved into 
Rizaroa in 1952 as the Forest Department began industrial forest plantation, and were joined by 
another group of eighty Murucha families. Uffo Marma claimed that he had brought the 
Murucha families from Sonachari village of Chaimpra Mouza and also maintained that he had 
been the first Forest headman, which some forest villagers disputed. Nevertheless, he was the 
Forest headman until 1998 when he handed the position down to his grandson Ukko Marma, the 
sitting Forest headman.   
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 The numbers are based on the register of the forest villagers of Matamuhuri Reserve.  
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Although the Marma forest villagers have continued to live in Rizaroa, the Murucha 
forest villagers over the years have often changed villages or the sites of their villages and have 
regularly deserted forest villages either as groups or individual families.  When I arrived in the 
Reserve in 2007, the Murucha forest villagers were living in five forest villages including 
Rizaroa, Buchipara and Jalanipara. The other villages of the Murucha forest villagers are 
Kiwaypara and Meringdom. The village of Kiwaypara was recently formed by the Murucha 
forest villagers of Rizaroa after the Forest Department had stopped organizing taungya forestry 
for plantation. Meringdom is a different story, however; it is an old village site of Murucha forest 
villagers, which they had occupied twice in the past and abandoned. Lately, a group of Marma 
have been living in it after coming into the Reserve in 1989 from the area of Lama Upazila, 
where they were displaced by state-sponsored Bengali settlement. The Murucha settlement in 
Meringdom appeared in 2004 as a group of Murucha forest villagers of Jalanipara moved in 
there as part of social forestry program, without pushing out the Marma who were already living 
there.  
Currently, legally recognized forest villagers comprise about 149 households with 1,150 
people and are mainly the old forest villagers of the Marma and the Murucha and their heirs. The 
Tripura forest villagers, excepting the families of Ananta Tripura and Bahadur Tripura, were 
forcibly displaced from the Reserve during the Matamuhuri war.
 116
 The village of Rizaroa has 
remained a densely inhabited multiethnic village of forest villagers and is also inhabited by a 
significant number of Bengalis (who do not consider themselves forest villagers, nor are they 
considered so by the Forest Department).  Combined, Rizaroa has about 1,000 people in 109 
households, of which the Marma forest villagers have emerged as the dominant group consisting 
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 The family of Ananta Tripura has since lived in Rizaroa along with the Murucha forest villagers where his family 
has three households. Bir Tripura had lived in Jalanipara where he died, but is survived by his wife and three sons.  
The family now lives in Meringdom with the Murucha forest villagers. 
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of 73 households. The other villagers of Rizaroa include 9 Murucha households, 3 Tripura 
households and 19 Bengali households.  Buchipara, Kiwaypara, and Jalanipara are single ethnic 
villages of the Murucha forest villagers, and each village has about 20 households and 100 
people. Meringdom has more than 300 people and 60 households including 162 people in 32 
Marma households (who are also not considered forest villagers). 
In each of the forest villages, the Murucha villagers have their own Karbari or village 
headman as part of conventional practice. This is also true for the Marma forest villagers of 
Rizaroa and the Marma of Meringdom. The Tripura forest villagers living in Rizaroa and 
Meringdom are under the Murucha Karbari of their villages. This conventional practice reveals 
that a single ethnic village under a village Karbari is the norm for the hill peoples’ village 
settlements; also, if and when there is a large multiethnic village, the villagers are separated by 
ethnicity, hamlet or residential location, and village Karbari. Thus, the position of Karbari 
appears as the signature marker of the community and a common feature of villages (or 
settlements) of the hill peoples, whether they are living in forest villages or the Mouzas. 
Importantly, all Karbaris customarily claim and maintain a territory of land whose boundaries are 
traditionally negotiated and fluid. This cultural practice of internal territorialization has been a 
key to the common property regime in CHT for centuries.          
The control of the forest villages was and to a lesser degree still is under the control of 
the Forest Department.  However, in terms of civil administration, the forest villagers (and also 
the other villagers in the Reserve) are subject to civil and criminal jurisdictions of the national 
government and the local government of Alikadam Union Council.
117
 The traditional 
administration of the chiefs and Mouza headmen has no role in the Reserve, and the land and 
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 For the purpose of local government, Alikadam Upazila is divided into two Union Councils (Alikadam and 
Choykhyong) each consisting of three Mouzas, but the Alikadam Union also includes the area of the Reserve. 
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revenue laws applicable to the Mouzas do not apply. As part of the local government of 
Alikadam Union, the Reserve has recently been divided into three wards, each represented by a 
council member generally elected for a 5 year term.  Nevertheless, the Union Council and its 
members play a limited role in governing the population in the Reserve because of the 
restrictions imposed by forest rules and the associated property regime. The major activities of 
the Union Council are related to the distribution of relief, public health campaigns, and 
occasionally minor civil and criminal offences.      
At the village level, the forest villagers are customarily governed by village Karbaris and 
the Forest headman. However, unlike the traditional Mouza administration, the relationship 
between forest villagers and their Karbari, and also between the Karbaris and Forest headman, 
are not legal, formal, or hierarchical but rather of mutual interdependence based on convention 
and customs. The Karbari is conventionally selected by the villagers themselves. On the other 
hand, the Forest headman is the main agent of the Forest administration and is chosen by the 
Forest Department. The main responsibilities of the Forest headman include mobilization of 
forest villagers for forest work required by the Forest Department, and distribution of land grants 
and wages to the villagers in exchange for their labour.  
Since the late 1980s, the economy and the forest villagers’ communities have 
significantly transformed through the gradual penetration of an exchange economy in place of a 
subsistence economy. In part, the penetration of market forces in the economy resulted from 
increased Bengali migration, administrative development in the locality of Alikadam Upazila, 
and encroachment on the Reserve. This has created substantial differences between the Marma 
and Murucha forest villagers in terms of livelihood strategies and use of land and forest 
resources. Using the household census of the Marma of Rizaroa and the Murucha of Meringdom, 
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I present a generalized statistical summary of differences between the Marma and the Murucha 
forest villagers in terms of their dependence on traditional occupations and livelihood strategies 
in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.  These suggest that the Marma forest villagers engage in a range of diverse 
economic activities, with about 40 percent at minimum holding three occupations: the majority 
depend primarily on farming or daily labour – at times both – in combination with jhum 
cultivation, small business, sharecropping, services and so forth. They also appear to be 
increasingly giving up traditional occupations, particularly hunting, weaving, and making liquor.  
In other words, with the development of Alikadam Upazila as a rural town, the economic 
activities of the Marma forest villagers have become a town-village relationship that is 
characteristic of capitalist exchange, at least empirically. In complete contrast, the Murucha 
forest villagers continue to engage in jhum cultivation, wage labour and bamboo cutting, while 
continuing their traditional activities of fishing, hunting, weaving and so on. 
 
Table 5.2: Dependence on Traditional Occupation by Ethnicity and Percentage   
Name of Occupation 
 
Name of Ethnicity and Percentage 
Marma (100% =73 Households)  Murucha (100%= 27 Households)  
Collecting Fuel Wood 97 100 
Collecting Vegetables 97 100 
Fishing 79 92 
Hunting Animals 19 75 
Making Baskets 67 93 
Making Liquor 7 79 
Weaving Cloth 42 93 
Data: Fieldwork Household Census (conducted in November 2007 and January 2008). 
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Table 5.3: Livelihood Strategies by Ethnicity and Percentage 
Name of 
Strategies 
The Ranking of Strategies by Ethnicity and Percentage 
Marma Murucha 
Primary Secondary Tertiary Row  % Primary Secondary Tertiary  Row  % 
Jhum 10 29 14 53 18 15 63 96 
Farming 40 4 1 45 11 Nil Nil 11 
Sharecropping 8 11 5 24 Nil Nil 4 4 
Wage Labour 31 14 8 52 30 44 7 81 
Bamboo 
Cutting 
Nil Nil Nil Nil 33 30 7 70 
Rent from 
Land 
1 8 1 10 Nil 4 Nil 4 
Small 
Business 
4 8 8 20 4 4 4 12 
Service 3 3 1 7 4 Nil Nil 4 
Dependent 3 Nil Nil 3 Nil Nil Nil Nil 
Column % 
(Number of 
Households) 
100 
(73) 
77 
 
38  
 
 100 
(27) 
97 
 
85  
 
 
Data: Fieldwork Household Census (conducted on November 2007 and January 2008).  
As shown in Table 5.3 above, one economic difference between the livelihood strategies 
of Marma and Murucha forest villagers is differential access to the bamboo forest. As mentioned, 
the bamboo forests of the Reserve are located in the interior part of the Reserve where the 
villages are predominantly inhabited by the Murucha communities.  Although bamboo forests 
are annually sold by the Forest Department to businesses in blocks, the Murucha villager 
communities are said to have exercised some control over access to the bamboo forest, and they 
collect cash rent from the businesses and individuals seeking access to the forest irrespective of 
their ethnic background. Under these circumstances, the Murucha forest villagers seem to enjoy 
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a better deal or access to the bamboo forest than the Marma forest villagers. It is important to 
note that cutting bamboo has been a widely practiced common strategy of the forest villagers as 
an alternative to wage labour for a very long time.  
Forest villagers generally work in bamboo cutting for cash advanced from small 
businesses that are working as sub-contractors for big businesses (who individually or 
collectively purchase the right over bamboo to be the extracted from the Reserve in a given 
year). A man can typically cut and collect 150-200 bamboo canes a day or up to 1500 in a week, 
earning no less than Tk. 1500 in a week. This is double the money one could earn from wage 
labour at the rate of Tk. 100 – Tk. 120 per day as of 2008 (in that same year US$ 1.00 was 
equivalent to about tk. 65.00). 
Nevertheless, central to the economic difference between the Marma and Murucha is the 
customary possession of cultivable plough lands in the Reserve.
118
 According to Enkko 
Murucha, a Forest Karbari, a forest villager could take possession of 2 acres, the Karbari 3 acres 
and the Forest headman 4 acres. The household census reveals, however, that 55 percent of the 
Marma forest villagers occupy about 130 acres of land, and this excludes 40 acres of land 
recently taken by the Forest Department through the social forestry plantation program. The 
average size of an agricultural farm of the Marma forest villagers is 3 acres (a minimum 0.40 
acres and maximum 12 acres). Interestingly, 13 households or 18 percent of the Marma also have 
land in the adjoining Mouzas. In comparison to the Marma, 55 percent of the Murucha of 
Meringdom have access to a total of 22 acres of valley land in the Reserve and only 11 percent 
have agricultural farms of more than 1 acre. It is noteworthy that the Reserve has approximately 
300 acres of cultivable plough lands, three quarters of which is around and between the forest 
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 The usufruct rights conceded to the forest villagers seem slightly different from the Reserved Forests of  plains 
land districts, in particular the Khasia forest villagers of Sylhet district, who are granted leasehold rights according 
to section 28 of the 1927 Forest Act. 
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villages of Rizaroa and Meringdom, the remaining one-quarter being sparsely spread across the 
Reserve beyond the village of Meringdom. Until recently, the land was mainly used to cultivate 
local tobacco and pulses for household consumption, and the method of cultivation was hoeing 
seeds or young plants following the burning of the grasses. 
To conclude this section, I would argue that concentration of land among the few Marma 
forest villagers in general and the land dispossession of the Muruch forest villagers in particular 
involves many factors, including the frequent desertion of the Murucha forest villagers from the 
Reserve. However, the most significant factors contributing to the process are: 1) access regimes 
regulated by the Forest headmen, and 2) the intensive use of valley land through ploughing and 
Bengali sharecropping. The intensive use of valley lands began in the late 1980s following the 
Matamuhuri war and subsequent settlement of the Murucha in the Reserve, which led the Marma 
forest villagers to depend increasingly on the valley lands for their livelihood. These phenomena 
are related to the gradual penetration of the market and tobacco cultivation that led to increased 
demands for land for cash crops.  
 
5.5  Practices of Social Forestry: Programs, Opportunities and Stakes 
This section examines the practices of social forestry in Matamuhuri Reserve and illustrates 
programs, participation, opportunities and stakes of social forestry. I demonstrate that the 
practices and programs of social forestry have remained a form of state intervention, reinforcing 
the authoritative role of the Forest Department and the state’s commercial and revenue interests. 
I begin with a brief review the development of social forestry in the country and the way it has 
been practiced in the plains land of Bangladesh to signify similarities and differences in 
modalities and practices of social forestry between the plains land districts and CHT. I further 
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show how social forestry programs were approached differently by different ethnic groups and 
communities (particularly ‘forest villagers’ and ‘other villagers’ of the Reserve), according to 
their stakes and opportunities.  
In Bangladesh, social forestry refers to tree growing programs of the Forest Department 
such as woodlot block, agro forestry, strip plantation, homestead plantation and protection of sal 
(shorea robusta) forest for the production of timber and fuel wood; these programs have been 
undertaken through participation among communities, groups, or individuals who take on 
increased responsibilities in the management and protection of the forest in exchange for 
usufruct rights to the forest produce and a share of the income (Asaduzzaman 1989; Khan et al. 
2005).
119
 The main forms of social forestry are woodlot block, agro forestry and strip plantation. 
Woodlot block and agro-forestry comprise growing trees and agricultural crops either on the 
same land or in close proximity and are carried out solely in degraded or encroached government 
forest land. Conversely, strip plantation takes place on public lands, such as embankments, 
canals, railways, roads and highways, and on other marginal lands belonging to private 
individuals, the community or the public. The marginalized public or community land includes 
institutional complexes of local government, educational institutions, or others.  
An authoritative review on social forestry in Bangladesh published jointly by the Forest 
Department and University of Chittagong suggests that social forestry emerged in the early 
1980s as a sequel of Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank (WB) funded projects 
beginning with ADB assisted Community Forestry projects (Khan, et al. 2005). Other scholars 
view the 1970s local initiative, the Betagi-Pamora project of the Forest Department and local 
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 The information on the involvement of Non-governmental organization in social forestry in the country is 
limited; however, there are good numbers of NGOs engage in social forestry programs but majority of them are 
involved with programs for homestead plantation (see Khan et al. 2005).        
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community organizations, as the start of social forestry in the country (Quddus, et al. 1993). Both 
accounts trace the discourse to a recent international agenda of national development linking 
population growth and deforestation.  In so doing, as demonstrated in Chapter II, these accounts 
ignore taungya forestry, a precursor to social forestry, which coexisted with scientific forestry 
across South and Southeast Asia. Importantly, they ignore any attempt to explain the Forestry 
Extension Service, which is a direct predecessor to contemporary social forestry practices and 
until recently existed in much of South and Southeast Asia including Bangladesh (Vandergeest 
and Peluso 1995). The Forestry Extension Service in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) began in 
the early 1960s as a state-financed program to distribute seeds and tree samplings to the rural 
population free of charge. It grew substantially in the mid-1970s and continued until 1985 
through new tree plantation programs in homestead and community forests in marginal public 
land in plains land Bangladesh (Choudhury 1982). In fact, the ADB-assisted the Community 
Forestry project that is considered by some as the forerunner of social forestry in Bangladesh; 
this was an alternative scheme of the Forestry Extension Service Project (1980-81 to 84-85). The 
Forestry Extension Service Project was funded by the government and operated alongside with 
the ADB-assisted Community Forestry project (FD 1981a).   
Nevertheless, by the early 1990s, social forestry emerged as a dominant strategy of forest 
management and rural development in Bangladesh with the increased interest of ADB, WB and 
other multi-national donors. The Forestry Master Plan – a twenty-year plan for forestry 
development in Bangladesh – that emerged during this period was a major policy shift in social 
forestry policy. The plan was completed in 1993 with financial assistance from the ADB; one 
outcome was the government endorsement of the Forest Policy of 1994 and this policy was, by 
any account, the most populist and environmentalist forest policy in Bangladesh to date (GOBD 
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1993a). In accordance with the new policies, the Forest Department designed the FSP (Forestry 
Sector Project), which was the largest social forestry project in Bangladesh, implemented across 
the country. As part of the ADB loan agreement for the FSP, the government passed the Forest 
Amendment Act 2000 that included provisional rules of social forestry. The new law amended 
the Forest Act of 1927, and section 28A set ‘social forestry’ rules that defined acts constituting 
social forestry, classes of social forestry, and minimum requirements for governing activities of 
social forestry.
 120
 It also included amendments and provisions that criminalized various actions 
perceived as harmful to social forestry. The provisional rules (the draft Social Forestry Rules 
2000) comprised detailed social forestry programs and were passed in 2004 amid protests by 
indigenous groups and environmental critics (Gain 2000:187-22). 
The social forestry project of Matamuhuri Reserve has two programs: horticulture 
resettlement and woodlot plantation.  Both programs ran concurrently for 4 years from 2002 to 
2006. Under the horticulture resettlement program, the Forest Department resettled a total of 124 
forest villager families that included 54 Marma, 67 Murucha and 3 Tripura families. Forest 
headman and Karbari selected the families from ‘bona fide’ forest villagers and their own 
relatives. Each family received a three-room house with a metal roof, 5 acres of upland in a 
block in the Reserve, and about Tk. 10,000 for both living and a horticultural grant.  The 
program further provided a community center and pond for the resettled villagers in Rizaroa and 
Meringdom. The community center is a one-storied concrete building with a hall, offices, and 
toilet, and came equipped with furniture, a color television, video cassette device (VCD) player, 
power generator, and water tank. Upon arriving in Rizaroa, I found that resettled families both in 
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 In its original version, section 28 of the Forest Act of 1927 set provisions for “Village Forests” that may be 
constituted in Reserved Forests with village communities as well as some of the provisional rules that may govern 
Village Forests and the communities including the benefits. The benefits included but were not limited to rights to 
timber, or other forest produce and pastures in the Villages Forests (MOA 1984).     
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Rizaroa and Meringdom were deeply concerned about a formal land and benefit agreement for 
the resettlement and were in conflict with the Forest Department over it. Most of the resettled 
families, excepting some Marma, failed to raise horticulture gardens and were thus using the land 
grant for jhum cultivation. They also considered the program a “lokbholana” or a deceptive act 
by the Forest Department to encourage forest villagers into the woodlot program. When I 
inquired at the Forest Department about the horticultural resettlement, the Director of Social 
Forestry of Forest Department denied any deception towards the forest villagers. It became clear 
to me that the resettlement was a ‘strategic’ move the Forest Department, partly because it was 
an integral part of the CHT component of FSP and also because there was funding from ADB for 
the resettlement scheme. As the Director of Social Forestry stated: 
After the failed negotiation between ADB, Forest Department and tribal leaders in 
Dhaka, we revised the CHT component of FSP as it was designed for USF land. In fact, it 
was not the revision of the project plan so to speak; we just put a slash after USF land and 
added reserved forests where it was needed to make the plan work for the reserved forests 
of CHT as well. I think that was the reason for the horticultural resettlement in 
Matamuhuri Reserve.  
 
I further understood through my conversation with the Director of Social Forestry that 
besides the USF of CHT from the 1980s to the 1990s, the Forest Department had tried 
horticultural resettlement once before, in the Reserve of Chittagong in the late 1970s, but had 
discontinued the policy. I also found a copy of the project titled “Further Extension of Social 
Forestry in the Chittagong Hill Tracts” – a follow up project of FSP that was to begin 
immediately, which confirmed the Forest Department’s policy on resettlement. Funded by the 
government, this social forestry extension project was intended to implement woodlot plantation 
in the Reserved Forests of CHT and ‘private land’ through the participation of communities, 
individuals and businesses. Therefore, it is no surprise that the horticulture program of 
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Matamuhuri Reserve remains in limbo and the Forest Department has not yet negotiated with the 
resettled forest villagers. In fact, the horticulture program cannot qualify as a social forestry 
program as defined by Section 28 A (2) of the Forest Act of 1927, unless there is a land 
agreement between the Forest Department and the resettled forest villagers.  
In contrast, the woodlot plantation program operated slightly better, with the participants 
receiving a Participant Benefit Sharing Agreement (PBSA), a formal group agreement with the 
Forest Department for participation of the communities. Under the program, the Forest 
Department raised 915 hectares of softwood plantation, mainly on low hills and slopes on the 
river banks, which was to be harvested within 30 years but no less than 10 years, depending on 
the authority of the Forest Department. The plantation included some old industrial species such 
as teak, gamar, and chikrasi, but was predominantly fast- growing species of akasmoni, hybrid, 
minjeeum, koroi, neem and rain trees, which are completely new and exotic to CHT. 
 
Table 5.4: Participation in Woodlot Plantation Scheme by Years, Ethnicity and Gender   
Ethnicity/Year 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06  Total by 
ethnicity 
 
% 
Ethnicity  
%  
Female 
by 
ethnicity 
 Female 
(Male) 
Female 
(Male) 
Female 
(Male) 
Female 
(Male) 
Bengali 0 (56) 12(92) 11(73) 14(28) 286 31.3 13 
Barua 0(0) 0(0) 0(2) 0(0) 2 0.2 0 
Murucha 4(110) 41(44) 2(6) 71(33) 311 34.0 38 
Marma 9 (67) 21 (7) 40(34) 8(34) 220 24.0 35 
Chama 0(0) 2(15) 2(14) 2(11) 46 5.0 13 
Tanchangya 0(0) 2(9) 2(12) 0(1) 26 2.8 15 
Tripura 0(4) 3(2) 2(0) 0(13) 24 2.6 21 
Column Total 13(237) 81(169) 59(141) 95(120) 915 100  
% Female of the Total 27 
Data: Matamuhuri Forest Range Office Record (Collected in November 2007).  
Based on the conventional policy of one participant per plantation hectare, the woodlot 
program has 915 participants, of whom 27 percent are female. Table 5.4 above shows the 
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participants by the year of participation, ethnicity and gender. A significant detail not presented 
in the Table is participants from the Reserve. I counted these from the participant lists and 
estimate that over 50 percent are from communities living outside the Reserve in Mouzas who 
are predominately Bengali, but include some Chakma, Marma and Tanchangya.  The Range 
Office and local political elites selected most of the participants, even though the law required 
the Forest Department to involve NGOs and citizens who would form a local body in the 
selection process. Bengalis and other participants living outside the Reserve in particular were 
selected by representatives of Union Councils, as well as by political party and community 
leaders; they included a large number of local government representatives, businessmen, and rich 
Bengali farmers. This clearly undermined both the policy prescription and the law that set out 
preferential selection of landless and other poor people. When I questioned the Range Officer 
about this, he defended the inclusion of Bengalis based on the grounds that they constituted 
stakeholders because they lived adjacent to the Reserve. He further justified political elite 
participation in the selection process, arguing that they represented an “advanced group of 
individuals” in leadership and were indispensable for motivation and mobilization of the 
participants. The Forest headman, however, claimed differently. He maintained that there was 
anticipation that the Bengali community would become violent, and that the Bengali community 
of Nyapara, in particular, had threatened to blockade the movement of forest employees and 
forest villagers to and from the Reserve and Alikadam Bazaar.  I would argue that other forces 
such as the army and local governments also played a role. In part, this was mainly because the 
Bengali community in Alikadam is an important demographic and highly mobilized interest 
group, and it is highly unlikely the government authorities would overlook their involvement in 
any development program in the Upazila.  
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In the Reserve, however, the Forest Department had a coercive policy for participant 
selection. Those who were part of the horticultural resettlement program became participants of 
the woodlot program by default, whereas other forest villagers, generally men in the vicinity of 
the woodlot plantation, were forced to join the program because they feared eviction from the 
Reserve.  
Significantly, I found that participation of communities in the woodlot program was 
subject to bureaucratic formalities and somewhat precarious. Plantation work was contracted out 
to Forest headman, Karbaris, and Bengali contractors, who forced the participants into 
compulsory labour that included three working days without wages for forest plantation; the 
Murucha were coerced more strongly than others in the communities. The Forest headman and 
Karbaris I interviewed considered labour without wages a “conventional” practice of work 
among forest villagers. More problematically, despite the critical importance of the woodlot 
plantation for social forestry programs, the participants were haphazardly grouped into so-called 
‘beneficiary groups’ as more of a formality than anything else, to monitor and protect the 
plantation.  Participants in a specific year were conveniently formed into groups of about 25 
individuals as their names appeared on the participant list irrespective of gender or ethnicity, and 
the PABS assigned residents specific blocks to protect and care for the woodlot plantation. 
According to the PABS, groups are collectively responsible for their block plantations and 
adjacent lands to provide care and prevent damage, fire, thievery and so forth; 80 percent of the 
plantation must be protected for entitlement to share in the income from the harvest. Ironically, 
most groups were not active, with the exception of Bengali participants whose groups are 
represented by Bengali elites and the Forest headmen. For example, upon interviewing 37 
participants that included men and women of Rizaroa and Meringdom, I found 80 percent of the 
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interviewees vaguely remembered their groups’ responsibilities for protecting the plantation but 
had forgotten their groups, the location of plantation blocks, or both. The remaining 20 percent 
were more knowledgeable, but had never met nor taken any action to protect the plantation 
excepting some occasional individual’ efforts.                 
This apparent failure of the groups was the result of the structure of the Forest 
Department. Historically and to the present, professional experts and bureaucrats have managed 
the Forest Department with semi-professional forest officers and untrained forest guards in the 
Ranges.  Beyond overseeing the regular annual plantation, the main activities in the Ranges have 
involved policing the forest at check stations on roads and waterways. Until recently, the Forest 
Department had no experience in operating grassroots development projects. Clearly, the Range 
Office of the Forest Department is not an appropriate agency for a social forestry program. The 
Foresters and Forest Guards are chiefly Bengali, do not speak the hill peoples’ languages, and 
have a highly pejorative disposition toward the hill peoples. In fact, communicative relations are 
rare and only occur between forest villagers and the Forest Department unless mediated by the 
Forest headmen and at times Karbaris. The following is from my fieldwork notes, a brief 
recollection of one of the Forest Department’s meetings with the participants of the woodlot 
program for the 2006 distribution of a PBSA document that I witnessed and participated in: 
A large gathering of participants of the hill peoples belonging to the Tripura, the 
Murucha, the Maram, the Chakma and the Tanchangya came from several villages to 
attend the meeting in the community center in Meringdom. Most of the villagers, mainly 
women and children, sat on the floor with the remainder either using a few available 
plastic chairs or standing. I sat with the other forest officers in decorative chairs, and we 
were separated from the villagers by a large table. The Range Officer, the Assistant 
Conservator of Forest (ACF), and Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) all gave lengthy 
speeches in the standard Bengali language. They attempted to explain the ‘social goods 
and economic benefits’ of the new social forestry program while repeatedly invoking fear 
of individual punishment and threat of collective economic loss if it failed. Throughout 
their speeches, both the ACF and DFO called jhum cultivation ‘the enemy of forest’ and 
urged the participating hill peoples to abandon the practice ‘to protect the land, soil and 
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forest of the Reserve.’ Since the Bengali language was unfamiliar to the participants, 
when Ukko Marma, the Forest headman, had the opportunity to deliver his speech, he 
summarily translated the earlier speeches into the Marma language. The Forest headman 
spoke in three languages during his short speech: Bengali, local Bengali, and his native 
Marma language. In the end, several PBSA documents were handed down to the 
participants in groups, and photos were taken.  All except the forest villagers and low 
ranking forest staff had snacks and tea in Meringdom followed by a lavish dinner at the 
Range Office. In hindsight, I consider the meeting an organized public ceremony 
completely disconnected from the audience in both language and communication, let 
alone the purposes for which the meeting had occurred. 
 
In sum, social forestry introduced a new legal regime into part of the Reserve.  It is meant 
to govern the land and forest, and it neither denies nor admits customary rights (or any right) of 
the forest villagers or other villagers to the land and forest in the Reserve in any form beyond the 
45 percent income from woodlot harvests. This share of income is further contingent upon the 
Forest Department’s authority and a number of stringent conditions of Social Forestry Rules of 
2004 and the Forest (Amendment) Act of 2000. There are two significant aspects of the Forest 
(Amendment) Act of 2000: 1): it criminalized many non-forest activities in the area of the social 
forestry program and the Reserved Forests with a provision that individuals be tried by a special 
magistrate; and, 2) it further empowered the Divisional Forest Officers (DFOs) with legal 
impunity of custodial power to try forest crimes (GOBD 2004).   
The effects of social forestry in the Matamuhuri Reserve have been the successful 
eradication of jhum lands around villages of forest villagers and jhum cultivation in the vicinity 
of the woodlot plantation. In turn, one third of the forest villagers of Kiwaypara and one villager 
of Rizaroa left their villages to move deeper into the interior part of the Reserve.  They did so in 
spite of receiving land and benefits under the resettlement program. Their lands and houses were 
occupied by Marma newcomers who pay rent, which is a new development in social relations in 
the rural setting of CHT. As I have shown in Table 5.3, a significant outcome of the woodlot 
plantation is an uneven effect on the livelihood strategies of the forest villagers.  The Murucha 
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forest villagers are becoming increasingly dependent on contract labourers for bamboo cutting 
leading to unsustainable logging of bamboo forest.  At the same time, the majority of the Marma 
forest villagers are turning to wage labour. Interestingly, the value of the plough land in the 
Reserve has also increased fourfold to Tk. 100,000 per acre because of lack of jhum land in the 
vicinity of social forestry, in turn setting off conflicts over Reserve lands (mainly plough lands in 
the Reserve). During my fieldwork in the Reserve I explored several of these conflicts, three of 
which were among the Marma, two between the Murucha and the Marma, and one among 
Bengalis, the Murucha and the Marma. Given that forest villagers have customary usufruct rights 
over the plough lands in the Reserve that they have subverted in practice for exchange, sale, and 
transfer of the lands, the land conflicts are mainly negotiated by Forest headmen and at times the 
army.  Many of these cases signal emerging patterns of land conflicts, and are generally hidden 
from the civil society of CHT; my local research assistant, Hla Marma, told me that his brother 
was murdered over a land conflict among kin members, and that it did not result in criminal 
charges.          
     Still, I anticipate that the most detrimental effect of social forestry in the Reserve will 
be ecological, relating to plantation techniques and technologies. The woodlot planation 
programs was primarily conducted on the banks of the Matamuhuri River in the northern 
boundary and around villages of the forest villagers which had already transformed by 
deforestation and cash crop cultivation with fertilizers and pesticides (see Photo 5.4 in Chapter 
V). In particular, the planting of new exotic species was undertaken on flat plains and hill slopes 
or flat low hills, and old industrial species on moderate high hills. Unlike the old taungya system, 
the plantation method used techniques that cut and cleared jungles, and at times bamboo forest in 
the plantation areas, without burning the vegetation and using fertilizers of urea, triple super 
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phosphate (T.S.P), and magnesium phosphate (M.P.).
121
 This completely wiped out the bamboo 
forest as bamboos failed to regenerate with the new plantation. The forest villagers also 
complained of unusual crop failures in plough lands around the plantation because the land was 
too dry. Additionally, vegetables (most importantly, ground potatoes
122
) commonly found in 
jungles became scarce. In sum, it is too early to evaluate with certainty the impacts of social 
forestry on the economy and ecology of forest villager communities, but we can conclude that it 
has pushed the Murucha forest villagers to their limits of survival. Many Murucha hoped that 
since they are part of the army’s militia, the army would eventually help them by limiting the 
further expansion of social forestry in the Reserve.   
    
5.6  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have dealt with recent social and ecological changes in the Matamuhuri 
Reserved Forest caused by the insurgency and counter-insurgency. Importantly, I have examined 
the practice of social forestry in the Reserve and how it has changed the old forest villagers’ 
system. I have shown that notwithstanding the global discourse of social or community forestry 
as “participatory management” of forest resources, the practice of social forestry in Matamuhuri 
Reserve is yet another form of state intervention and domination by the Forest Department. The 
laws regarding social forestry (namely the Forest Amendment Act of 2000 and the Social 
Forestry Rules of 2004) are coercive and the discourse of social forestry misplaces the 
concreteness of ‘social’ onto a policing agenda of the forest, which has been uncritically derived 
from the notion that deforestation is caused by ‘environmentally uncaring’ poor or indigenous 
                                                          
121
 According to the plantation journals of Matamuhuri Forest Range, there were 1500 kilograms of urea, 750 
kilograms of triple super phosphate and 375 kilograms magnesium phosphate used for a 50 hectare block plantation, 
i.e., 12 grams urea, 6 grams triple super phosphate and 3 grams magnesium phosphate per tree.   
122
 A ‘ground potato’ is a type of wild potato naturally found in CHT. 
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peoples. Ironically, the social forestry program by design and practice has no environmental 
program or conservation agenda. In fact, social forestry in the Matamuhuri Reserve created a 
commercial timber and/or fuel woods production zone. I submit that, while social forestry can 
meet the demand for timber and fuels and increase revenues for the Forest Department, it will 
prove to be social and ecological disaster for the hill peoples in the Reserve, particularly the 
Murucha.  
Given the example of the Matamuhuri Reserve, a pertinent question is whether other 
Reserved Forests of CHT have been altered in comparable ways. More importantly, if they are 
similar, what future does social forestry hold for the hill peoples living in the Reserved Forests of 
CHT? In response to the first question, other Reserved Forests of CHT (namely, Kassalong, 
Renikhyong and Sangu Reserves) are indeed much like the Matamuhuri Reserve and are 
occupied by the army and the hill peoples. However, the extent to which Kassalong and 
Renikhyong Reserves have been changed by the army, hill peoples’ settlements, and illegal 
logging, is as yet unknown. Local timber businessmen of Chokoria Upazila of Cox’s Bazar 
district conceded that during the post-Peace Treaty period, the Sangu Reserve was also logged 
illegally. It bears repeating that Sangu Reserve has not been under the formal management of the 
Forest Department since British rule and had been without policing by the Forest Department 
until the 1980s. It was transferred to the Bandarban Forest division from Chittagong Forest 
division in the late 1980s, and thus placed under a Range Office, but has remained without 
planned management because of difficult terrain and inaccessibility.  It is likely that the Sangu 
Reserve will remain inaccessible. It is also highly unlikely that the Forest Department will 
achieve successful campaigns for social forestry programs in Kassalong and Renikhyong 
Reserves, as the hill peoples’ political groups in the northern part of CHT are highly politically 
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mobilized. This means social forestry programs could remain confined to Matamuhuri Reserve, 
although they may extend to new Reserved Forests of CHT created in Mouzas during the war 
and insurgency, although they are disputed by the hill peoples. However, a more likely prospect 
for social forestry programs will be conflicts among three models of the programs in USF (or 
Mouzas): 1) a community based social forestry in cooperation with the Forest Department as 
envisioned by Social Forestry (Amendment) Rules 2010; 2) corporate and business led social 
forestry; 3) village common forest or VCF, an indigenous movement for common property 
resource management. I will consider this third possibility in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER VI 
“Saving the Village Common Forests”:The Politics of Indigenous Movement 
 
[A] commitment to native, traditional, and agro-ecological techniques found in 
intellectual currents in social science and development activism is often missing 
among indigenous peoples’ organizations: in its place is a commitment to 
reforming, adapting, and managing modernization. 
                       − Bebbington (1996). 
 
6.1  Introduction 
The title of this chapter is from a documentary, “Saving the Village Common Forests in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts.” Taungya, a local non-governmental organization (NGO) of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), produced the documentary in 2004 to promote village common 
forests (hereafter, VCFs) as an example of indigenous culture and customary forest management 
practice.
 
I watched the English version
123
 of the documentary first in mid-July, 2008 at the Head 
Office of Taungya in Rangamati while I participated in a day-long training and workshop session 
for Taungya’s staff during my fieldwork with Taungya (see Photo 6.1 below). The workshop was 
the formal beginning of the project, “Consolidating Community Rights over Natural Resources 
for Conservation of Environment and Sustainable Development.” The workshop was entirely a 
hill peoples’ event. Nikhilesh Chakma, a forestry studies graduate and the project coordinator, 
moderated the workshop; the trainee staff included both men and women and all were members 
of hill peoples’ communities. Among the resource persons were Moni Shopon Dewan, ex-deputy 
minister of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs, and Parash Kisha, a medical physician and the general 
secretary of Taungya. The founding chairperson of Taungya, Raja Devasish Roy, the sitting 
                                                          
123
 The documentary is also available in the Bengali and Chakma languages. The hill people themselves produced 
the script, music, photography, video, and narration in the documentary and it is the only one that I am aware of in 
the Bengali and Chakma languages. In the English version, the narrators are the Chakma chief, Devasish Roy, and 
Jessica Skinner, whose nationality I could not ascertain. 
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Chakma chief, was also listed as a resource person; however, he could not be present at the 
workshop as he had become an Assistant Advisor to the Chief Advisor of a military-backed civil 
interim government of the country. 
The documentary begins with a scene portraying the life of rural villages of hill peoples 
and then moves to selected presentations of historical narratives of CHT and the birth of village 
common forests. Below I offer a small excerpt from the documentary to give you a sense of its 
tone and content. 
Devasish Roy:  At one time, the greater part of the Chittagong Hill Tracts region was 
covered with dense tropical and subtropical forests, creeper and jungle. The indigenous 
people used to cultivate swidden or jhum on a rotational basis. Traditionally, large trees 
were never cut down. And, the same land was not cultivated for before a fallow period of 
at least 15 or 20 years. The land was abundant and the population was small. There was 
no need to distinguish between swidden land and forest. Any patch of the forest [could 
be] cut, burned, dried and cultivated through swidden method for rice, cotton, vegetable 
and fruits. Once left fallow, the swidden plot regenerated into a forest again. Gradually 
the situation changed. The population, number of settlements, markets and towns grew.  
During the 1870s, the British colonial government converted [the] first tract of natural 
forest into a mono plantation of teak by importing saplings and seeds from nearby 
Burma. The large forest and plantation was re-designated as a reserved forest and given 
over to the new Department of Forest for management and protection. And, even today, a 
quarter of the hill tracts are classified as reserved forest and administered by the Forest 
Department. However, these reserved forests did not remain protected. As the human 
population grew, the natural vegetation and wildlife began to diminish, many species of 
animal and birds went extinct. [...]  The need for special measures to retain forest cover 
was now felt even more acutely.   
 
Jessica Skinner: The scarcity of land and natural forest produce had actually begun to be 
felt even before the British colonial government left in 1947. Elders met to devise new 
ways of protecting their natural resources. The reserve [i.e. VCF] was an innovation 
based upon their traditional resource management pattern to retain forest cover around 
the settlement for long term use. This gave birth to the village common forests of today 
which are not allowed to be cultivated for swidden or otherwise by the communities 
themselves on the strength of sanction and religious taboos. 
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Photo 6.1: Training workshop for Taungya’s staff in Taungya’s Office, Rangamati.   
 
In its most common usage, village common forests (VCFs) refer to small patches of 
common land in Unclassed State Forest (USF). Generally, VCFs hold some forest cover and are 
part of USF land which has not been settled by individuals, businesses or state agencies; the 
forests are managed traditionally by headmen and at times by Karbari for everyday use as fuels 
or other household necessities. Currently, there exist over a hundred VCFs, mostly in the 
territory of the Chakma chief’s circle, covering the entire Rangamati district and part of 
Khagrachhari district. However, until recently, the existence of VCFs had been little known 
beyond CHT; they first became public knowledge briefly in the 1998 Rangamati Declaration 
(Gain 2002:187-222), and then later in 2001 when an elaborated account of VCFs was co-
authored by Raja Roy, the Chakma chief (Roy and Halim, 2001). In fact, the leadership and 
indigenous activism of Raja Roy played an instrumental role in bringing awareness of VCFs not 
only to the wider public but also to urban indigenous activists of the hill peoples. Asish Chakma, 
a member of Taungya, explains this as he described to me his own surprise on discovering the 
VCFs:  
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Khairul: How and when did you come to know VCFs? 
Asish: Rajababu (Raja Devasish Roy) told me in early 1998. 
Khairul: What did Raja Roy tell you and why? 
Asish: I was the founding member of Taungya and Rajababu was my boss. So he told me 
to visit Beganachari village in Barkal Upazila and talked to a local Union Council’s 
Chairman for assistance for video recording a VCF and village elders. I did not know 
what a VCF was. Rajababu explained it with few words and told me to see it with my 
own eyes.  So I went to Shuvolong and met the local Chairman and then to Beganachari. 
We [taped] the VCF in Beganchari and interviewed the village elders in their seventies. 
The elders called the VCF reserved or rajdhani, and they said they had had it for a long 
time: ‘parents or grandparents must have kept it in the way it is now; we take bamboo 
and at times trees when one needs them.’ They knew it was not a government reserved 
forest, and I was very shocked that I did not know much of our own people and culture!  
Khairul: Could you tell a bit more about why you taped the VCF and interviewed elders? 
Asish: Oh yes! I do not know for sure but I think a Danish ambassador came to CHT after 
the Peace Treaty. Rajababu must have talked to him about VCFs. I believe the video tape 
was meant for the ambassador.  
Khairul: Do you know how Raja Roy came to know about VCFs? 
Asish: No, I do not know. But I think he must have known everything in his area, should 
he not? You know there is a standing order [of the Deputy Commissioner] of the 1960s 
and Rajababu knew it, and the [political] environment has not been conducive for him to 
work until now.             
  
Since 2003, Taungya has undertaken several programs and strategies to protect the VCFs, 
including reforming their traditional management. The project of “Consolidating Community 
Rights over Natural Resources for Conservation of Environment and Sustainable Development” 
(hereafter, the second VCF project) was the second phase and continuation of an earlier project 
titled “A Pilot Project on the Protection of Village Common Forest in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: 
A Project on Watershed Management” (hereafter, the pilot project). The pilot project was 
completed in 2005 and the second VCF project was planned for completion in December 2010. 
Both projects are funded by the Human Rights and Good Governance Program Support Unit of 
the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Dhaka.  
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A social current that connects Taungya, the VCF projects, and the documentary is an 
indigenous movement of the hill peoples led by the Chakma chief and Chakma elites of CHT. In 
this chapter, I describe the creation of Taungya, its VCF projects, and the way Taungya has 
mobilized grassroots actors such as women, rural peasants, and jhum cultivators of the hill 
peoples for the “alternative development” of forest resource management through the VCF 
projects. I argue that the VCF projects have been motivated by a number of overlapping political, 
ideological and theoretical agendas. Clearly, the political objectives are to defend customary 
control over the remaining common land in USF against market and state forces. The ideological 
agendas are intended to reform the management, customary rights and practices of VCFs towards 
a village council of men and women for the conservation of VCFs as well as the well-being of 
rural village communities. This approach to VCFs is also couched in terms of theoretical or 
conceptual understandings of hill peoples’ indigeneity, their cultural differences with Bengalis 
and the state, and to some degree their social and political autonomy (Roy 2002; 1994).  
This account of Taungya’s VCF movement relates to several current themes in political 
ecology, namely indigeneity, NGOs, and alternative development (Brosius et al.2008; Dwivedi 
1998; Escobar 1995; Routledge 1993; Rangan 2004; Tsing et al. 1999). In engaging the debate 
concerning these themes, I agree with other scholars about the danger of romantic, idealized and 
reified representations of traditional or indigenous communities and knowledge (Agrawal, A 
1995; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Li 1996, 2000; Mccay 2001; Sinha et al. 1997; Tsing 1999) 
and the potential legal and political consequences of the racialization of resources, spaces and 
governance (Vandergeest 2003). Following Li, I consider communities or indigenous 
communities not as alternatives to market, state, or growth-oriented development, but rather as 
part of such development (Li 2001; 2002). I also acknowledge, as Li convincingly argues, that at 
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the heart of the indigenous movement for identity and customary or collective rights over lands 
and resources is a liberal notion of protecting vulnerable ethnic groups from capitalist 
dispossession. She suggests that this liberal notion of protectionism upheld by the leaders of the 
indigenous movement is hardly different from the paternalistic protectionism of the colonial state 
and can still be found when indigenous people are governed by members of their own group or 
NGOs (Li 2010). However, as the case of the VCF movement will illustrate, I argue that there 
are clear analytical differences between indigenous activists’ resistance to dispossession and 
states’ agendas of “managing dispossession” (Li, 2010), an important difference is in their 
approaches to conservation and development.  
In what follows, first I discuss the context and conjunctures of Taungya. In particular, I 
examine the emergence of indigenous movements and non-governmental organizations in CHT 
as civil society actors that articulate ethnicity, politics and forest resource management for 
alternative development. Second, I examine the origins of VCFs in order to trouble the idea of 
VCFs as an indigenous or traditional entity and show how such entities are in fact produced at 
the intersection of competing politics and resource conflicts. Third, I discuss Taungya’s pilot 
VCF project, explore the project intervention (its agendas, rationalities and programs) and look 
at the ways the project was implemented and the compromise that emerged. Finally, I consider 
the effect and limits of the VCF project and the movement. In sum, this chapter offers an 
example of an indigenous movement of the hill peoples and illustrates how hill peoples’ 
indigeneity is articulated with an environmental issue of forest conservation. This indigenous 
movement is a South Asian case that resonates more with those of Southeast Asian indigenous 
movements that are brilliantly described by Li (2000) and Tsing (1999b) (but compare Baviskar 
1997, 2001; Karlsson and Subba 2006; Guha 2000; Rangan 2004; Shah 2007; Shiva, 1989; Shiva 
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and Bandypadhyay 1992). It will show that the indigenous identity of the hill peoples is more of 
an “articulation” by elites (Li 2000), and the issue in the articulation of VCFs and indigeneity is 
more about power and the exercise of customary rights over the land and forest resources than a 
desire to live as “indigenous” and unchanged traditional rural communities. Nevertheless, a 
potential outcome of the indigenous movement and its opposition to state forestry is the 
expansion of political forests at the expense of remaining jhum land; in effect it risks further 
dispossession (see and compare Walker 2001).   
  
6.2  Taungya and an Indigenous Movement of the Hill peoples  
Currently, there exist several networks of indigenous movements of the hill peoples, one of 
which is Taungya, which is led and dominated by the traditional and political elites of the 
Chakma. Taungya was first established in 1995 by Raja Roy, the sitting Chakma chief, as a 
proto-political organization called, “The Committee for the Protection of Indigenous Culture”. 
At that time Raja Roy was rising in prominence as a leader of an indigenous movement of the 
country. In 1996, the Committee changed its name to Taungya to claim to represent the 
indigenous culture of jhum cultivators and their relations to forests, assuming that taungya 
cultivation is an indigenous tradition. In 1998, it registered as a non-governmental organization 
(NGO) with the Department of Social Welfare and afterwards with the NGO Affairs Bureau in 
2001 (Taungya n. d.).  
The foundation of Taungya as a specific organization of hill peoples’ indigenous 
movements and later as an NGO is concurrent and connected to many recent changes in the 
political process in CHT in relation to complex national and international conjunctures. Events at 
the national level were: the emergence of indigenous movements of the hill peoples and their 
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position concerning culture, resources and territory; the hill peoples’ movement against land and 
forest policies in general and the social forestry program in particular; and the opening up of the 
economy of CHT to NGOs following the Peace Treaty of 1997 after the long isolation of the 
region due to insurgency and counterinsurgency. The international conjunctures included the 
United Nations and multinational banks’ discourses on indigenous rights and “sustainable” 
development.  
The indigenous movements of the hill peoples began in 1993 with the first International 
Year of the Indigenous People (see also, Chowdhury 2008). At this momentous time, the specific 
national agenda that mobilized indigenous groups, environmental NGOs, and indigenous elites 
and activists was the Forestry Sector Master Plan. Financed by the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Master Plan was completed 
in 1993, producing twenty-one special reports and a Five Year Action Plan called the Forestry 
Sector Project (1996-2001). Importantly, the plan formulated policies, strategies and action plans 
for a period of twenty years (1993-2012) according to the global discourse of sustainable 
resource management supported by the United Nations and other transnational organizations 
(e.g. World Bank, ADB, IUCN). By March 1993, the executive summary of the master plan and 
a draft of a new national forest policy based on the master plan were available to the public and 
civil society organizations (GOBD 1993a).
124
 Significant aspects of the master plan proposals 
and the new forest policy included aggressive forest plantation programs in partnership with 
communities, NGOs, and private business; these programs would bring 20 percent of the 
country’s land under forest cover, from an existing 17 percent. Of this 17 percent “forest land”, 
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The financial assistance was conditional on the government adopting a new forest policy as well as amending the 
Forest Act of 1927, the age old British forest rule, in order to institutionalise “social forestry rules” in law. In 2000, 
the government passed the Forest Amendment Act 2000 that included provisional rules of social forestry (see 
Chapter V). 
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little less than two-thirds was without any tree cover and was completely deforested. It is worth 
mentioning here that the existing forest areas excluding the Sundarbans, Chittagong and Cox’s 
Bazar were inhabited by the country’s indigenous peoples. The master plan declared these forest 
areas to be “Ecologically Stressed Zones” (GOBD 1993b); this included Unclassed State Forests 
(USF) of CHT which for the most part had already been alienated from common land and given 
to individuals, businesses and the Forest Department by the 1980s (see Chapter IV).  
Critical to the emergence of hill peoples’ indigenous movements (as well as other 
indigenous movements in Bangladesh) was the role of NGOs, especially the Society for 
Environment and Human Development (SEHD). Interestingly, SEHD was formed in the early 
part of 1993 by a journalist of a Dhaka-based English weekly magazine to promote indigenous 
issues and environmental justice in Bangladesh. In particular, SEHD organized a national 
seminar on “Forest and Forest Peoples” in 1994, aiming to articulate indigenous agendas 
including the opposition against the new forest policies. In 1996, this concern was followed up 
by an international seminar entitled “Property, Property Rights and Politics and Economics of 
Life” attended by the prominent subaltern scholar, Professor Gayatri Spivak, along with many 
other scholars and activists.
125
 More significantly, on December 18-20, 1997 (just weeks after the 
Peace Treaty) SEHD, the Bangladesh Indigenous and Hill People Association for Advancement, 
Dhaka (BIHPAA) and Minority Rights Group International, London (MRG) organized a national 
roundtable conference called the “Adivasi Question of Bangladesh”. This conference resulted in 
the formation of the National Adivasi Co-ordination Committee (NACC), the first national 
network of the indigenous groups of the country, headed by Raja Roy.  
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 This seminar was organised by SEHD along with three leading NGOs of Bangladesh; for seminar proceedings, 
see Ali (1997). 
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The issue that seems to have prompted Raja Roy into joining the indigenous movements 
were local concerns that arose in early 1992, when the government had begun the legal process 
of the reservation of forest land in USF that was being taken by the Forest Department for forest 
plantation and resettlement programs during the counterinsurgency war (see Chapter IV). To 
protest this government policy, Raja Roy wrote a letter to the Ministry of Environment and 
Forest (MOEF) in 1992, expressing concerns about the reservation. In September 1993, he 
followed it with another letter in which he critiqued the forest plantation programs and made 
both legal and political arguments against them.
126
 This reservation of USF land seems to have 
been the moment of awakening for the Chakma chief, when he found the connection between 
forests and land alienation of hill peoples whom he later discovered as “indigenous” (Roy 1994).  
Raja Roy’s participation in the indigenous movement also relates to the tradition of 
political activism and rebellion of the Chakma chiefs since the Mughal period, as well as the 
political dynamics of the insurgency and war in CHT. In the early years of the insurgency, Raja 
Roy was inaugurated as chief of the Chakma circle at the age of eighteen in 1977, replacing his 
father Raja Tridiv Roy. Raja Tridiv Roy had settled in Pakistan because of his pro-Pakistan role 
during Bangladesh’s war of liberation after Bangladesh achieved independence. It is worth 
repeating that the inauguration of Raja Roy as the Chakma chief was followed by a period of 
intense insurgency, accusations of genocide of the hill peoples, Bengali settlement, and 
counterinsurgency development throughout the 1980s. Besides regional autonomy, the political 
programs of the insurgency also aimed to replace the traditional administration system in the 
region with a representative democratic government (see Chapter IV).
127
 The situation meant a 
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 Roy shared copies of these letters with me during our meeting in June 2007. 
127
 It is important to note that the JSS gave up its opposition to the hill chiefs during the negotiation of peace talks 
during the late 1980s. The Peace Treaty further recognized the chiefs’ role in the administration of CHT as advisors 
to the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs as well as to the Regional Council.     
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huge loss of family land and income for the new Chakma chief at a time when the future of the 
chiefs’ positions remained uncertain. Nonetheless, Raja Roy continued pursuing higher 
education in Bangladesh and later in the United Kingdom until 1985 graduating in law; and in 
1988, he joined the Bangladesh Supreme Court as a barrister. 
The Peace Treaty of 1997 marked the most important event in the history of CHT since it 
became part of Bangladesh. The Peace Treaty broke down decades of isolation of the region and 
led to an end of the de-facto military regime while opening avenues for development programs 
as well as local government administrations and civil political activism. In particular, it 
significantly changed the scope, organization, and agendas of the indigenous movements of the 
hill peoples. The process that contributed the most to these changes was the opening of the 
economy of CHT to NGOs and a new development regime of transnational aid agencies, namely, 
the CHT Consortium (UNDP n. d.). Led by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
the CHT Consortium made the NGOs the primary locus of the development process and 
institutional practice. This resulted in the unprecedented growth of local non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in CHT, varying in sizes, structures, and skills.
128
 The process also led to 
the growth of specific types of local NGOs concerning the indigenous movements of the hill 
peoples and, in some other instances, the process led to the transformation of indigenous 
organizations into NGOs, as in the case of Taungya. In turn, several local and national networks 
of indigenous movements emerged, including the NACC as mentioned earlier.  
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 Besides national and transnational NGOs, more than a hundred local NGOs currently exist in the region. That 
number is based upon official records of NGOs in the three districts of CHT that I collected through the Deputy 
Commissioner (DC) Office of Rangamati District in July 2008. My statement about the growth of the NGOs as 
unprecedented is based on consideration of the period during which these local NGOs emerged and also the 
population size of the region. For example, in Alikadam Upazila, there are seventeen NGOs for 40,000 people, 
about half of whom live inside the Matamuhuri Reserve Forest (see Chapter V).  
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Until 2000, the NACC (National Adivasi Co-ordination Committee) led the indigenous 
movement of Bangladesh (including hill peoples) for political recognition and rights over forest 
resources and land. Until then, the indigenous movement of the hill peoples was mostly 
represented by the Chakma chief and participation among the hill peoples was limited to urban 
student activists. This movement was also primarily centred in Dhaka, the capital city, where the 
main program was a day-long celebration of World Indigenous Day which included a colourful 
rally in the streets of Dhaka, seminars, and discussions with national and international 
dignitaries. In 2002, some members left the NACC to form the Bangladesh Indigenous Peoples 
Forum (BIPF), with the guerrilla leader of the JSS, J. B. Larma, as its president. The 
participation of the JSS in the indigenous movements of the country changed the field of forces: 
BIPF became the national network of indigenous movements advancing a common agenda of 
gaining constitutional recognition for the indigenous groups; in turn, the NACC lost its national 
position and its agenda converged with the work of Taungya. In 2006, another network within 
the overall indigenous movement, Bangladesh Adivasi Odhikar Andolon (BAOA), was formed 
by left-leaning Bengali academics and public intellectuals who have long been associated with 
the indigenous peoples through RDC (Research and Development Collective), an advocacy 
NGO.  
Taungya’s differences with the BAOA and BPIF lay partly in organizational structure, 
ideology and agenda. The BAOA is mainly a Dhaka-based national civil society organization 
advocating for indigenous peoples’ political and cultural rights. An intrinsic ideology of the 
BAOA movement is South Asian Marxism and an orientalist historiography.
 129
 This ideology 
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 I was present in the meeting when the BAOA was formed in 2006 and my views on the BAOA are built on my 
familiarity with the movement leaders and critical position on the left movement in Bangladesh. In part my critical 
view is shared by young indigenous activists of CHT (see Khisa, D. 2008).     
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considers the indigenous peoples of South Asia to be pre-Aryan original inhabitants of South 
Asia from whom Bengalis, the dominant group of Bangladesh (and West Bengal and Tripura of 
India), are descended as a “mixed race.” The BAOA movement mainly targets progressive 
sections of the Bengali political classes to advance indigenous peoples’ causes while framing 
indigenous issues in terms of the protection of secularism and social justice in the country, both 
of which are core ideological components of Bengali nationalism. However, a concern is that the 
leaders of BAOA hold a paternalistic view of indigenous communities and they appear to 
consider themselves ‘organic intellectuals’ best suited to lead and represent indigenous peoples.  
The indigenous movement of the BIPF represents the special interests of different 
indigenous networks, groups and NGOs; within these networks, the hill peoples are represented 
by the JSS (the former insurgency movement). The main objective of the JSS in joining the 
overall indigenous movement is to mobilize the support of both national and internal NGOs, civil 
society activists and the other indigenous groups for full implementation of the Peace Treaty. 
The party views BIPF as a political platform for “peaceful political action” in its struggle for 
“self determination” and democratic governance in CHT. However, J.B. Larma insisted in an 
interview with me that “the party has not completely given away the option to return to armed 
resistance and guerrilla war, if the government does not implement the treaty fully.” 
Significantly, the JSS still holds an ethno-nationalist political position and views the hill peoples 
as a “Jumma nation”; it thus aims for the recognition of the hill peoples as a “Jumma nation” 
with a constitutional guarantee which the Peace Treaty denied them.  
Taungya’s indigenous movement and its ascent to fame largely hinges upon the political 
activism of the Chakma chief Raja Roy and the ways he embraced social and ecological issues, 
articulating alternative strategies of resource use and development. Since 1994, Raja Roy has 
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attended and presented papers at a number of conferences worldwide, including the Asian 
Development Bank’s and World Bank’s reviews on indigenous policies, while sitting regularly 
in sessions of the Working Groups on Indigenous Population (WGIP) at the United Nations.
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Importantly, he has more than twenty publications, mainly written in English, including book 
chapters, journal and newspaper articles, reports and short notes.
131
 Key themes throughout his 
writings are land, forests, traditional administration and customary rights. These are what Li calls 
“a capacity to present cultural identity and local knowledge in forms intelligible to outsiders”; Li 
argues this capacity is an important condition for the cultural and political work of articulation of 
indigenous identity (Li 2000:169). I would argue that this capacity is critical not only for the 
articulation of indigenous identity but also for the articulation of an alternative indigenous 
agenda of development and indigenous movements.     
 
6.3  The Origins of VCFs:  Indigenous Invention vs. State Regulation 
The claim that VCF was invented in the second quarter of the twentieth century by “indigenous 
elders” based on indigenous custom is questionable and partial at best. Relying primarily on my 
fieldwork with VCF communities, interviews with Taungya’s VCF staff, and the contexts of the 
existing VCF localities, I argue that even as an idea the VCF is first and foremost an invention of 
state regulation as opposed to indigenous elders (compare Agrawal, A 2005). The practice of 
VCFs seems to have begun following the construction of the Kaptai dam in 1962 and was shaped 
by the strategic positioning of the insurgency movement and counterinsurgency development in 
its local settings. To support my argument, first I examine the meanings of the local names of 
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 This statement is in part based on my interview with Raja Roy in June 2007 and also on reading publications and 
conference papers supplied by Raja Roy during the interview.  
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 This statement is based on the lists of publications and conference papers supplied by Raja Roy during my 
interview with him in June 2007. 
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VCFs and I then go on to examine the textual origins of the VCFs. Finally, I provide a contextual 
analysis of the existing VCF localities based on the inventory report of VCFs prepared by 
Taungya. 
Village common forests (VCFs) are a neologism, known locally among the Chakma as 
service bon, or at times, rajdhani. Service bon is a hybrid term of the English word service and 
Bengali word bon, meaning forests. Service bon literally means forests for service. The name 
derives from the practice of privileges for headmen, the service holders of the traditional 
administration who were allowed by the Regulation of 1900 to keep certain areas of USF as 
forest common lands in their Mouzas according to their positions without paying tax for it to the 
government. On this consideration, service bon is a forest area in USF under headmen or at times 
under Karbaris for their service to the government and are not taxable. The term rajdhani is a 
Bengali word meaning the capital city. The appropriation of the term rajdhani to refer to 
“common forest” underscores, first of all, the centrality of this resource to the community, and 
importantly, the position and power of headmen or Karbaris who control it. Both local names 
signify a place of resource whose meaning depends upon the traditional authorities’ control of 
the resource. Since the positions of traditional administration were only invented by the British 
in the last quarter of the 19
th
 century and crystallized through the Regulation of 1900, they 
cannot be reduced to being simply “sovereign indigenous elders” outside of the state’s power and 
legal sanction.  
The textual origins of the VCFs, or the appearance of them in written language, can be 
identified with precision to the amendment of rule 41 of the Regulation of 1900 in 1939; the rule 
was intended to empower the Deputy Commissioner of CHT to regulate and control jhum 
cultivation and the migration of jhum cultivators from one Mouza to another. The rule also 
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included provisions to empower headmen to keep some areas of common USF land as a Mouza 
reserve of bamboo, timber and other forest products. The contexts and rationalities of rule 41A 
require further research, but the detailed provisions of the rule and the Deputy Commissioner’s 
Annual Report of 1939-40 suggest that the provisions were meant as a regulatory instrument 
aimed to encourage headmen to take care of the future domestic needs of the hill peoples of their 
Mouza (GOB 1941: 11). The provision reads: 
41A. The Headman is responsible for the conservation of the resources of his mouza. For 
this purpose any headman may-  
 
a) prohibit the removal of bamboos, timber and other forest produce by residents of his 
mouza other than for their domestic purposes or by non residents for any purposes;  
b) exclude any area or areas in his mouza from the jhuming area with a view to keeping 
such area as a mouza reserve of bamboos, timber and other forest produce;   
c) prevent newcomers from cutting jhums in his mouza, if in his opinion their doing so 
[is] likely to result in a scarcity for jhum for his own tenants in future years; and 
d) prevent any person from grazing cattle in his mouza when such grazing is harmful to 
his jhuming area (GOBD n. d.).     
 
A subsequent text to this rule was a1965 executive order of the Deputy Commissioner 
under rule 7 of the Regulation of 1900. In part, the order clarifies the status of VCFs in the past, 
while providing specific directives to all headmen to maintain village common forest in their 
Mouza. 
It has come to my notice that due to the indiscriminate felling of trees and cutting of 
bamboos all over the Unclassed State Forest of this district there are hardly any timber 
and bamboos resources available in the mouzas for meeting the domestic need of the 
mouza people. In the past it was the practice to maintain a small reserve in most of the 
mouzas under the control of mouza headmen for meeting the requirements of the mouza 
people for their own use. But since this practice has given up the people are facing 
extreme hardship in finding these materials for construction of their houses and for 
meeting other domestic needs. It is, therefore, found expedient to keep certain areas in 
each mouza as Reserve so that mouza people may not have any difficulty in getting these 
forest produce readily available from the mouza reserve according to the needs with the 
permission of the Headmen concerned. [...] It is, therefore, ordered that in each mouza 
there shall be maintained a mouza reserve by headmen/karbaries concerned to be 
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administered by the mouza headmen. No timber or bamboos or other forest produce from 
this shall be allowed for the purpose of sale. The area of the reserve should be 
approximately 100 acres per mouza whether in one block or more. It may be convenient 
to have a number of blocks contiguous to bigger paras whose administration may be 
delegated by the Headmen to the local Karbaries. [...] It will be responsibility of the 
headmen not only to protect these reserves from any illegal felling but also to plant up the 
area with suitable species (Reprinted in Taungya 2002:22).    
  
This order was issued following the havoc caused by the Kaptai dam and its aftermath in the 
displacement and resettlement of the hill peoples. As shown in Chapter III, one of the 
government policies of resettlement was jhum control or the gradual elimination of jhum 
cultivation in favor of horticulture plantation. This policy of jhum control had a different agenda 
of improvement than the conservation of VCFs solely for the needs of the hill peoples and their 
traditional practices. A comprehensive reading of the Deputy Commissioner’s Order makes this 
point and the last sentence of the statement clearly illuminates it. Still, Taungya reproduces these 
texts out of context in order to use them as evidence that VCF are an indigenous invention. 
Taungya further argues that these texts are in effect the colonial state’s recognition of prior 
indigenous customs. The problem with this argument is not only that it is purely theoretical, as I 
show below, but also that it says little or nothing about the field of forces that led to the practices 
of VCFs other than the sovereign wills of “indigenous elders” based on indigenous customs. 
As I began to read VCF files in Taungya’s Office, especially the inventory report of the 
existing VCFs, I found the claim of VCFs as “indigenous invention by elders” even less credible. 
The inventory was conducted by indigenous staff of Taungya through key informant discussion 
(KID)
132
 and surveys of forest sites with the participation of local village communities, with 
financial assistance from the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development 
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 Taungya’s reports claimed that it also used focus group discussion (FGD) in addition to key informant discussion 
(KID) and surveys. It seemed to me the term focus group discussion (FGD) is misunderstood in its objectives and 
strategies; in Taungya’s usage, informal or formal group discussion is referred to as “focus group discussion.” 
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(ICIMOD). The inventory report is a rich documentation of local knowledge of VCFs in CHT. It 
contains details of the VCFs’ administrative contexts (i.e. Upazila, Union, and Mouza), land 
area, species, the year of preservation, communities, population, local social and cultural 
institutions, distances from administrative centers, maps, and more. According to the inventory 
report, there are about one hundred and twenty seven (127) VCFs in CHT; most of them are in 
Rangamati district of the region, with as many as five (5) in Khagrachhari district and eight (8) in 
Bandarban district. However, the inventory could only report details of eighty eight (88) VCFs 
including the five in Khagarchari district but none of the Bandarban district. In terms of 
traditional administrative divisions of the region, all the VCFs fall within the boundary of the 
Chakma chief’s circle. Considering civil administrative units, the VCFs of Rangamati district are 
located only in four Upazilas out of the district’s ten Upazilas. Of these, more than half (47) are 
located in Barkal Upazila, almost a quarter (20) in Langadu Upazila, about one eighth (10) in 
Naniarchar Upazila and as many as five (5) in Rangamati Sadar Upazila. The VCF of 
Khagrachhari district belongs to Dighinala Upazila, one of the district’s seven Upazilas (see 
Table 6.1 below). Most importantly, all the VCFs are reported as being inhabited by members of 
the Chakma community, as I found in Beganachari and Nahbhanga during the fieldwork.   
The ethnic dimension and spatial distribution of the VCFs raise more questions than 
answers to the claim of VCFs as indigenous custom. In particular, the prevalence of VCFs 
among only the Chakma seemed puzzling at first. This is partly because the Chakma have been 
the group representing the settled agrarian community and economically better off among the hill 
peoples since the British occupation (Hutchinson, 1909; Ishaq, 1971). Currently, the Chakma are 
the group with the least number of jhum cultivators, only 18 percent
133
 (Tripura, P. and A. 
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 The incidences of jhum cultivation among the other hill peoples groups are: the Murucha, 90 percent; the Pankho, 
the Lushai, and the Khumi, 80 percent; the Bawm, 70 percent; the Tripura, 53 percent; the Tanchangya, the Khyang 
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Harun, 2003:79). Moreover, the Chakma have had higher literacy rates, education and political 
mobilization compared to other groups of the hill peoples since 1965 (Bertocci 1996). Kisha, the 
general secretary of Taungya, holds that the Chakma are increasingly becoming an urban 
community and the majority of the urban Chakma have given up their traditional lifestyle and 
culture to “follow Bengali urban middle classes.”134  
Interestingly, the prevalence of VCFs among the Chakma in the territory of the Chakma 
chief’s circle soon became a guiding question of my inquiry that led to the unknotting of several 
threads of the materiality of VCFs practices. On reflection, I gathered that what differentiated the 
Chakma and the Chakma chief’s circle from other groups in CHT was the scale, intensity and 
high participation of the Chakma in the insurgency. Thus, I interviewed Asish Chakma, a 
founding member of Taungya, to explore the role of the insurgency movement in the practice of 
VCFs. Asish had worked with Taungya from 1998 to 2005 in various capacities, beginning as a 
grassroots activist and later becoming a field supervisor of the pilot project. He was also a key 
agent for the survey of the VCFs of Barkal, Langadu, and Rangamati Sadar Upazilas for the 
VCFs inventory report.  
My interview with Asish was not as informative as I had wished. He began repeating 
Taungya’s popular narratives with his intimate knowledge of the VCFs and personal stories of 
how he had helped the inventory report.  He also carefully avoided answering my question of 
why there are more VCFs among the Chakma in some Upazilas than among the other groups and 
Upazilas. Eventually, Asish did open up to the question to speak his mind. In answer to the 
question, he surmised three reasons: First, there were relatively sufficient common jhum lands in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and the Chak, 50 percent; and the Marma, 30 percent (Tripura, P and A. Harun, 2003:79; percentage numbers are 
averaged and rounded). 
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 Interview with me, July 4-6, 2008. 
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the areas. Second, the villages were more permanent. Finally, during the insurgency movement, 
there was a strict ban imposed by the JSS, the insurgent political party, against cutting down the 
jungle area. On the point of the JSS, he further confirmed that during the insurgency the JSS had 
set up an alternative to the traditional administrative system in villages in order to control jhum 
cultivation and other economic activities. “They used the jungle for hiding out and keeping the 
arms and ammunition safe and protected from the army. Perhaps, it was from the time of the 
insurgency that the social values of keeping VCFs emerged.” Naturally, I asked a follow up 
question about the role of traditional values and ideas about the care of forests and environment. 
Asish replied: “Yes, I think there may be some thinking of environment, if not all about the 
forests or conservation. Indigenous people do think about streams and water and do know that 
streams need shadow and jungle otherwise they would dry out. There are VCFs in and around 
streams, and I think that could be another reason too.”  
I find Asish’s theory to be the most plausible explanation of the conjuncture and agencies 
shaping the practice of VCFs, taking into consideration the counter- insurgency development 
which alienated much of USF common lands for Bengali resettlement, expansion of forest 
plantation, and businesses (see Chapter IV). For example, let us consider the locations of VCFs 
in Rangamati and Khagrachhari districts. In Rangamati district, the territories of all the four 
Upazilas with VCFs (Rangamati Sadar, Naniarchar, Langadu and Barkal) fall in between the 
Kassalong and Renikhyong Reserved Forests and are located along the Karnaphuli River and its 
tributaries of Kassalong and Maini, and in part submerged by the Kaptai Lake (see Appendix A: 
Map 7). Therefore, apart from some thousands of acres of fringe land in the valleys regulated by 
the Kaptai dam water regime, much of the cultivable land areas in these localities are composed 
of ranges of low and high hills. Dighinala Upazila of Khagrachhari district, on the other hand, is 
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located in the northwest part of the region and includes a large part of Kassalong Reserved Forest 
(see Appendix A: Map 2). Although Dighinala Upazila includes plough lands in valleys and low 
hill valleys, more than half of its cultivable areas are also formed by low and high hills without 
valleys (ADB 2001a: 85-92). Of all these Upazilas, Barkal Upazila to the east and Dighinala 
Upazila to the north of CHT were considered to be frontier base camps of the insurgents 
bordering the Indian states of Mizoram and Tripura respectively, and were connected by the 
Karnaphuli River and its tributaries. They had also been major sites of insurgency and counter- 
insurgency violence and alleged genocide. The effects of violence in terms of displacement and 
dispossession of the hill peoples in these Upazilas are yet to be ascertained. However, according 
to the records of refugees returning following the Peace Treaty, 65,000 hill peoples had taken 
refuge in India during the insurgency and they all were from the Rangamati and Khagrachhari 
districts of the region. The overwhelming majority of the returning refugees were Chakma while 
the remaining refugees were Tripura and Marma. An important note to this account of refugees is 
that it excludes the people who briefly took refuge in India but were made to return to CHT, and 
also people who were internally displaced. Regarding the counter-insurgency development 
discussed in Chapter IV, the entire region of CHT had gone through strategic deployment of 
Bengali settlement, forest extension, and militarization. The details need not to be repeated here, 
but the example of Barkal Upazila suffices to make the point. Population statistics and forest 
plantation records indicate that unlike the other Upazilas, Barkal had only a small number of 
Bengali settlements and was saved entirely from forest extension; this partly explains the 
predominance of VCFs in the Upazila compared with the other Upazilas (ADB 2001b: Annex 3; 
CHT South Forest Division n. d.).  
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Table 6.1: VCFs by Upazila (Sub-district) and the Year of Preservation 
 
Year Upazilas (Sub-district) Total 
 Rangamati Naniarchar Langadu Barkal Dhighinala  
1936-1940 Nil Nil 1 Nil Nil 1 
1941-1945 Nil Nil Nil Nil 1 1 
1946-1950 Nil Nil 1 1 Nil 2 
1951-1955 Nil 1 Nil Nil Nil 1 
1956-1960 Nil 1 Nil 5 Nil 6 
1961-1965 1 2 2 27 Nil 32 
1966-1970 3 5 1 9 1 19 
1971-1975 1 Nil Nil 2 Nil 3 
1976-1980 Nil Nil Nil Nil 1 1 
1981-1985 Nil Nil 1 Nil 1 2 
1986-1990 Nil Nil 2 1 Nil 3 
1991-1995 Nil Nil 2 Nil 1 3 
1996-2000 Nil Nil 5 1 Nil 6 
2001-2005 Nil Nil 3  Nil 3 
Year 
Undocumented 
1 1 2 1 Nil 5 
Total 6 10 20 47 5 88 
Data: Taungya files examined in June and July of 2008.  
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Nevertheless, to check the reality and materiality of VCFs in practice on the ground, a 
research assistant visited the Beganachari VCF community in Barkal Upazila with Taungya’s 
staff members (I could not go in person as I was sick with fever). The Beganachari VCF is the 
best known VCF as it has been showcased by Taungya on many occasions, including the 
documentary. During the two-day visit in Beganachari village, the research assistant also met 
some villagers of the Nabhangya VCF community in Beganachari who came there to join the 
“indigenous sports” organized by Taungya. The research assistant formally interviewed four men 
and two women representing both Beganachari and Nabhangya villages; both villages were 
inhabited by a single ethnic community, the Chakma. Interestingly, he also found that the 
Beganachari VCF has only partly existed for the last three decades and that the Nabhangya VCF 
was only created in 2002 as a result of Taungya’s campaign, “Saving the Village Common 
Forest.” Kumar Chakma, a member of the Nabhangya VCF community, told the research 
assistant:   
In 2002 when Taungya came to Benganachari, I was visiting relatives here, I asked the 
members of Taungya what our village had to do to have a service bon, and how many 
villagers had to agree. Taungya said there was no limit of villagers. I went back to 
Nabhangya, and called other villagers to talk about Taungya’s project. We found a 
taroom (jungle) in a common Mouza land (USF) in the area of our village. We called all 
villagers who would want to join the management of the taroom. Not all were interested, 
but fourteen families, and then with the help of Taungya we made it a new service bon.  
 
However, the above statement is not meant to undermine the existence of VCF for some times, 
but rather to point to the effect of Taungya’s VCF campaign as seen in the Table 6.1 that shows 
that as many as three VCFs were created between 2001 and 2005. The Table further shows that 
more than one third of the 88 VCFs that were surveyed by Taungya came into their existence 
from 1961 to 1965 and about a quarter of them between 1966 and 1970. Both the timing and the 
location of the appearance of these VCFs are of critical significance; the appearances of these 
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VCFs coincide with the aftermath of Kaptai dam, and they are all located in the areas which are 
in part submerged by the Kaptai dam (see Appendix A: Map 7).    
Nevertheless, the most difficult question in my inquiry on VCF origins was whether or 
not the state regulation of VCFs has some basis in previously existing indigenous customs of the 
hill peoples. As Hall (1990) reminds us, cultural practices (broadly defined) always come from 
something; they always have their own history: “like everything which is historical, they undergo 
constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are 
subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power” (Hall 1990: 225). 135 In my 
conversations with Raja Roy, the Chakma chief boldly defended Taungya’s claim of indigenous 
invention of VCFs; he further argued that the laws regarding VCFs and the Deputy 
Commissioner’s Order do not undermine the claim:  
I would not deny that the laws existed and they still are in effect. But there is no single 
evidence of any government initiative regarding VCFs or to make VCFs an effective 
institution of forest conservation. Instead, since the Pakistan period and more so during 
Bangladesh, thousands of acres of common Mouza lands (USFs) have been taken away 
for forest plantation programs of the Forest Department, Bengali settlement, and other 
purposes of the government. It is us, I mean our rural communities, who have kept these 
VCFs as it is a traditional practice. Now suppose, if our communities did not keep VCFs, 
how then have they come to exist? If you think they knew the laws and followed them, it 
is up to you to believe it but I cannot agree with you. I think it would be a more 
appropriate question, if the rural VCF communities do know the laws regarding VCFs. In 
fact, many Bengali academics or lawyers do not understand, or perhaps, do not want to 
understand the Regulation of 1900, the laws of Chittagong Hill Tracts.  In the context of 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts, laws followed customs and traditions, and not the other way 
round.
136
  
 
I think the Chakma Chief’s argument about the laws and customs is not merely provocative but 
also holds some merit because of the Regulation of 1900 in general and the entire edifice of the 
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 In fact, Hall refers to cultural identity, but I see his point as equally valid with respect to cultural practices 
(compare Li 2000: 152)   
136
 As I found out after my conversation with Roy, the argument is not new. Since his very first published article, the 
argument has reappeared frequently (Roy, D. 1994; 2002).       
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traditional administration in CHT in particular (see Chapter II). This is not surprising if one 
follows Henry Maine’s theory of the origin of laws which holds that in modern societies many 
laws are originated in customs and traditions (Maine 1861). As a matter of fact, my interviews 
with the Murucha forest villagers as well as with the Tripura community of Golden River 
suggested that both communities had the tradition of “community forests.” The forests were 
generally kept near settlement areas for immediate needs of bamboo and other forest products. 
However, as the communities moved out for new settlements after some time, the forests were 
cut down and burned for jhum cultivation.   
In sum, I conclude that the origins of the VCFs among hill peoples cannot be attributed to 
the sovereign will of indigenous elders. Rather, VCFs are an invention of state policy discourses 
of jhum control. Nevertheless, it may have some basis in indigenous customs of some hill 
peoples’ groups. However, the prevalence of VCFs among the Chakma in specific locales is due 
to the strategic positioning of the localities from the standpoint of the insurgency movement and 
counter-insurgency development.  
 
6.4  The Pilot VCF Project: A New Discourse of Political Forests 
The pilot project was a two-year project that began in 2003.  The key concept that informed the 
project’s rationales, objectives, programs and agenda is the “protection” of VCFs and their bio-
diversity. The project plan argues that:  
Given the fast pace of deforestation in Bangladesh, and especially in CHT, the protection 
and preservation of VCFs is crucial for the livelihood, environment, and cultural and 
religious needs of VCF communities. VCFs meet the demands of timber and bamboo 
needs of VCF dependent communities, they are repositories of food, biodiversity and 
indigenous medicinal herbs and plants, and are related to religious and cultural 
ceremonies of many indigenous peoples. Likewise, the management of VCFs provides an 
important role to rural communities in environmentally sound watershed management, 
which is extremely necessary to combat deforestation, harmful monoculture plantation, 
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environmental degradation and resource scarcity. Thus, better protected VCFs would  in 
turn lead to: (i) maintenance of forest cover;( ii) maintenance of biodiversity; protection 
of headwater streams; (iii) maintenance of herbaria; and (iv) preservation of cultural and 
religious tradition of indigenous communities related to forests (Taungya 2002:13-14). 
 
The project plan to protect the VCF was predicated on analyses of a number of 
interrelated social, political and environmental problems in CHT and on recommendations 
published in the article, “Valuing ‘Village Commons’ in Forestry: A Case from the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts” (Roy and Halim 2001). The Chakma chief, Raja Roy, co-authored the article with 
Dr. Sadeka Halim, a Bengali academic turned indigenous activist. The authors describe what 
they regard as the major challenges to the VCFs. The first challenge, they argue, is the trend of 
deforestation in the country, especially in the CHT. The authors maintain that deforestation in the 
CHT is an historical phenomenon caused by state forest and land policies that began with the 
British and have resulted in alienation of the hill peoples. The situation was exacerbated by 
industrial development in the 1960s and population growth in the region resulting from state 
sponsored and voluntary Bengali settlement during the 1970s and 1980s. The second and 
important challenge is the absence of land tenure in the VCFs. As VCFs are formed from parts of 
USF land (that have not been alienated from hill peoples by market or state), the state only 
recognizes usufruct rights of the communities over the VCFs land, retaining ownership and 
control for the state. Thus, legal access to the VCF lands remains wide–open for state acquisition 
or market forces dominated by Bengali businesses and individuals as well as affluent urban 
members of indigenous communities. Roy and Halim (2001) further argue that the absence of 
land tenure over VCFs has had a severe impact on the remaining VCFs and requires protection 
not only from external processes of state, market and Bengali business, but also from indigenous 
affluent and urban members of hill peoples’ communities. They conclude that “indigenous forest 
management perspectives on [forest land tenure] have differed radically from the conventional 
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industrial-capitalist concepts influenced by colonial legislative regimes . . . [and] need to be 
accounted for and acknowledged to ensure sustainability of the VCFs” (Roy and Halim 
2001:28). Nevertheless, they concede that various regimes of local customary management also 
present a major problem for the sustainability of the VCFs as they are mostly governed by 
Mouza headmen or Karbaris (village headmen), lacking uniform rules or any rule, depending on 
the particular power relations between VCF communities and the traditional elites (Roy and 
Halim 2001). In general, they suggest four measures as ways toward “a meaningful dialogue” 
among the state, NGOs, and indigenous leadership for the protection of VCFs and indigenous 
rights in CHT:  
(i) to recorded (sic) the VCFs as the joint and common property of the concerned 
VCF communities; 
 
(ii) to redistribute state-appropriated common forest lands to indigenous communities 
conditional upon their sustainable use as forests; 
 
(iii) to involve the indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities in the 
joint management of state-managed forests and to share the resources of such 
forests in an equitable and practical manner; and   
 
(iv) to recognize the indigenous knowledge, innovation and practices related to 
forestry and environment protection and utilise them with prior and informed 
consent of the peoples and communities concerned (Roy and Halim, 2001: 30). 
 
These recommendations inform Taungya’s political agendas with respect to land and forest.  
Taungya’s pilot project turns these recommendations into a technical problem of “protection and 
preservation” of the VCFs. In so doing, the pilot project took the local VCFs communities as its 
primary targets of intervention where it could maximize the effects of achieving its goals, and the 
state and its bureaucracy were secondary targets for liaison and advocacy for collective rights 
over the VCF land. Figure 1 and Figure 2 reproduced here from the appendix of the pilot project 
plan clearly demonstrate these priorities and illustrate a local practice of development 
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planning.
137
 The pilot project selected twelve VCFs covering three Upazilas (sub districts) of 
Rangamati district, namely Barkal, Langadu, and Rangamati Sadar. At the community level, the 
project planner proposed a policy of “limited intervention” in the spirit of a “bottom up” 
approach to community development and the plan had two main programs: a) reforming the 
existing unstructured or semi-structured local management of VCFs, and b) raising community 
awareness about VCFs in relation to biodiversity, environment, and watershed protection. 
Additionally, three VCFs including the Beganachari VCF received small grants for elementary 
education, safe drinking water, sports items and sanitation programs. 
Several ideologies and development agendas informed the pilot project’s programs, 
including (but not limited to) participation by women in the management of the VCFs, equitable 
distribution of the VCFs resources, sustainable management of the VCFs, and good governance 
of local communities. These agendas met the donor policy expectations, which are aligned with 
the contemporary neoliberal discourse of community and environmental development. What is 
new, however, is the way that Taungya translated the discourse of community and environmental 
development to shape the practice of management of common property forest management on 
the ground. Under the reform program, eleven VCFs were brought under a management 
committee with one third of women participants elected by the respective VCF villagers for a 
two-year period; the community of Noapara VCF, facing a shortage of cultivable lands, had to 
open its VCF area for jhum cultivation and opted out of the project. The committee was given 
sole responsibilities for: i) safeguarding the VCF land and resources from jhum cultivation, fire, 
hunting and thieves; ii) regulating the community use of VCF through a policy of equal access to 
all villagers; iii) determining the harvesting  period of bamboo on a sustainable basis, and the 
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 Some words and phrases are partly edited for clarity in both figures’ presentation 
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sale of the harvest; and iv) distribution of income from the VCFs. Accordingly, each of the VCF 
communities set new rules for community members’ usage and access rights over VCF 
resources, including the harvesting schedule, sale of VCFs, and distribution of the income from 
VCFs. In the Beganachari VCF, the following are the provisional rules agreed by the villagers: 
i. Every household of the village community should join the VCF community paying Tk. 
5.00 every month to be considered a member of the VCF;  
ii. No person other than the member’s household will be allowed to access rights over the 
VCF land and forest produce;  
iii. The member household will be allowed to collect fuel, fodder and vegetables other than 
bamboo roots from the VCF, but hunting, trapping and any form of cultivation will be 
prohibited;  
iv. Each member household that needs bamboo for personal use or household repairs should 
purchase bamboo for Tk. 3.00 each by the permission of the committee; 
v.  Harvesting and sales period for bamboo will be 5 years, timber trees will be preserved; 
and, 
vi.  In the case of a newcomer to the village community, she/he cannot be a member of the 
VCF community; if she/he resides in the village for a minimum of two years and is 
willing to live in the village permanently, the committee will decide his/her membership 
if she/he wishes to join the VCF community.   
 
The rules of Beganachari appear to be typical of the way that VCFs are re-organized as the 
collective property of resource users or what can be called a form of “community forestry.” From 
my reading of the pilot project’s files and reports, I gather that the rules do not vary greatly from 
one VCF to another; the differences are only in the amount of membership fees and the prices of 
bamboo for community usage. In some cases, however, there are no strict restrictions on 
occasional hunting, as only a few individuals still practice hunting in the communities.
138
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 I gathered this information about hunting from Taungya’s VCF files and village-level meeting resolutions. 
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Figure 6.1: Logical Framework of the [VCF Pilot] Project 
 
Goals/Expected 
outcome 
Inputs Means of 
Verification 
Assumptions 
Goal -1 
To Preserve 
and Protect the 
Village 
Common Forest 
 Database 
 Research 
 Skill Training 
 Advocacy and 
Liaison 
(a) Land Tenure 
(b) Sales of VCFs 
Forest Produce 
(c) Welfare 
Extension 
Service 
 
 FGD 
Analysis 
 KID 
analysis 
 Review 
Reports 
 Monitoring 
Reports 
 Evaluation 
 Consent of VCF 
Community 
 Legal Sanction 
Goal -2 
Strengthening 
Organizational 
and Livelihood 
Security of 
VCF 
Communities   
 Training Workshop 
 Experience sharing 
 Water and 
sanitation 
 Income Generating 
Assistance 
 Education 
 Advocacy and 
Liaison 
 Review 
Reports 
 Monitoring 
Reports 
 Evaluation 
 Consent of VCF 
Community 
 Absorption 
Capacity of VCF 
Community 
 Existing and 
Potential 
Leadership skill 
Goal- 3 
Awareness 
Raising on 
Sustainable 
Watershed  
Management 
 Education 
 Advocacy and 
Liaison on 
(a) Environment 
(b) Biodiversity 
(c) Sustainable 
Resource 
Management 
Techniques  
 
  Absorption 
Capacity of VCF 
Community 
 Cooperation of 
Rural 
Communities 
 
253 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Liaison and Advocacy Network of VCF Communities 
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Over the project period, the members of the management committees were brought to Rangamati 
to join a series of workshops and seminars designed to address the question of indigenous land 
rights and forests, which opened up an opportunity for the VCF communities to meet and speak 
directly to state functionaries, headmen, and indigenous activists. Meanwhile, the communities 
were visited by Taungya’s members for similar kinds of training and community meeting. The 
assumption that underlies the action of Community Organizers and the training of members of 
the VCF committees and communities is that hill people villagers need to be reminded of their 
customs and traditions because these have been either lost or increasingly ignored due to the 
insurgency and war as well as resulting economic, political and social crises. There was also a 
hope that the training would make the functionaries and resource users in VCF village 
communities into collective environmental subjects who would plan, reach consensus, and think 
of the village population in their relation to the natural resources to be managed. Further, these 
actions created a new network of VCF communities, the Chittagong Hill Tracts Association of 
Mouza Reserve, to coordinate these VCF communities at the regional level of CHT for legal and 
political recognition of VCFs as the collective property of village communities.  
In sum, the pilot project brought about a new form of commercial community forestry in 
CHT through mobilization of a large group of men and women of the hill peoples in the project 
villages into corporate bodies of resource users. In turn, the project has begun a new process of 
the making of political forests in CHT that risks not only the exclusion of the hill peoples’ access 
to forest resources in Mouzas but also risks the racialization of forest resources.
139
 Given that all 
eleven VCF communities that were part of the pilot project are mainly remote communities of 
jhum cultivating peasants, the important questions are what these changes have meant for hill 
                                                          
139
 By the term racialization, I mean the process of ethnicization of resources by an ethnic group, resulting in the 
exclusion of other ethnic groups (see Vandergeest 2003 for further explication of racialization of resources).  
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peoples’ customary rights to jhum land and how the project communities responded. To explore 
these questions and the implications of the VCF movement, I turn to the next section. 
 
6.5  Implications of VCF   
Though it is too early to comprehensively evaluate Taungya’s intervention in VCFs, the 
articulation of indigeneity and forest conservation raises a serious concern about the possible 
effect of VCFs on hill peoples in general and jhum cultivation in particular. Certainly, there has 
been increased interest in VCFs. In 2008, a VCF community of Taungya’s pilot project received 
the Prime Minister Award for an outstanding forest conservation effort. Currently, in addition to 
Taungya, a number of national and international NGOs are running VCF projects for biodiversity 
conservation and rural development in CHT.
140
 Though the plans, projects and programs of these 
national and international interventions were beyond the scope of my research, these new 
interventions seem to have not only appropriated but also exacerbated Taungya’s problematic 
popular narratives of VCFs.  For example, Friends of the Earth International’s webpage on its 
VCF projects reads:  
Village Common Forest (VCF) is an ancient system of forest use and management 
practiced by tribal communities living in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in South-east of 
Bangladesh. The communities are highly dependent on the forests in the remaining 
VCFs, which provide wood and bamboos for constructing houses, and are an abundant 
source of food and medicine (Friends of the Earth International n. d.).  
 
Notice that there is now a suggestion that VCF is an “ancient” practice and that the hill peoples 
are “highly dependent” on it, when in fact VCF does not exist in most rural communities of 
CHT. Importantly, there is evidence that there exist long-drawn-out conflicts over VCF land, 
including conflicts between conservation and jhum cultivation in all the project villages. The 
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 These NGOs are Proshikha, the Arannayk Foundation, and Friends of the Earth International. 
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evidence also points to the fact that the pilot project has not only further exacerbated such 
conflicts; it also appears to have coerced hill people into giving up their common land and at 
times private land for the expansion of VCFs. For example, let us consider the following local 
stories of three VCFs of the pilot project that I have constructed from the final report of the pilot 
project and the office reports of the Community Organizers.  
The first is the Duluchari VCF. This VCF is one of the primary project areas of the pilot 
project. The community of Duluchari VCF consists of a village with 74 households, mainly jhum 
cultivating peasant families, and a Buddhist monastery. The land of the VCF was reported to be 
between 120 and 500 acres in different office reports of Taungya. The final report of the pilot 
project put the land area at about 200 acres at the outset; however, in describing details about the 
current management of VCF the report contradicted itself, saying that the size of the VCF was 
approximately 120 acres. Most interestingly, it further suggests that the land area was initially 
“half of the present size” of 120 acres and that the additional land came in 1991 from the 
villagers’ donation of their privately-owned registered and unregistered land to the Buddhist 
Monastery in the village, which is part of the VCF.  
Secondly, the Madyachar VCF, another primary project area of the pilot project. The 
VCF, according to the final report, was established in 1956 and was about 200 acres. In 2003, 
when it came under the project, the land area was 100 acres and was claimed by nine villages of 
about 500 households. The reports of the Community Mobilizers suggest that the land area of the 
VCF grew to 500 acres in 2004 after the jhum harvest of that year. The major problems of the 
management of the VCF, as noted in the final report, were: a) no clear demarcation of the 
boundary; b) conflicts about the number of villages having claims over the VCF; c) conflicts 
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over jhum land and VCF land; d) conflicts over claims to private land in VCF; and e) fire from 
jhum.  
 Finally, the Bagchari VCF. This VCF was reported to have been formed jointly by 
Bagchari and Rangdakaba villages in 1965. In 2001, Rangdakaba villagers wanted the VCF for 
jhum cultivation but Bagchari villagers denied them. Thus, the VCF was divided between the 
villages, and Rangdakaba villagers did jhum on their part. In 2003, when the villagers of 
Bagchari joined the pilot project, they formally complained to the Chakma chief against the local 
headmen for giving Rangdakaba more than the half of their share in the VCF. The intervention 
of the Chakma chief helped Bagchari villagers to recover their share of the land. Interestingly, 
the Bagchari community also expressed their desire to increase their area of the VCF because 
they claimed Rangdakaba had formed a new VCF that was bigger in area than Bagchari’s. 
These stories no doubt are partial; however, they provide anecdotal evidence of the 
possible risk of VCFs on jhum cultivation in the project area. Clearly, the VCFs under the pilot 
project shrunk the existing jhum land even if they did not completely eliminate jhum cultivation 
in the project area. The extent to which this has affected the livelihood of the project 
communities, I cannot ascertain; however, the VCF rules against jhum cultivation, with fines in 
all the project communities, imply that there is high demand for jhum land in all project 
communities. It is also likely that recent interest in conservation of VCF among the Chakma is a 
sign of Chakmas’ increased dependence on other sources of income than jhum cultivation. 
Whatever the case may be, conservation of VCF is clearly an irony for the overall indigenous 
movement of the hill peoples. First of all, if the VCF movement becomes successful, it will 
further marginalize the remaining jhum land or jhum cultivation, something the state has tried 
and failed to do so since the British. The loss of jhum cultivation would mean the loss of the 
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rural way life of the hill peoples, and for some hill peoples it would certainly cause poverty or 
the loss of entitlement to livelihood security, particularly marginal jhum cultivating peasants 
among the Chakma. Significantly, there are hardly enough USF common lands for the entire 
rural hill peoples groups to have VCFs of their own. Given that VCFs exist mainly among the 
Chakma villages in the Chakma chief’s territory, the problem is clearly the conceptual 
justification of indigenous identity of the hill peoples which the VCFs try to articulate in the first 
place. In sum, the practice of VCF risks not only class differentiation among the project 
communities in terms of their access to USF common and VCF resources, but also a new 
indigenous identity. 
 
6.6  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explored the particular indigenous movement of the hill peoples led by 
Chakma elites, and their support for the conservation of the VCF in terms of cultural 
understandings of indigenous identities, forest, and customary practices of forest management in 
CHT. I have shown that notwithstanding the claim that VCF is an indigenous tradition, VCFs are 
not only a recent invention of the state; they also mostly exist in Chakma villages in the territory 
of the Chakma chief and have largely been shaped by the insurgency as well as 
counterinsurgency development. I also demonstrate that hill peoples’ interest in conservation of 
VCF arises in part as a means to re-claim customary land rights and has several political and 
development agendas, including the reform of traditional management of VCF in favour of 
decentralization of power and gender equity.  
However, in spite of the differences in the degree of control and the nature of 
punishment, there are striking similarities between the VCF rules and the Forest Department’s 
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social forestry program in terms of criminalization and disciplining of jhum cultivation and 
access to forest resources. In sum, I argue that conservation of VCF presents a greater risk not 
only to the rural communities of CHT but also to the indigenous movements of the hill peoples.  
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CHAPTER VII 
Conclusion 
 
 For Bangladesh, the legitimacy to govern [the Chittagong Hill Tracts] is not a 
question because CHT has been a part of Bangladesh since its birth, a part of 
Pakistan from its birth and even before.  
   —Major General (Retired) M. Ibrahim (1991). 
  
 
This dissertation has set out to examine and understand forests and forest relations in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), one of the most forested regions in Bangladesh. My interest in the 
forests of CHT was stimulated by the insurgency and war that took place in CHT between 1975 
and 1997 as well as by the counter-insurgency development strategy of forest plantation and 
resettlement programs of the 1980s and 1990s. At the time I started my research, I understood 
that forests and forest relations were fundamental not only to the state and society in CHT but 
also to the political and ethnic conflicts in this region. Although there had been an increased 
interest in the issue of the insurgency movement and ethnic conflicts in CHT since the mid 1980s 
(Schendel et al. 2000), there remained a clear gap of research on the political ecology of forests 
in relation to the insurgency, war and ethnic conflict. My dissertation addresses this gap.              
Central to this dissertation are two theoretical assumptions that I have built on Foucault’s 
ideas of discourse, power and knowledge and also Vandergeest and Peluso’s theory of 
territorialization and political forests (Foucault 1991; Sivaramakrishnan 1999; Vandergeest and 
Peluso 1995; 2001). The first assumption is that discourses of forests are central for the 
intelligibility as well as materiality of forests and forest relations. The second assumption is that 
a forest, as a category, idea or a matter, is a political phenomenon; therefore, forest relations are 
not only social and ecological relations; they are at the same time political relations of power.  
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The overall concern of this dissertation has been to examine the effects of discourses of 
forests on hill peoples’ society, life and livelihoods; in particular, how these discourses have 
constituted forests and forest relations in the social and ecological context of CHT and how they 
have changed hill peoples’ agrarian relations and relations of power. Broadly, the chapters of this 
dissertation have been organized around the political regimes of Britain, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh, and then around social movements in CHT, in a historical sequence that represents 
the origins and changes in discourses of forests in CHT. Each chapter has represented a specific 
conjuncture of state formation, ruling class elites, and development discourse in South Asia as 
well as CHT. Less significantly, the chapters also relate to specific ethnographic field sites of my 
fieldwork in CHT.  
As such, this dissertation is neither about the state in CHT nor about the history of the hill 
peoples or the forests per se. Instead, it offers a genealogical account of forests and participatory 
or social forestry of CHT and the ways that these discourses have constituted forest and agrarian 
relations as well as relations of power from the time of British rule to the present. Genealogy, as 
a specific form of “history” or what Foucault called “history of the present”, has several 
advantages. It helps the analysis of ideas, events or discourses by focusing on “their most unique 
characteristics, their most acute manifestations” rather than attempting to describe a continuous 
history or an analysis of causes and effects (Foucault, 1984:88). Significantly, genealogy helps 
us to analyse ideas, events or discourses not only in terms of how they emerge in particular 
moments or conjunctures, but also in terms of how they change or get articulated differently 
while they shape and are shaped by different fields of forces in each specific conjuncture.   
In Chapter One, I began with an account of ethnographic encounters in my field sites, 
while situating the contexts and themes of this study. These descriptions followed a theoretical 
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exploration of discourses of political ecology, examining the relationships among discourses, 
state, and power. The chapter also described my fieldwork methodology and ethics, ending with 
an overview and summaries of the chapters to follow.   
My exploration of discourses of forests began in Chapter Two, dealing with the 
conjuncture of colonialism and British rule in CHT. In this chapter, I tracked the events and 
discourses leading to the making of political forests and the institutionalization of colonial 
forestry in CHT in the late nineteenth century. Key events that led to the making of forests in 
CHT of colonial Bengal were the Forest Act of 1865 and the subsequent Bengal Forest rule of 
1871. The Act not only legitimized the discourse of sovereign claims and rights over forest 
resources in British India but also formalized forest administration across British India; in effect, 
the Act extended the colonial state’s rights not only to life and things such as trees, jungle, bush 
and animals, but also to the land and territory which had previously been either frontier or of 
marginal interest to the state. The making of forests in CHT involved several processes, 
particularly jhum revenue settlement, internal territorialization of civil administration, and 
territorialized control of forests, and was also associated with discourses on customary rights of 
hill peoples. These processes resulted in two different categories of forest which together 
comprised the entire land area of CHT: one category was Reserved Forests (RF) based on the 
absolute state property regime and territorial control under the Department of Forest; the other 
was Unclassed State Forests (USF) under the civil administration of the Deputy Commissioner.  
For the most part, the USF remained as forest commons of hill peoples for jhum cultivation as 
well as for their domestic needs of bamboo, fuel or timber. This juxtaposition of forests and jhum 
in the USF emerged through conflict and compromise between civil and forest officials, partly as 
a mechanism of control of the Reserved Forests. The result has been that the hill peoples were 
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denied private ownership of land, with only user rights, and this was the seed of the land 
conflicts which emerged during post colonial states.  
In Chapters Three and Four, I examined changes in territorial control of forests as well as 
agrarian relations in CHT, in the context of the postcolonial states of Pakistan and Bangladesh 
respectively. In Chapter Three, I explored industrial development and its uneven effects on 
forests, landscapes, and hill peoples. Here I also recounted the industrial displacement, 
dispossession and resettlement of hill peoples, particularly the Chakma. In Chapter Four, I dealt 
with counterinsurgency developments and the expansion of Reserved Forests in USF, relating 
these to the discourse of “optimum land use” that emerged as part of industrial development. 
This chapter further gave details about the spatial and ecological contexts of the insurgency 
movement, explaining the ethnic dimension of the insurgency in general, and Chakma 
predominance in the movement in particular.  
In Chapter Five, I examined counter-insurgency effects on Reserved Forests and the 
contemporary strategy of political forests that went under the label of the social forestry program 
for maintaining the territorial control of the Reserved Forests. In particular, I examined social 
and ecological changes in Matamuhuri Reserve; I paid particular attention to deforestation 
processes in Matamuhuri Reserve, providing ethnographic arguments for deforestation’s links to 
scientific forestry and counterinsurgency. Significantly, this chapter further illustrated how the 
new social forestry program differed from the practice of the forest villager system, one of the 
earliest forms of participatory forestry that had existed in CHT until recently.   
Finally, in Chapter Six, I focused on an indigenous movement of hill peoples and the 
movement’s strategy of protecting village common forests (VFCs) for alternative development. 
The chapter gave evidence of how discourses of indigenous identity are now articulated by 
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indigenous elites of hill peoples to assert customary control over land and forests, and how 
indigenous discourses have promoted the invention and expansion of political forests, resulting 
in social exclusions, conflicts and corporatization of forest resources. Given the existence of 
VCFs only among the communities of the Chakma, I have also noted the issue of how one ethnic 
group seems to be redefining hill peoples’ indigeneity itself.  
Throughout the chapters, there ran several underlying themes: opposition to jhum 
cultivation; development; and social forestry. Although these themes overlapped with each other, 
they took distinct forms in relation to the discourse of political forests at each conjuncture of a 
particular historical development. For example, as seen in Chapter Two, at the birth of political 
forests in the late nineteenth century during British rule in CHT, the opposition to jhum 
cultivation was one of the main rationalities for territorial control of forest reservation and for the 
associated state property regime of forest resources. In turn, on the one hand, there was a 
concerted development effort by the British to introduce plough cultivation among hill peoples 
on USF land; on the other hand, there was an invention of taungya forestry and forest villagers 
system for the improvement of plantation in the Reserved Forests. I have argued that 
notwithstanding its limitations, the practice of taungya forestry was one of the earliest forms of 
participatory forestry and had existed in CHT until recently as part of scientific forestry and the 
control of the Reserved Forests.  Similarly, in Chapters Three and Four, I have shown that 
industrialization and counterinsurgency introduced a new regime of development in CHT based 
on resettlement of jhum cultivators with horticulture cultivation. This approach to horticulture 
began as an experiment with a new form of territorial control of political forests and social 
forestry during Pakistan rule. However, it became a dominant model of development and social 
forestry during the insurgency as part of counterinsurgency efforts; these efforts forcedly 
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resettled insurgents and the insurgency supporters as forest labourers, while expanding territorial 
control of political forests in USF at the expense of alienating a million acres of common jhum 
land from hill peoples. As shown in Chapter Five, resettlement of jhum cultivators with 
horticulture cultivation remained one of the fundamental rationalities of development in CHT, 
including the contemporary discourse of social forestry, though it differed in terms of structures 
and programs. Ironically, the indigenous model of alternative development and social forestry 
showed striking similarities with the state model of social forestry in terms of the opposition to 
jhum cultivation.  
Another underlying theme of this dissertation is environmental change in CHT. 
Notwithstanding colonial and contemporary discourses of jhum cultivation that frame it as an 
environmentally destructive practice, environmental changes in CHT have been mainly rooted in 
the policies and practices of forest resource extraction and development by the state. For 
example, since British rule, the forests in USF (representing three-fourths of the land area of 
CHT) have been under the civil administration, and the Deputy Commissioner(s) as well as the 
chiefs and headmen of traditional administrations hold authority over the extraction of forest 
resources from the USF through a system of permits; however, the extraction of forest resources 
from the USF has rarely been regulated in practice. In fact, during British rule, the unregulated 
extraction of forest resources from the USF was seen as effective control of the Reserved Forests 
(see Chapter II). As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, critical forces behind environmental 
change in the USF were industrialization (particularly the Kaptai hydro-electric power plant) and 
later counterinsurgency strategies of Bengali settlement and industrial land settlement with 
Bengali businesses. Against the narrow criticism of jhum cultivation, I have suggested a complex 
pattern of environmental changes in the Reserved Forests of CHT. The case of Matamuhuri 
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Reserved Forest (in Chapter Five) reveals that a major factor of environmental change in the 
Reserved Forests was the practice of forest plantation. As part of scientific forestry and the 
working plan regime, forest plantation involved transformation of heterogeneous forest species 
with selected industrial timber species and was carried out by taungya forestry. However, key 
forces of environmental change in the Reserved Forests were encroachment on the Reserves by 
the hill peoples’ communities and by the military as part of counterinsurgency. I have suggested 
that the militarization of Matamuhuri Reserve was of critical importance for the introduction of 
social forestry in the Reserve, associated with exotic species and uses of fertilizers.             
In addition, this dissertation has addressed broader questions of the ethics of 
environmental development and political power. In particular, I share with Peter Penz the 
concerns about environmental justice and continued dispossession and marginalization of hill 
peoples through development. Penz, a leading scholar of environmental ethics, interprets 
environmental justice in terms of human rights to lands and to the environment; he offers an 
ethical analysis of development practices in CHT in terms of their declared objectives and 
rationales that make claims about environmental protection, poverty alleviation, national unity 
and so on. Penz argues that the policy rationales of development in CHT do not survive close 
scrutiny nor do they have moral or ethical justification, and thus he holds that hill peoples have 
the moral right to self-determination and secession (Penz 1993). Certainly, my own identity as a 
Bengali and a citizen of Bangladesh left me with a dilemma in terms of a moral analysis of hill 
peoples’ rights to “secede”; however, my research with the insurgency movement found that the 
political programs of the insurgency have never included statehood or secession but rather a 
“regional autonomy” and political recognition of the hill peoples as a “jumma nation” 
(Chowdhury 2002; also Chapter IV). Importantly, it is my contention that environmental 
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problems are not simply problems of ethics, identities or ideology but complex phenomena of 
political ecology and power (Li 2002); problems of environment exist across political societies 
and political economies (Harvey 1996). Pace Penz, as I have discussed in Chapter 1, the state is 
one locus of power and is more of a mythic abstraction of institutions than a unified actor in a 
society (Foucault 1991). Therefore, a more pertinent ethical question about environmental 
problems and the ethnic conflict in CHT is not about the state per se but about the power, forms 
of government, and arts of government, or what Foucault called governmental rationalities; that 
is, how to be governed, by whom, to what extent, and so on (Foucault 1991).  
In sum, I have suggested that the ethnic conflicts in CHT are rooted in the discourse of 
political forests which assume a contradiction between forests and jhum cultivation, resulting in 
the displacement and dispossession of hill peoples, particularly the Chakma; however, my 
discussion in this dissertation implies that the persistence of the conflict is primarily due to 
continued dispossession and marginalization of hill peoples through counter-insurgency 
development, especially “social forestry.” Although the scope of government institutions and 
governments in CHT has been greatly transformed by the counter-insurgency and most recently 
by the Peace Treaty, the land conflict is yet to be resolved; violence, therefore, in the form of 
murderous conflict between Bengalis and hill peoples, or between the factions of the JSS or hill 
peoples and security forces, has remained a signature feature of the everyday lives of the hill 
peoples.  
To conclude, let me return to the statement in the epigraph to this conclusion. The 
epigraph represents a key statement of state discourse and its rationality, that is, Bangladesh’s 
rights to govern the CHT is a sovereign right of the state and is based on its colonial inheritance 
of rights over CHT. However, this dissertation has clearly demonstrated that the Bangladesh 
268 
 
state and its institutions have never attempted to legitimate the rule of the state over hill peoples; 
nor has there been any intention, on the part of the state and its institutions, to govern the hill 
peoples’ population for their improvement or welfare.  
269 
 
Appendix A: Maps of Chittagong Hill Tracts  
 
 
 
Map 1: Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, in relation to South Asia and Southeast Asia (Source: 
Hutchinson 1909; Sopher 1963; BBS 1986). 
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Map 2: Reserved Forests, Districts, and Sub-district boundaries in CHT (Source: BBS 1986). 
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Map 3: Territories of Chiefs’ Circles (Source: BBS 1986). 
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Map 4: Distribution of Hill Peoples in CHT (Source: BBS 1992a; 1992b; 1992c). 
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Map 5: Forest Divisions of CHT with Old and New Reserved Forests  
(Source: Fieldwork Maps collected from Rangamati Forest Circle and cross-check with data collected 
from the Forest Divisions of CHT, but compare CHTDB n. d. b). 
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Map 6: Impact of Kaptai Dam (Source: Hutchinson 1909; Sopher 1963; BBS 1986). 
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Map 7: Sub-district with the Majority of VCFs (Source: GOBD 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 2002d). 
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Appendix B: Alternative Names of the Hill People Groups Used by the Groups Themselves  
 
 Chakma Marma Tripura Mro Tanchangya Chak Khyang Khumi Bawm Pankho Lushai 
Ckakma Chagma Mogh Tibiri Murang Tanchangya Chak Khyang Khumi Kuki Pankho Lushai 
Marma Chama Marma Murang Mro Doinynak Chak Khyang Khumi Bawm Pankho Lushai 
Tripura Chama Mukhuo Brung Mro Chakma Sak Khyang Khumi Bawm Pankho Lushai 
Mro Doinyak Maran Murun Murucha Tanchangya 
Doinynak 
Chag-
ma 
Khyang Khumi Bawm Pankho Langke 
Tanchangya Chama Marma Tripura Murung Tanchangya Chak Khyang Khumi Bawm Pankho Mizo 
Chak Chakma Mraing  Murung Doinynak Achak Khyang Khomui Langge Pankho Lushai 
Khyang Sak Uya Lun Mra Sak Chak Heyu Khumi Langy Pankho Lushai 
Khumi Chwa Kramo Mroing Lihu Chwa Chak Khyang Khumi Laiye Panko Lushai 
Bawm Chakma Mran Buey Murung Tanchangya Sak Kyang Khumi Bawm Pankho Mizo 
Pankho Chakma Mran Bhay Miriya Tangtangna Chak Khyang Khaileng Bawm Pankhua Lushai 
Lushai Akam Mran Tuikuk Mriya Takam Chak Khyang Khumi Bawmzo Pankhua Lushai 
Source: Fieldwork (collected mainly from rural communities of hill peoples’ groups; but compare ADB 2001b). 
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Appendix C: Population of Chittagong Hill Tracts, with Rural and Urban 
Distribution, by Census Years 
 
Table 1: Bengali and Hill People Population of the Chittagong Hill Tracts from 1872 to 2011   
Year Total  Bengali Hill Peoples 
1872 63,054 1%  99%  
1881 101,497 Nil Nil 
1891 107,286 Nil Nil 
1901 124,726 7% 93%  
1911 153,830 8%  92%  
1921 173,243 Nil Nil 
1931 212,922 11% 89%  
1941 247,253 6% 94% 
1951 287,688 9% 91% 
1961 385,079 13% 87% 
1974 508,199 19% 79% 
1981 745,000 39% 61% 
1991 974,445 49% 51% 
2001 133,1966 55% 45% 
2011 1,598,231 47% 53% 
Source: Adnana 2004: 57; Chakma, G. 2012:7-13; BBS n. d. a; n. d. b; n. d. c; 2007:25 and 167. 
Note: The 1872, 1901, 1974, 1981 and 1991 census figures are taken from Adnan (2004). The 
2001 and 2011 Census figures are reproduced from BBS (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics) 
sources cited above. The other census figures are from Chakma, G. (2012).   
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Table 2: Distribution of Rural and Urban Population of CHT by Ethnicity in 1991 and 2011 
 
Year/Ethnicity 1991 2011 
% Rural 
 
% Urban 
 
% of Total 
CHT 
Population  
% Rural 
 
% Urban 
 
% of Total 
CHT 
Population  
Bengali 52 48 49 57 43 47 
Hill Peoples 80 20 51 82 18 53 
(BBS n. d. a; n. d. b; n. d. c; 1992a: xi, 150; 1992b: xi, 102; 1992c: xi, 137) 
 
Table 3: Ethnic Composition of Rural and Urban CHT in 1991 and 2011 
 
Year/Locality 1991 2011 
% Bengali 
             
 
  
% Hill 
Peoples 
% of Total 
CHT 
Population  
% Bengali %  Hill 
Peoples 
% of Total 
CHT 
Population  
Rural 38 62 67 38 62 70 
Urban  69 31 33 68 32 30 
(BBS n. d. a; n. d. b; n. d. c; 1992a: xi, 150; 1992b: xi, 102; 1992c: xi, 137) 
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Appendix D: Forest Villagers Form  
(Reproduced from a torn-apart document found in Matamuhuri Forest Range Office) 
Bangladesh Form No: 1685 
Form of Agreement of Forest Jagir Villages 
Articles of agreement made and entered into this   22th    day of   August 1985 between the 
President of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh hereinafter referred to as the party of the first part and 
Chu Aung son of Mongchao here in after referred to as the party of the second part. 
 Whereas the party of the second part desire to render service in the Forest Department [illegible] 
lieu of the privilege of being granted for cultivation service land at  ............................................                          
in the part of Matamuhuri Reserve Forest situated in Alikadam Thana   in the Bandarban district   within 
the following boundaries: 
North ... ... ... ... ....... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .......... 
East... ... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ....  
South... ... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ....... 
West... ... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ....... 
 
I. The Party of the second part shall be allowed to cultivate land in the area specified above free of 
rent as service jagir only so [illegible] performs the duties and observes the conditions 
hereinafter prescribed.    
 
II. The land shall be held as service jagir and shall not be alienable and shall be liable to resumption. 
When the service of the guarantee or his successor shall no longer be required or when such a 
course is otherwise found necessary by the Forest Authorities, Government shall have the 
right to dispense with the services of the guarantee or of his successor and to resume the grant 
at any time it pleases. 
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III. The Party of the second part shall cultivate only such part or parts of his service jagir within the 
above specified area as the Forest Officer in charge of the Division hereafter termed the 
Forest Officer shall permit. 
IV. The Party of the second part himself with his dependents shall whenever called upon to do so by 
the Forest Officer perform such work or works as may be ordered by the Forest Officer to be 
done for the preservation, protection and improvement of the Government Reserved Forest to 
the following extent:- 
 
Up to [blank]              days` work without remuneration 
Up to [blank]               days` work for a daily wage of paisa  
 
Provided that  
i) The Party of the second part shall not be called on to perform Government work 
to the detriment of proper cultivation of the land referred to in clause III of this 
agreement. 
ii) a day of work shall mean 6 hours` work  
iii) in village [sic] which perform regeneration work the Forest Officer may fix the 
number of days work to be considered as equivalent to one acre of plantation 
created or tended. 
iv) The party of the second part shall not engage to work for any employer other 
than the Forest Department until his full amount of work his [sic] performed 
except with the permission of the Forest Officer. 
 
V. If the party of the second part becomes headman he will be assigned a large amount of land as his 
service jagir than his fellow tenants and shall be responsible for mustering them and seeing to 
their proper working. 
(For other than hill forests) 
VI. The party of the second part and his dependent will be permitted- 
a) To cut, collect [illegible] free of charge for their own use but not for sale, gift or 
[illegible] the parts of the Reserved Forest adjacent to the village site bamboos, 
creepers,   edible roots and fruits and fuels and poles not exceeding 3 feet in girth of 
all kinds of trees except those of classes A, B, C, D and E of the current schedule. 
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OR 
(For hill forests) 
To cut, collect and remove free of charge for their own use but not for sale, gift or 
barter from the part of the Reserved Forest adjacent to the village site bamboos, 
creepers,   edible roots and fruits and dead fallen wood  not exceeding 3 feet in girth 
for fuel. 
b) To obtain free of charge of [sic] their own use but not for sale, gift or barter permits 
for removal of marked trees of such of the above mentioned species as the Forest 
Officer may consider that they require for their buildings or for the manufacture of 
agricultural implements. 
c) To graze free of charge within the portion of the Reserved Forest adjacent to the 
village site such cattle as the Forest Officer may consider necessary for cultivation of 
their land. 
 
VII. The party of the second part and his dependents shall not be permitted to do any of the 
following acts:- 
(For other than hill forests) 
a) Cut, lop of damage in any way any tree growth other than that permitted under clause 
VI (a) above  
OR 
(For hill forests) 
Cut, lop or damage in any way any standing tree growth without the written permission 
of the Forest Officer  
(b)  Kindle or carry fire in part of the Reserved Forest  
(c)  Graze cattle in any part of the Reserved Forest [illegible] by order of the Forest 
Officer  
VIII In the event of the party of the second part and his dependents being ejected by the Forest 
Officer from the Village for breach of this agreement any buildings he or they may have 
erected within the village may be disposed of by the Forest Officer at his discretion 
within fifteen days’ of his or their ejectment and the person or persons shall not be entitle 
or receive [sic] any compensation on account of such disposal. 
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IX The party of the second part shall dismiss any dependent or servant whose presence is not 
approved and such dependent or servant shall leave the Reserved Forest forthwith. And, 
he shall not harbour on his premises any person who has been ordered to be removed 
from the location in the reserved forest. 
X The party of the second part hereby engages to report the commission on any forest 
offence to the Forest Officer-in-charge of the division and to make every [illegible] to put 
out any fire that may occur or approach the Reserved Forest without being specifically 
called upon to do so. 
XI The Forest Officer shall have power at any time to declare this agreement terminated if in 
his opinion the party of the second part fails to comply with all or any of the [illegible] 
clauses of this agreement and in the event of this agreement [illegible] thus declared 
terminated any standing crop shown by the party of the second part shall be disposed of 
by the Forest Officer for the benefit of the guarantee.   
XII In the event of any dispute arising between the Forest Officer and / or any part thereof or 
with reference to any matter [illegible] the party of the second part as to the construction 
[illegible] of relating thereto such dispute shall be refer to the Conservator of Forest, 
Bangladesh whose decision thereon shall be the final [illegible] between the said parties.  
XIII The cost of any stamp duty due in respect to this instrument shall be borne by 
Government. 
 
Signature or mark of the party of the second part 
Dated the 20
th
 day of _August   1985  
 
Signature of first witness 
 
Signature of second witness 
 
Signature of Divisional Forest Officer on behalf of the President of Peoples Republic of 
Bangladesh 
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Appendix E: A Copy of the Letter of Permission for Fieldwork in Lama 
Forest Division, Chittagong Hill Tracts with English Translation 
 
(English Translation) 
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh Government 
Forest Department  
Office of the Chief Conservator of Forest 
Bon Bhabon, Agargao, Sher-e-Bangla Nagar, Dhaka 1207 
Letter No. Dev. 11/Miscellaneous/2007 
 
To           
Divisional Forest Officer 
Lama Forest Division, Lama 
 
Subject: Regarding the Permission for PhD Research and Data Collection in the Forest Areas of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Reference:   the Application of Mr. Khairul Islam Chowdhury, Assistant Professor, Department of 
Sociology, Shah Jalal University of Science and Technology, Sylhet, dated on October 6, 2007. 
 
On the above subject and reference, this is to inform you that Mr. Khairul Islam Chowdhury, Assistant 
Professor, Department of Sociology, Shah Jalal University of Science and Technology, Sylhet, has been 
doing PhD research under the Department of Anthropology, York University, Toronto, Canada, on the 
Conservation Initiative and Livelihood Programs of the Forest Department, and has applied for the 
permission to visit the forests of Lama Forest Division for research work and data collection. On the topic 
concerned, he [Mr. Chowdhury] is given permission to visit the forests of Lama Forest Division for 
research work and data collection. Henceforth, he has been given permission to visit the forests in Lama 
Forest Division in order to collect data. Therefore, as instructed, you are requested to provide assistance 
during his visit.           S/d 
(Haradhan Bonik) 
Assistant Chief Conservator of Forests 
Development and Planning  
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Glossary 
 
Adda an informal public space used to hang out in a group, involving extended 
group conversation usually concerned with politics or other intellectual 
topics  
Ansar  a para-military organization of Village Guards in Bangladesh 
Boisuk  New Year’s celebration of the Tripura 
Capas Mahal cotton estate  
Challes  bamboo raft 
Dewan pre-colonial village headman among the Chakma 
Jhum slash-and- burn cultivation 
Joutha Khamar  collective farming 
Karbari  village headman 
Khas land  government land 
Khas Mehals  government estate 
Mouza collection of villages as a revenue unit 
Mro Bahini   a para-military organization of Village Guards in CHT (comprised of the 
Murucha)   
Muktijoddha  freedom fighters of Bangladesh’s Liberation War 
Nowabad  new cultivation 
Pahari  inhabitants of hills (hill peoples of the CHT) 
Panchayats  village councils 
Pattas land records 
Puja  worship of gods and goddesses  
Raja hill chief of Chittagong Hill Tracts 
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Rajdhani  capital city 
Razakars  a Bengali militia organization created by the Pakistani Occupying army in 
East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971   
Rowaza  pre-colonial village headman among the Marma 
Rupee  Pakistani currency 
Shanti Bahini  guerrilla organization of the JSS 
Shashan   place of cremation   
Taka Bangaldeshi currency 
Taluk pre-colonial and early colonial land revenue unit 
Taungya technique of forest plantation with jhum (slash-and burn) cultivation 
Thana police station 
Upazila sub-district 
Upojati  Bengali synonym for so-called “tribes”, meaning “sub-nation”  
Zamindar landlord with large land holdings 
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